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ABSTRACT 
The nonprofit world of the university has long segregated the 
approved public voices of the administrative class from the 
underground voices that carried a narrative about pathologies in the 
workings of power, an underground not suited to enter the realm of 
something public and serious. The no confidence vote has partially 
filled the gap in the management of approved internal voice, but 
certain traditions of secrecy have resisted exposure through 
unmanaged group challenge. Recent scandals at major universities 
 
 * Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. This 
Article is a companion to a long-term project on votes of no confidence. It contains 
some passages from the author’s forthcoming book (with co-author Sean McKinniss), 
Votes of No Confidence: Theory and Practice (in draft). An early draft of this Article 
was presented at “Amending America’s Unwritten Constitution” at Boston College 
School of Law for panel discussion with other papers (May 2019), and a fragment at 
the 2014 Law & Society conference in Minneapolis. I have thought about and talked 
about votes of no confidence with colleagues at the College of Law (and witnessed 
two). I owe special gratitude for encouragement, chastisement, and helpful comments 
to Texas writer James P. McCollom and Michigan novelist Lev Raphael as well as 
colleagues in the academy and law, to wit, Anita Bernstein, David Blankfein-
Tabachnick, Adam Candeub, June Carbone, Jeff Goodwin, Carmen V. Harris, Brian 
Kalt, Harry Lewis, Anne Lawton, Amy C. McCormick, Robert A. McCormick, Sean 
McKinniss, Cyril Moscow, the late Marc Poirier, Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Renée 
Steinhagen, Sheila Teahan, and Bert Westbrook as well as to many of my late 
colleagues who passed onto me in conversations their searing experience with a vote 
of no confidence in the Detroit College of Law and who thereby preserved, for me, a 
part of the institutional history of the MSU College of Law. It is no longer possible to 
list all the students with whom I have discussed the paper and from whose 
commentary I have benefitted but I am indebted to students beyond hopes of counting. 
I am grateful to persons who agreed to be interviewed, often anonymously for fear of 
reprisal, about their experience with votes of no confidence in their institutions and to 
the #MeToo movement for breaking silences that were too long shatter proof. The 
opportunities provided by my long career to witness the highs and lows of human 
behavior are also worth a note. Tyler Silvestri, a recent Michigan State University 
College of Law graduate, provided useful readings of a near complete draft of this 
Article. I am grateful to the editors of the Law Review for their care and diligence. I 
am responsible for any errors and for all flaws of exposition or clarity. 
412 Michigan State Law Review  2020 
have helped energize an examination of administrative practices 
designed to insulate the university from meanings revealed by persons 
subjected to the abuse of power. The #MeToo movement has recently 
burst forth into the university setting, powered by journalists and 
students bringing university secrets into public view. #MeToo reveals 
to the public accountability pathologies in nonprofit institutions that 
have been periodically, but only partially, addressed by votes of no 
confidence brought by faculty or other professionals. #MeToo has a 
primary goal that meshes with the purposes of the no confidence 
tradition of self-help, deployed by groups to expel bad leaders 
supported by an institutional hierarchy. Relief from an abusive or 
failed leader is the short-term goal in a vote of no confidence, but the 
uncovering and dissemination of social knowledge that has been 
successfully suppressed is an epistemological enterprise as well. The 
effect is to rescue private shared knowledge from dismissal by 
administrators and others possessing a voice deemed serious and 
public. The methods by which #MeToo and other disclosures about 
pathologies within the academic setting can be exposed are little 
analyzed or compared. This Article is a preliminary examination and 
evaluation of the techniques by which groups composed of faculty 
members, and to a lesser extent, students work to bring private 
knowledge into a public forum for immediate response and long-term 
reform. #MeToo presents an opportunity to compare methods for any 
group facing a problematic leader or other person the hierarchy will 
neither correct nor dismiss. The comparison addresses the 
comparative efficacy of expert group voice, student self-help, 
litigation, and investigative journalism in forcing leader exit as well 
as producing a long-term enhancement of social knowledge of the 
patterns of organizational dysfunction and abuse. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What do Benito Mussolini and Lawrence Summers have in 
common? You may be surprised to learn that the Prime Minister of 
Italy during World War II, informally known as, “Il Duce,” and the 
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President of Harvard University both suffered votes of no confidence.1 
Although the two men have virtually no similarities of either 
leadership or character, both were vulnerable to and ultimately ousted 
by the enigmatic vote of no confidence. Neither vote was binding; 
nevertheless, both leaders resigned.2 
Two very different leaders yielded to the force of a demand that 
was not backed by the clarity of a formal rule and that carried with it 
a sense of existential risk (the lives of Mussolini’s dissenters and the 
professional standing of Summers’s). Perhaps Mussolini detected 
something more than the moral force of opinion in a body he formally 
led that made yielding the right choice. A courteous soldier with a 
machine gun may have had some persuasive force as well. In contrast 
to the peaceful farewell encouraged by his council and backed by the 
suggestion of force, his ultimate fate after two safe years in exile was 
death as a captive of partisans.3 Lawrence Summers remains secure in 
exile, with an exit package conferred on him by the governing body of 
Harvard University.4 Despite the differing post-service fates, the two 
leaders nonetheless share an experience: forced exit by means of 
nonviolent improvisation resorted to by groups that reach a collective 
judgment about their leader. The judgment is simple. He or she must 
go.  
 
 1. See CHRISTOPHER HIBBERT, BENITO MUSSOLINI: THE RISE AND FALL OF IL 
DUCE 173 (1962) (describing the plotting to pass a resolution in the Grand Council, a 
group created by Mussolini to preside over the Italian cabinet, and also describing a 
resulting censure motion that led to Mussolini’s dismissal by King Emanuel of Italy); 
see also Marcella Bombardieri & David Abel, Summers Gets Vote of No Confidence, 
BOSTON GLOBE (Mar. 16, 2005), http://archive.boston.com/news/education/higher/ 
articles/2005/03/16/summers_gets_vote_of_no_confidence/ [https://perma.cc/ZL2F-
ED6Z] [hereinafter Summers Gets Vote]. 
 2. See HIBBERT, supra note 1, at 197 (explaining that the King had accepted 
Mussolini’s resignation); see also Alan Finder et al., President of Harvard Resigns, 
Ending Stormy 5-Year Tenure, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2006), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/22/education/22harvard.html 
[https://perma.cc/7MBA-9ZPQ]. 
 3. See HIBBERT, supra note 1, at 313, 315 (describing the capture and 
execution of Mussolini by partisans). It is beyond the scope of this Article to review 
historical evidence about the details of the execution of Mussolini during a period of 
disorder in Italy at the ending of World War II. 
 4. See Peter F. Zhu, Summers Salary Data Released, HARV. CRIMSON (Apr. 
6, 2009), https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2009/4/6/summers-salary-data-
released-in-addition/ [https://perma.cc/2SFN-T32S] (providing a summary of 
Summers’s post-service financial compensation from Harvard and other activities). 
Though not especially lavish, the exit package provided for Summers included a 
university professorship from which he might maintain his preeminence in national 
and intellectual political life. See id. 
 Looking for a Life Raft 415 
Even with the vast differences between the two men and their 
settings, the underlying stories of their exits contain commonalities. 
Groups have the ability to force a leader’s exit. The risks of forming a 
group and communicating within it are seen as high. The sense of 
danger limits the number of such undertakings. Yet dysfunctions arise 
that prompt groups to assign responsibility to the top operating 
authority, whether in a government or a private institution, for bad 
results and/or for offensive personal behavior. Given incentives to be 
cautious, group actions are not a complete answer to dysfunction. 
Secrecy and caution prevent detailed after-the-fact recounting of 
specific cases, in wartime Italy or in leafy Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Yet history can yield some facts that help fill out the story of an 
uncertain group power that provides one source of a check on leaders 
who become problematic in the eyes of their followers but whose term 
would continue in the absence of intervention.  
Despite the critical role they play, a focus on leaders as a source 
of problems requiring an intervention does not address general 
accountability problems in universities and other nonprofits in the 
United States. Leaders often are the source of a problem, and group 
outcry a potential resolution, but there may be recurring patterns of 
misconduct within organizations that groups fail to oppose with 
demands for the exposure of the misconduct and termination of the 
wrongdoer. The general subject of group dynamics that may or may 
not address a problematic, abusive, or immoral organizational culture, 
caused at the top or tolerated, is in need of comparison between votes 
of no confidence that focus on a leader exit and other responses to 
organizational dysfunction or internal misconduct. Leaders can be the 
clear source of a problem, or there may be cultural patterns—as 
illuminated in the course of #MeToo—that go deeper than the impact 
of one leader. But the vote of no confidence is a salient tool of groups 
to raise an outcry demanding action. Leaders often do harm, and 
groups sometimes react with a demand for their expulsion.  
The formal power of dismissal does not lie with the group, but 
the moral power does. In Western democracies, the resort to a claim 
of moral power by a group to demand a leader’s exit arises from a 
congeries of values in a free society, especially one where scholars 
and other commentators have identified a problem of rampant 
organizational corruption. Yet relatively little is known about the inner 
dynamics and overall results of these forced exits of leaders. 
Mussolini’s two-stage exit left a gap in social knowledge about a 
deeply symbolic punctuation mark to an era of Italian fascism. The 
departure of Summers from the presidency of Harvard is somewhat 
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better understood, but the general topic of votes of no confidence in 
American nonprofit institutions, including leading universities, lacks 
reliable narratives. 
For reasons less fraught than wartime intrigue, social knowledge 
about peaceful forced exits of leaders in American institutions is 
subject to dispute and misinformation. Further, the departure of one 
person from leadership is not easily interpreted in regard to its 
meaning for the organization’s present or future. There is always 
disagreement about the process by which a group expels a leader, and 
there is similar uncertainty about the import of such an expulsion for 
the trajectory of the institution.  
Did the leader cause a problem that needs to be solved? If so, 
what is it? Are trends the leader may have embodied still in effect? 
Does a leader’s forced exit transmit social knowledge that will cause 
change, or does it allow the institution to repackage an approach the 
leader sought to bring into the organization? What do votes of no 
confidence tell us in a particular case and in general about American 
institutional life? What do they teach us about our shared institutional 
life? Does the practice of forcing out a leader because of group protest 
sufficiently address the types of institutional problems that recurring 
institutional scandals seem to reveal? What other methods might 
supplement votes of no confidence? What might they achieve that 
such votes do not? 
In America’s organizational life, spasms of truncated 
accountability appear, and after limited public disclosure of the 
narrative of wrongdoing, often accompanied by misleading counter 
commentary, the facts that prompted a spasm of disclosure disappear 
into a vacuum of participant reticence and institutional misdirection. 
Though it is a leading method for groups to demand that leaders be 
brought to account, the vote of no confidence is vulnerable to 
disappearance from sight or sound. Moreover, groups do not readily 
find the common voice needed to organize a vote demanding a 
leader’s dismissal. The #MeToo movement has exposed the failure of 
mission-related groups to organize internally to raise a cry about 
sexual misconduct that is not perceived to affect the group or the 
institutional mission as a whole. Those targeted by sexual misconduct 
have thus found outlets for exposure of misconduct that an 
organization fails to root out, either by command from above or by 
group clamor. In response, organizations have spawned new kinds of 
secrecy, proceedings lacking in due process, with punishment meted, 
and secrecy imposed.  
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Those subjected to secret proceedings may succumb to the 
preference for silence that organizations, and those affected by the 
endings engineered within them, generally embrace and achieve with 
pressure backed by power. The latter is a concern worthy of attention 
and is another feature of the problem of organizational secrecy. The 
focus here will be on the first-order problem of primary bad conduct 
in organizations and the methods that groups deploy to force the exit 
of leaders whose conduct is a cause of group remedial demand. Given 
the limitation of the known methods for forced leader exit as a solution 
to a crisis of dishonesty in institutional culture, that focus must include 
thinking about a basis to remedy the damage done in American 
organization life that has energized command logic over the 
citizenship logic needed for our democracy.  
For this Article, I have devised the term “command logic” to 
describe the overuse in organizations of hierarchy as a means to 
authorize undiluted, top-down orders emanating from the person of a 
leader. Hierarchy and the associated use of leaders in various entities 
is a method of coordination designed to reduce the transaction costs of 
contracting in a free market.5 As I use the term, “command logic” is 
an assertion of a scope of authority in a person that overpowers the 
economic benefit of using leadership to reduce transaction costs and 
enhance coordination within an organization.6 I also argue that such 
overuse and monopolization of coordination efficiencies in a single 
individual afforded backing from the higher tiers of an organization 
damages citizenship by training participants in organizations to be 
passive subjects rather than active partners in coordinating exchanges 
within the entity. #MeToo fiascos do not necessarily arise from 
misconduct by top leaders in an organization but perhaps more 
problematically from the loss of democratic citizenship arising from a 
culture of passivity and consequent abdication of moral agency. Such 
abdication may well be encouraged by leadership that largely supports 
 
 5. See ERIC ALSTON ET AL., THE LOGIC OF LEADERSHIP AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL HIERARCHIES 1 (2019) https://econ2017.sites.olt.ubc.ca/files/ 
2019/11/pdf_seminar-paper_-Lee-J.-Alston_27-Nov.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJQ4-
4TUH] (reviewing the economic analysis of organizational hierarchies).  
 6. My use of the term supports my argument that such top-down occupation 
by a leader of the whole organizational space for reaching optimal results, where the 
leader does not efficiently substitute for market exchanges, is bad for a given 
organization’s mission but is also critically damaging the undertaking of citizenship 
in a democratic society. Those subjected to command logic in their organizational life 
are being trained to be subjects rather than fully contracting citizens in a 
democratic/republican order. 
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lower-level administrators and thereby reinforces passivity from the 
ranks. 
Finally, the broad significance of the search for accountability in 
nonprofit bodies is epistemological, an aspect of self-rule addressed in 
a recent book, Democracy and Truth: A Short History.7 A critical 
component of “the work of democracies” is building an infrastructure 
for the production and dissemination of knowledge.8 Doing the work 
involves broadening the shared base from which citizens understand 
and collaborate to produce deeper shared knowledge about the 
patterns that underlie and drive a common life. This work of 
democracies aspires to build a capacity for intervention against flawed 
depictions supportive of continuing wrongs in a shared civic life. 
Where organizations suppress the production of shared knowledge, 
improvisation to oust incompetent or abusive leaders contributes to 
social knowledge. Creative workarounds to undo institutional regimes 
of silence are voluntary gifts to democracy.9 They are vital but 
insufficient, a signal of work undone. 
The Article proceeds in the following order. Part I provides a 
brief overview discussion of no confidence votes in the nonprofit 
sector.10 It also presents an account of “a gap in the gap,” that is, the 
inadequacy of the vote of no confidence as a means of protecting 
students, and even faculty, from sexualized mistreatment, such as 
assault disguised as medical treatment, sexual licentiousness with 
students, retaliation against faculty members for reporting sexual 
 
 7. See generally SOPHIA ROSENFELD, DEMOCRACY AND TRUTH: A SHORT 
HISTORY (2019) (discussing epistemological conventions as an aspect of self-rule). 
 8. See id. at 16–17. 
 9. A comparison of similar improvisation relying on a legal structure of 
corporate and securities law tied to the profit motive to uncover sexual misconduct in 
corporations has been provided by some scholars. See, e.g., Daniel Hemel & Dorothy 
S. Lund, Sexual Harassment and Corporate Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1583, 1583 
(2018). See Paula Loop et al., PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, The Changing Face of 
Shareholder Activism, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 1, 
2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/02/01/the-changing-face-of-
shareholder-activism/ [https://perma.cc/8S75-YLED] for a brief discussion of the 
resources of the for-profit corporation for uncovering scandal inside the organization. 
Hemel and Lund suggest that concern, though worthwhile, that profit-driven corporate 
shareholder monitoring of sexual misconduct creates discursive harm by 
foregrounding harm to shareholders rather than victims and overlooks the larger 
critical epistemological work of democracy to which the profit motive tied to the 
structure of corporate law makes a contribution. See Hemel & Lund, supra note 9, at 
1671–73. 
 10. See infra Part I. 
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misconduct, and sexual or gendered harassment of faculty members.11 
Part II lays out the history, contemporary logic, and typical patterns of 
votes of no confidence.12 Part III addresses specific university 
shortfalls—Epic Failures—in which no official exercised vigilance 
against morally odious conduct by persons abusing the position of 
trust in which the institution had placed them and provides a case study 
of #MeToo-related litigation that resembled, but also differed from, 
the typical vote of no confidence.13 Part III also examines factors that 
might explain failures of accountability in the nonprofit sector.14 Part 
IV analyzes the failure of the vote of no confidence to serve as an 
internal monitor of sexual misconduct, with specific examination of 
the events at Michigan State University involving sexual predation, 
and describes and assesses forms of outsider intervention.15 Part V 
assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the various responses to the 
unique challenges of the sexual predation and the silences about it that 
brought #MeToo into being.16 A Conclusion notes the shortfalls in 
organizational culture and in outsider forces that might substitute for 
outcry by knowledgeable insiders.17  
The harm of organizational silence and denial accrues to 
citizenship broadly conceived, and the cure, if one can be had, is civic 
 
 11. See id. 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See infra Part III. The shortfall of collective voice and individual 
litigation to create general reform in nonprofit institutions provides the occasion to 
consider the difficulty of regular reliance on human risk-taking where the rewards are 
not, in the estimation of the risk taker, commensurate with the risk. That shortfall has 
been especially pronounced in connection with sexual misconduct mainly directed at 
women and girls. The shortfall reflects societal failures to respect women’s voice 
about harassment and even sexual violence. See Rebecca Solnit, The Harvey 
Weinstein Verdict is a Watershed—and a Warning, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2020), 
https://nyti.ms/2wfV440 [https://perma.cc/8YBZ-3USS] (describing her experience 
of invisibility and the failure of her words in connection with harassment). 
Facts circulate freely in a democracy of information that results 
from a democracy of voices. We have something else instead, 
from personal life to national politics: a hierarchy of audibility 
and credibility, a brutal hierarchy, in which people with facts 
often cannot prevail, because those who have more power push 
those facts out of the room and into silence or make the cost of 
stating those facts dangerously high. 
Id. 
 14. See infra Part III. 
 15. See infra Part IV. 
 16.  See infra Part V. 
 17. See infra CONCLUSION. 
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courage.18 The existing combination of weak but knowledgeable 
insider voices and external but less knowledgeable outsider voices 
lends itself to a failure of republican government.19 The health of 
democracy in the United States depends on aligning the governance 
of the university and other nonprofits with their public missions to 
support free inquiry, robust expression, public service, and engaged 
citizenship. 
I. FRAMING THE ISSUE: THE VOTE OF NO CONFIDENCE AND THE 
SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE AMERICAN NONPROFIT 
SECTOR 
Votes of no confidence have played an increasing role in 
nonprofit enterprises as a means for correcting social damage caused 
by the failure of oversight by boards of trustees or governmental 
monitoring.20 These self-help statements by group members fill an 
 
 18. See infra Part IV. 
 19. The failure of accountability in a critical location for the formation and 
enhancement of citizenship undermines the republican health of the states and is in 
dire need of an intervention in the guise of a republican guarantee with clout. See 
Melissa Murray, Sex and the Schoolhouse, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1445, 1446 (2019) 
(reviewing JUSTIN DRIVER, THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: PUBLIC EDUCATION, THE 
SUPREME COURT, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE AMERICAN MIND (2018)) (describing 
schools as “sites of values inculcation — places where the state may instruct a 
common core of citizenship values. Some of these . . . values [are] associated with the 
project of constructing citizens. But schools . . . also inculcate values of sexual 
citizenship”). 
 20. The vote of no confidence is defined and analyzed in detail in Parts II and 
III. Part II addresses its origins in the British Parliament, describes how the logic has 
been transferred to organizations in the United States and in other democratic 
contexts, and indicates specific problems, results, and processes that typify these 
votes. For initial purposes, here is a definition offered by one faculty member to 
colleagues in a speech to explain the impact of a no confidence vote. The definition 
was recovered by this faculty speaker from an oral tradition and after study and 
distillation of certain writings to capture its essence: 
What is a vote of no confidence? It’s a formal declaration of non-
support for a leader whose legitimacy rests partly on a core group 
within an organization. In a university setting, that group is the 
faculty. We do not have the authority to select the Chancellor or 
to remove him from office, but he needs our confidence for the 
university to function.  
See Lizabeth Zack, Professor, No Confidence Vote Address at the University of South 
Carolina Upstate (Apr. 24, 2015). The legal system provides remedies for proven legal 
injuries to individuals (and to an aggregation of individuals in some instances) and 
provides a system for collective bargaining by unionized employees of various 
organizations. Corporate law permits shareholders of corporations to sue on behalf of 
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accountability gap in organizations that have missions to address 
critical social need yet experience internal governance failures that 
threaten to impair the mission, transgress ethical and moral precepts, 
or violate the entity’s core governance rules. As a gap filler, the vote 
of no confidence takes pride of place in reviewing the urgent need for 
improved accountability of organizations for wrongdoing, and within 
the organization, the accountability of leaders to the groups they claim 
to lead. The vote of no confidence is a response to the leadership role 
in certain organizational corruption, as well as the group psychology 
that supports assertions of command as a means of maintaining silence 
about a bad leader. These votes have significant strength as a safety 
valve but given their reliance on serendipitous inspiration within 
groups and on word of mouth, they cannot serve as a check on 
systemic patterns of bad behavior. Because they often arise outside the 
formal processes of the enterprise and depend on improvisation 
loosely informed by an oral tradition, their strengths come with 
limitations as well.21 They have episodic but limited power in a 
 
the corporation for injuries to the corporation or to sue as shareholders for direct injury 
to the value of their shares. All of these systems are designed to identify interests for 
which the legal system provides protection and, where injury is proven to individual 
or collective interests, to provide a remedy suited to the nature of the identified 
protectable interest. They are part of a formal system of law by which legal remedies 
can follow for proven transgressions against entity interests or shared values. There 
are no simple counterparts for universities or, in most states, for other nonprofits to 
bring lawsuits for collective injuries to the institution or to individuals. The resort for 
accountability is primarily to the state attorneys general. See Dana Brakman Reiser, 
Enron.Org: Why Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Assure Comprehensive Nonprofit 
Accountability, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 205, 206–07 (2004) (predicting that attorneys 
general will fail to address lapses in nonprofit governance); see also infra Part II 
(providing a discussion of the governance structure of American universities and the 
limited capacity of the boards to function as monitors over the conduct of 
administrators).  
 21. See infra Section II.B (addressing the origins of the term). When first 
used in Parliament to demand the forced exit of Robert Walpole as First Minister to 
the King, the concept was unprecedented and hence an improvisation drawing on the 
regular procedures for making motions. See infra Section II.A (describing the 
variation in methods by which groups undertake to organize a vote and the efforts by 
institutions to prevent the use of official university channels to communicate and cast 
votes, as well as arguments that ensue after a vote over its credibility as representing 
a relevant subset of the whole membership within the organization). On occasion, 
faculties bring a motion in a faculty meeting, though the capacity to bring motions is 
the sole basis of the action, not a specific provision for a no confidence motion. See 
id. (discussing the fraught nature of votes and the secrecy often associated with the 
planning). Journalism about the votes can be hostile. In a 2018 Wall Street Journal 
article about them that required corrections because of overstatements about their 
frequency, the claim was made that the votes typically occur in faculty senates, along 
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societal setting that still honors dispersed voices as carriers of 
actionable social truth yet fears unmanaged voice from the ranks.22 
They rely on moral suasion as a substitute for formal power. 
 
with the assertion that just one “adamant” faculty member can trigger one, an 
assertion that is not consistent with the case studies my coauthor and I have done on 
specific cases. See Douglas Belkin, No Confidence: College Faculties Rebel with 
More Votes Against Leadership, WALL STREET J. (May 19, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
no-confidence-college-faculties-rebel-with-more-votes-against-leadership-
1526727601 [https://perma.cc/9RKW-EKDS]. The pattern is one of fraught 
consultations among risk-averse faculty or nonprofit members before an effort is 
attempted. Notably, the Journal acknowledged that “[t]hey are purely symbolic, but 
they frequently carry significant weight.” See id. The concession that they are only 
symbolic belies any suggestion that they are a formality embedded in the governance 
process of an institution. As a practical matter, faculty senates and the like need not 
have a formal provision for a vote of no confidence. See Jeremy Barlow, Vote of No-
Confidence: Yea or Nay?, BOARD EFFECT (July 30, 2016), 
https://www.boardeffect.com/blog/vote-of-no-confidence-yea-or-nay/ 
[https://perma.cc/4VZU-2NQL]. A good example of a no confidence motion done 
using existing governance rules for voting is available in an undated posting 
disclosing the ground rules for a vote of no confidence in the president of California 
State University, San Bernardino, which contains a link to the general Senate rules for 
voting. See CAL. STATE UNIV., SAN BERNADINO, WHAT IS A VOTE OF NO 
CONFIDENCE?, https://www.csusb.edu/sites/default/files/upload/file/VNC_FAQ_2-
rev.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JJB-8877]; see also Mark Muckenfuss, Vote Goes Against 
Cal State San Bernardino President Tomas Morales, PRESS-ENTERPRISE (May 26, 
2017), https://www.pe.com/2017/05/26/vote-goes-against-cal-state-san-bernardino-
president-tomas-morales/ [https://perma.cc/2STN-FCPZ]. 
 22. See generally ROSENFELD, supra note 7. For an abstract economic 
depiction of “collective conservatism” in public opinion broadly conceived outside 
the institutional setting, see generally TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: 
THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION (1995). The thesis of the 
book does not rely on a concept of coercion from above, but from the “utility” 
calculations of individuals assessing the climate of opinion generally, and by 
comparing the “utility” to them of expressing their genuine, private beliefs against the 
marginal effect of adding one dissenting voice to public discourse and the cost of 
going against the perceived strong consensus. See, e.g., id. at 22–44 (deploying 
concepts of intrinsic utility, reputational utility, expressive utility, and total utility to 
model the process of “choosing a public preference”). Using the example of 
attachment by lower caste persons in India to the caste system, Kuran explains 
“collective conservatism” as a result over time of accumulating “acts of individual 
prudence” by persons actually skeptical of caste until many low caste persons believe 
in the system and participate in strengthening the status quo. See id. at 200–01. Kuran 
summarizes: “they have deprived one another of facts and arguments essential to 
defining their lot in life as unacceptable.” Id. at 201. Briefly, Kuran’s explanation of 
societal opinion formation is somewhat at odds with the thesis in Democracy and 
Truth: A Short History by Sophia Rosenfeld concerning the presumably positive 
values of an organizational epistemology of what I call “dispersion of actionable 
communal truth.” See ROSENFELD, supra note 7, at 36 (referring to aspirations in early 
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In the university setting, the effort of putting together a public 
expression of “no confidence” depends on forming group cohesion 
among risk-averse faculty members. Though a vote of no confidence 
sends a message, individual votes neither necessarily provide rich 
information about the specific problems prompting such a vote nor 
cumulatively provide deep or wide knowledge as to why issues in 
enterprises cause recurring outcries. Their powers lie in the simplicity 
of their message: no confidence in a leader. That simple but bold 
message has a predictably short shelf life, however. Its intensity 
coincides with its promulgation, often conveying shock value to the 
attentive audience for the entity’s affairs. After a rejection by the 
group with formal authority to dismiss the target, a period of quiet 
often ensues. If an exit occurs, the institutional spokesmen ordinarily 
deny all connection to the group’s demand for the leader’s departure. 
The institution lapses into silence about the matter except on the 
occasion of appointing a permanent replacement, which requires 
acknowledgment of a vacancy by resignation. 
Public silence by the institution then prevails publicly and inside 
the institution. Collaboration of the kind that would support a shared 
authority, or epistemic democracy, goes begging for volunteers.23 
Nothing so grand as an “undogmatic but usable, communal truth” 
emerges from a group’s successful outcry to expel a leader.24 Hence, 
even after a successful vote manages to oust a leader, the how-to 
disappears into the receding memories and the silences of the culture 
that produced the vote and the leader who prompted it. After all, the 
 
democratic development of the production of “usable, communal truth”). 
Nonetheless, the idea of intrinsic utility provides a kernel of common analytic 
assumption—that personal preferences lurk and are blocked by some kind of barrier 
to open discourse. Kuran compares how opinion formation can be influenced by the 
pressures that emanate from nondemocratic or democratic government forms but 
suggests the difference between them is only of degree. See KURAN, supra note 22, at 
90. Kuran does not provide a model for how an organizational subculture influenced 
by hierarchical controls over discourse functions within a democratic political system 
attached, formally, to free expression. See id. at xi (describing his undertaking to 
“provide an integrated account of the role of preference falsification in guiding, 
distorting, stabilizing, constraining, and changing the social order”). For a powerful 
and influential treatment of how perceptions of a predominant group view affect not 
just willingness to dissent, but also privately held views, see generally ELISABETH 
NOELLE-NEUMANN, THE SPIRAL OF SILENCE: PUBLIC OPINION—OUR SOCIAL SKIN 
(1980).  
 23. See ROSENFELD, supra note 7, at 37 (referring to an aspiration of republics 
after eighteenth century revolutions to a “fully collaborative, trusting, enlightened 
‘regime of truth’” in political life). 
 24. Id. at 36. 
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institutional hierarchy possesses the greater speech capacity—the 
production of bland but seemingly authoritative speech routines. The 
group lacks the resources to mount counter speech, in public or in 
governing bodies, and within the group there is a sorting out of 
possible advantage and disadvantage. Advantage is gained from bland 
acceptance of the public narrative of normality, and disadvantage from 
undue interest in maintaining, developing, and spreading for 
newcomers’ consumption accounts supporting institutional awareness 
of the ins and outs of the conflict. With relative ease, the institution 
typically seizes control of the public narrative of its history and erases 
or pushes the counternarrative into deep background, fragmenting and 
even erasing public memory of the episode.  
The result is to reinstate formal, organizational control over 
enterprise history. An epistemology of the organization built from 
internal communication and shared experience is buried with the loss 
of knowledge gained in the turmoil, the opening up of “talk” within 
the group is closed down and arrested from further development, and 
system-wide “organizational truth” disseminated by an ethos of 
collaborative production of knowledge is supplanted by the sequential 
work of individual enterprise narrative control.25 Useful 
documentation which would provide faculties or other organization 
professionals a working how-to handbook is lost to history.26 So we 
see that, despite their operational impacts on the targeted leaders, votes 
of no confidence do not spread information into the public record 
about characteristic shortfalls in organization leadership, or group 
remedial response. What then is the larger systemic message of these 
episodes of group outcry? If the pattern of no confidence votes sends 
a decipherable message, it might be a distress signal: systemic trouble 
in organizational culture in certain nonprofit sectors.  
What other message might votes of no confidence add to the 
store of social knowledge about nonprofit institutional life? Are there 
areas of concern about which we have gained knowledge but which 
 
 25. See id. at 16 (suggesting that a grasp of “truths,” and hence of what is 
“conveyed as legitimate, reliable knowledge” arises from personal experience and “as 
a result of communication with those around us”); see also id. at 32 (discussing how 
plain speech was a method of communication for theorists). 
 26. That gap will be filled, at least in part, by my forthcoming book with Sean 
McKinniss. See generally MAE KUYKENDALL & SEAN MCKINNISS, VOTES OF NO 
CONFIDENCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE (forthcoming 2020). I have written this Article 
separately, but I will refer throughout to “our work,” except where I refer to pre-
collaboration work by either of us. Some excerpts of the materials contained in this 
Article may be included in the book. 
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have not produced votes of no confidence? Is the silence of 
professional groups in some areas of misconduct also a signal about a 
problem in organizations that implicates problems even deeper than 
poor leadership? This Article offers a preliminary sorting of issues that 
prompt outcry about organizational failures: first, problems that 
trigger votes of no confidence, and second, issues that become a crisis 
but do not prompt votes of no confidence, at least not before the crisis 
is made public by other means. In the #MeToo era, the latter—severe 
failures of internal accountability not brought to light by internal group 
voice—becomes what might be called epic failures (hereinafter “Epic 
Failures”). These Epic Failures expand the scope of our work on votes 
of no confidence to undertake a survey of alternative methods by 
which voices emerge to expose suppressed social knowledge and 
demand accountability for pathologies in the workings of power and 
in the social life of organizations. 
In the university and other nonprofit enterprises, the problems 
no confidence votes address are ordinarily matters of internal 
academic or professional concern. Though the particulars may attract 
some public interest, press coverage tends to be limited: little more 
than the printing of press releases at the beginning and, if a resolution 
occurs that supports an announcement, the printing of a final press 
release. Attracting interest or concern from the general population for 
the issues at stake is a challenge due to lack of empathy for or 
understanding of faculty concerns and possible resentment over the 
ability of faculties to “fire their bosses.” In addition, faculties are 
overmatched in a public relations battle with university public 
relations departments that command formidable resources to shape a 
public narrative. Faculties, who sometimes receive deferential 
treatment from students who address them as “Professor,” find the 
general public simply indifferent, inclined toward support of power, 
or hardened against them by their perceived privilege. As will be 
explained, no confidence votes can succeed in dislodging a leader who 
has become obnoxious to the faculty, and the general message they 
send by their steady occurrence is that the academy has a governance 
problem that periodically requires unauthorized group voice to prompt 
action from the hierarchy. The fact of their recurring appearance both 
affirms the problem, and, given the structure placing institutional 
narrative in the hands of administrative hierarchy, falls short as a long-
range solution to a culture of overreaching administrators and faculty 
who have lost heart for regular engagement sufficient to prevent crisis.  
By contrast, Epic Failures can confound administrative efforts to 
restore a sense of normalcy. Certain problems may be so explosive 
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that group silence prevails, but in the long run, administrative efforts 
at concealment fail because voices of victims emerge and are 
magnified by the legal process, journalism, and social media. Further, 
Epic Failures have the potential to shift narrative power away from 
institutional control to narrators in possession of long-suppressed 
social knowledge about the management of voice within nonprofit 
institutions to protect entrenched power, even power expressed in 
forms that are morally odious. Such a shift in narrative power moves 
“epistemic authority” at least a notch.27 Yet it also cedes narrative 
power to outsiders who may lack a sufficient understanding of the 
internal culture to provide an improved body of social knowledge and 
may have motives to shape narratives without careful regard for 
evidence. 
If the vote of no confidence is an occasional avenue for faculties 
to demand an end to a period of disarray as well as fear and/or 
maladministration caused by an individual abusing any or all of 
faculty members, school resources, or academic norms, can we 
identify the problems that have failed to prompt faculty voice by extra-
formal or nonroutine means? While proving a nonevent is difficult, 
my coauthor and I agree that we cannot think of faculty votes of no 
confidence that brought attention to sexual misconduct affecting 
fellow faculty members, staff members, or students. Yet recent high-
profile scandals that resonate with the #MeToo movement have 
brought attention to shocking gaps in university systems for 
accountability to faculty targets and student victims of sexual 
predation.  
Once exposed, public interest in such scandals at the intersection 
of sex and power is intense and sustained. Moral suasion has done its 
own work as facts emerge—but rarely from group self-reporting. Sad 
to say, internal means for bringing to light allegations of sexual 
assaults of students by university employees and sexual harassment of 
faculty members by more powerful faculty members have been 
elusive. Such allegations have not been brought into the public arena 
by votes of no confidence. The work of breaking silence falls to 
investigative journalism and the voice, courage, and litigation of 
victims who go public. In addition, a single faculty member (or 
nonprofit professional) can, rarely, break silence with narrative-rich 
litigation about the alleged seamy conduct of a leader and also achieve 
 
 27. See ROSENFELD, supra note 7, at 20 (referring to “a struggle over people 
as holders of epistemic authority”). 
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personal vindication.28 Litigation by a courageous internal speaker 
under attack can substitute for group voice when a group, such as a 
faculty aware of possible misconduct, will not speak. Hence, morally 
fraught accountability failures can be exposed even when they are not 
brought to light by group voice.  
That story—the story of the #MeToo movement as a vehicle of 
delayed accountability and social knowledge—is still unfolding. As 
noted above, the institutional response to the movement may include 
recourse to the kind of narrative control to which organizations are 
attached. A result can be, and has been in known instances and in 
instances not yet revealed, secret processes that subject accused 
individuals in institutions to violations of due process, often for an 
extended period, with high stakes for their constitutionally protected 
interests, and attendant violations of basic fairness and respect.29 These 
 
 28. See infra Part III. Note that the “whistleblower” is a separate idea, one 
that relies on legal permissions for a single individual to expose organizational 
wrongdoing that may be pervasive and supported within the group as a necessity for 
the organization to remain secure. The whistleblower is not a carrier of group voice 
and may suffer severe personal harm by way of retaliation and group shunning. 
Several recent books have addressed the whistleblower. See ALLISON STANGER, 
WHISTLEBLOWERS: HONESTY IN AMERICA FROM WASHINGTON TO TRUMP 12 (2019); 
see also Robert G. Kaiser, With These Two Whistleblower Books, Read Cautiously, 
VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Oct. 2, 2019, 7:24 PM), https://www.pilotonline.com/ 
entertainment/books/vp-db-book-whistleblowers-20191002-dus5gbskubaxrfnlne7 
bcxhi3u-story.html [https://perma.cc/3SP7-MRTF] (commenting on the timeliness of 
the books but noting problems, variously, of oversimplification and factual error). See 
generally TOM MUELLER, CRISIS OF CONSCIENCE: WHISTLEBLOWING IN AN AGE OF 
FRAUD (2019) (discussing the many cases of whistleblowing in America). See 
STEPHEN MARTIN KOHN, THE NEW WHISTLEBLOWER’S HANDBOOK: A STEP-BY-STEP 
GUIDE TO DOING WHAT’S RIGHT AND PROTECTING YOURSELF xvii (2011) (providing 
advice to persons considering using whistleblower protections to expose 
organizational wrongdoing). 
 29. See AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, THE HISTORY, USES, AND ABUSES 
OF TITLE IX 69–70 (2016) (discussing problems in university administration of its 
obligations under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972). 
Success stories about compelling colleges and universities to 
address problems of sexual assault are matched by reports of 
cases in which university administrators have failed to punish 
gross and repeated sexual harassment or in which title IX 
administrators from the Department of Education and within the 
University have sought to punish protected academic speech. 
These cases have compromised the realization of meaningful 
educational goals that enable the creation of sexually safe 
campuses; they have also undermined due-process rights and 
shared governance in unprecedented ways. 
Id. at 69. 
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due process issues are outside the scope of this Article but are of 
significant concern. Notably, though, institutional secrecy is usually 
based on a claimed concern for victims of mistreatment. This, 
however, is also a manifestation of the drive by institutions to manage 
public knowledge to the advantage of the institution, with damage to 
the interests served by a social commitment nurturing an epistemology 
of the organization produced by the “dissemination of undogmatic but 
usable, communal truth.”30 Individual rights are harmed, but so is a 
basis in shared knowledge to address recurring problems of 
misbehavior, accusation, and institutional response. 
This Article addresses the shortfalls in formal processes of 
accountability in nonprofit institutions. In addition, it describes and 
analyzes the informal interventions brought to bear by internal groups, 
or, when internal groups fail, by individuals who break the silence and 
stir public uproar. In it, I provide the first close look at a confluence 
of trends: (1) frequent resort by faculties to votes of no confidence to 
address leadership problems and to attempt to force a leader out; (2) 
the emergence of sexual scandals involving long-term abuse of 
students or other vulnerable persons without intervention by 
university or other institutional officials or outcry by faculties or group 
members; (3) the #MeToo movement with its insistence on revealing 
submerged facts about the patterns in the abusive use of power to 
coerce sexual favors; and (4) a new determination to speak up 
exemplified by an individual faculty member’s use of litigation as a 
partial substitute for group voice to allege abusive sexualized conduct 
by an official in a law school. The approach is a description and 
analysis of the accountability gap in nonprofits, especially 
universities, with comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of 
techniques that have supplemented the vote of no confidence as a tool 
for accountability driven by disclosure. The general background, 
about which there is increasing scholarly and other treatment, is the 
pervasiveness of corruption in American institutions, including those 
of higher learning. Recent books have addressed the spread of 
corruption permeating many American institutions,31 such as 
 
 30. See ROSENFELD, supra note 7, at 36. 
 31. See generally LARRY LESSIG, AMERICA, COMPROMISED (2018) (arguing 
that American institutions, including Congress, have been corrupted by a general 
dependence on the improper influence of money rather than “the people” or 
professional norms and the like). Hence, Lessig argues that an institution can be 
“corrupt” without having corrupt individuals in it. See id. An interestingly similar 
claim was made by a British visitor to Tidewater Virginia in the late 1700s, albeit 
perhaps tongue in cheek. See ALLAN NEVINS, AMERICA THROUGH BRITISH EYES 31 
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universities invaded by corporate money and “branding,” the 
corporate world, and the American political order writ large.32  
The story of power used wrongfully has many chapters. It spans 
the most intimate dimensions of home, the workplace (including the 
less secluded domains of enterprises large and small), and public life 
encompassing the oppressions inflicted or tolerated by the political 
order. The constitutional dimension of the problem concerns the blight 
on democracy brought by entrenched power in settings not readily 
remitted to a zone of privacy, a problem meant (many argue) to be 
addressed by the Guarantee Clause of the United States Constitution 
but left to fester unaddressed by either court or legislative resort to the 
protective meaning of the clause to safeguard a “republican” basis for 
our common life.33 Much of the common life of American citizens 
occurs in enterprises, either formally private or loosely classified as 
 
(1948) (suggesting that planters have been harshly judged by those who blame them 
for sins of the fathers (those whose crimes brought slavery to Virginia) and have thus 
“confounded the necessity of the present with the evil of the past, have let the crimes 
of a few discolor the many, and the iniquity of a system vouch for that of individuals. 
. . . Unless a man has been willing to break up this system at the cost of his own utter 
ruin, he has been pronounced a selfish barbarian, a loathsome maggot complacently 
fattening on corruption”). The description of a planter’s day that follows, occupied 
with libations and naps attended by enslaved women, seems to belie the opening 
defense of the individual against the system. See id. at 32–35. Whatever the theory of 
the deep source of corruption—in human character or the money culture of American 
life of late—its scope is conceded to be vast. See Kaiser, supra note 28 (referring to 
Tom Mueller’s “extensive footnotes [that] include a remarkable catalog of books and 
articles that document the ‘increasing incidence of fraud and corruption in many parts 
of U.S. society’”). 
 32. See JOSHUA HUNT, THE UNIVERSITY OF NIKE: HOW CORPORATE CASH 
BOUGHT AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 216–17 (2018) (recounting secretiveness 
about sources of corporate funding, concealment of sexual assault by athletes, and 
interference with academic judgment as a result of corporate cash). See generally 
ROBERT MCCOLLOM, THE LAST SHERIFF IN TEXAS: A TRUE TALE OF VIOLENCE AND 
THE VOTE (2017) (describing the risky struggle against the power of a violent sheriff 
to control the vote in a South Texas county and thereby retain power); TAMAR 
FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICAN’S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A CROSSROAD 
(2006) (describing the spread of corruption through corporate America). 
 33. See U.S. CONST. art. IV § 4; Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 42 (1849) 
(holding that whether a state government is a republican government is a political 
question for Congress, not the courts); THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 312–16 (James 
Madison). For a scholarly treatment of the Guarantee Clause arguing that the original 
meaning did not contemplate judicial enforcement, see Ryan C. Williams, The 
“Guarantee Clause,” 132 HARV. L. REV. 602, 604–06 (2018) (describing Senator 
Sumner’s view of the Clause as a “sleeping giant,” suggesting the giant may show 
signs of awakening, and reciting the critical views of various contemporary scholars 
on the practice of judicial nonenforcement). 
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state-sponsored (e.g., state universities), and becomes subject to forms 
of unaccountable coercive power. In such settings, the republican 
capacity to name and resist misconduct loses influence, as does the 
commitment to communal truth.  
II. THE VOTE OF NO CONFIDENCE: DEFINITIONS AND FEATURES, 
FUNCTION, ORIGINS, STRENGTHS, LIMITATIONS, CONTEXTS 
In recent years, votes of no confidence have become a prominent 
method for groups to voice their displeasure with bad leadership. 
These votes have occurred in a variety of organizations, such as 
hospitals, medical associations, fire and police departments, and even 
a Gaelic football team.34 The preponderance of notable no confidence 
votes, however, has occurred in higher education, particularly from 
faculties voting against their institutions’ presidents. This Article does 
not incorporate a close treatment of specific cases. Some of the 
patterns in such votes are described in Subsections III.C.2 and III.C.3 
by comparing and contrasting their forms and patterns with details of 
the litigation at Case Western Reserve University School of Law 
against the dean and the University. 
A. No Confidence Vote: Defined 
In basic terms, a vote of no confidence announces the loss of 
support in a group whose support is a predicate, derived from 
 
 34. See Eric Andrew-Gee, Ontario Medical Association Head Resigns After 
No-Confidence Vote, GLOBE & MAIL (Feb. 6, 2017), 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/ontario-medical-association-head-
resigns-following-no-confidence-vote/article33920497/ [https://perma.cc/7UMX-
CG5B] (reporting on a vote of no confidence on the head of a medical association); 
Rick Armon, Resident Physicians at Summa Health Vote No Confidence in System 
President, AKRON BEACON J. (Jan. 1, 2017), https://www.beaconjournal.com 
/news/20170102/resident-physicians-at-summa-health-vote-no-confidence-in-
system-president [https://perma.cc/J5WR-7S2V] (reporting on a vote of no 
confidence that took place in a hospital); Leslie Dixon, Oxford Fire Chief Resigns 
After Members Vote ‘No Confidence,’ SUN J. (Dec. 6, 2016), 
https://www.firerescue1.com/fire-chief/articles/150458018-Maine-fire-chief-resigns-
following-vote-of-no-confidence/ [https://perma.cc/WBJ9-CENE] (reporting on a 
vote of no confidence in a fire department chief); Seán Moran, Mayo Footballers Vote 
No Confidence in Joint Managers-Reports, IRISH TIMES (Sept. 29, 2015), 
http://www.irishtimes.com/sport/gaelic-games/gaelic-football/mayo-footballers-
vote-no-confidence-in-joint-managers-reports-1.2370918 [https://perma.cc/S4WS-
945N] (reporting that players on a football team passed a vote of no confidence in the 
team’s managers).  
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democratic norms and organizational realities, of a leader’s ability to 
function.35 It occurs within the cultural setting of democratic societies, 
in cultures that foster an expectation, however well-articulated or 
neglected in a given sector, that acquiescence to a leader is required at 
the time of installation and during his or her term of office.36 In the 
most specialized institutions, the vote is a mechanism by which 
mission experts bring a group voice to force to the surface problems 
that, after fruitless efforts to air and attain responsive action, point 
toward leader exit as the solution. Indeed, the premise is that the leader 
is the problem because of bad behavior or inability to address 
institutional priorities. As a collective social understanding of 
legitimacy and embedded norms in institutions, it is an unwritten 
compact for key social enterprises, maintained without legal help yet 
recovering procedures and restating norms in recurring patterns of 
self-help: a modern oral tradition.37 In institutions that have a form of 
collective social ownership that relies upon a group with both 
expertise and a fiduciary obligation to carry the mission of the 
institution by playing a governance role, the vote serves as a safety 
valve.  
The vote also occurs in membership groups with less reliance on 
expertise but which assert group voice against leaders who violate the 
 
 35. See Peter Schmidt, How to Fire Your President: Voting ‘No Confidence’ 
with Confidence, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (June 23, 2009), 
https://www.chronicle.com/article/How-to-Fire-Your-President-/47315 
[https://perma.cc/TXN2-4JDV]. 
 36. Faculties of law schools, at the time of a decanal appointment or a group 
demand for dismissal, have relied on a statement in the American Bar Association 
Standards. See generally ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL 
OF LAW SCHOOLS 2019-2020 (2020). Law faculties cite these law school Standards to 
describe an institutionally specific normative basis of the no confidence vote. See id. 
The core norm provided by the standards is the requirement, embedded in an 
enforceable accreditation provision, that deans not be appointed over the objection of 
a substantial majority of the faculty. See id. at 10–11. (“Except for good cause, a dean 
should not be appointed or reappointed to a new term over the stated objection of a 
substantial majority of the faculty.”) Law faculties also have a strong expectation as 
lawyers that a test of continuing legitimacy will be imposed on the dean of a law 
school. See id. 
 37. See ROBERT SCHOLES & ROBERT KELLOGG, THE NATURE OF NARRATIVE 
25 (1966) (describing how the absence of writings about the vote of no confidence 
makes those who perform them akin to the performers of primitive oral songs, who 
follow a grammar “learned below the level of consciousness”); see also id. at 23 (“[In 
an oral tradition,] [w]e can speak of the elements of the song—the plot, the episodes, 
the conception of character, the knowledge of historical events, the traditional motifs, 
the diction—as being transmitted, but we cannot speak of the oral transmission of the 
song itself.”). 
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group’s expectations for competence or fair treatment. The vote has 
no persuasive force for elected offices, which have formal removal 
mechanisms that match the weight of the electoral mechanic for filling 
the office.38 Outside the electoral context, however, an authoritative 
demand for a leader’s exit, arising from a democratic ethos that 
respects group input, carries force even without a format given by a 
system of political authority that manifests the legitimacy of its role 
outside prescribed channels.  
By contrast, because of demand, the for-profit corporation has 
developed mechanisms that allocate a kind of republicanism to large 
shareholders to force board responsiveness.39 In the case of investment 
as ownership, money talks. In the absence of an investment-driven 
claim on ownership and associated policies to give the claim real 
force, internal voice relies on moral stature and group-based expertise 
and commitment. Where money talks in the nonprofit sector, it may 
become a source of wrongful influence at odds with the normative 
ideal of a healthy bond with mission. It may also bring #MeToo 
 
 38. See JACK MASKELL & RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL34037, “NO CONFIDENCE” VOTES AND OTHER FORMS OF CONGRESSIONAL CENSURE 
OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS 1 (2007) (“Except through the process of impeachment, 
accordingly, no action by the Congress (or of either House) can have any practical 
effect similar to that of a parliamentary vote of no confidence.”); see also id. at 2 
(noting that some have gone so far as to argue that “impeachment was the proper, and 
exclusive, constitutional response for Congress to entertain when the conduct of 
federal civil officers is called into question, rather than a resolution of censure” and 
citing Congressional deliberations concerning a resolution in 1867 on the unfitness of 
office of Mr. Henry Smyth and the 1924 resolution calling for the resignation of the 
Secretary of the Navy). 
 39. See generally Jack B. Jacobs, Fifty Years of Corporate Law Evolution: A 
Delaware Judge’s Perspective, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 141 (2015) (discussing the 
mechanisms of for-profit corporations). In their recent article on the corporation and 
sexual harassment, Daniel Hemel and Dorothy S. Lund discuss (and rebut) critiques 
of the effort to stretch corporate law to check sexual misconduct in enterprises for the 
poor fit of such efforts with the task of assuring that managers adhere to making 
business judgments in the interests of the core corporate business purpose. See Hemel 
& Lund, supra note 9, at 1668–71. Such a critique is a mark against deploying the 
term “republicanism” in connection with the role of large shareholders in extracting 
compensation for harm to third parties targeted by wrongful sexual power within the 
corporate structure. See id. Yet Hemel and Lund conclude that avoiding harm to 
investors resulting from un-remedied sexual misconduct “is entirely within corporate 
law’s ambit.” See id. at 1671. Thus, the profit motive is not a sure response to the 
citizenship harms inflicted by organizational cultures that rely on top-down authority 
to limit internal expression, though it may prevent harms that arise from the misuse 
of such authority for wrongful personal gratification. See id. 
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pressures to staff responsible for what nonprofits call 
“development.”40  
In part as a practical understanding, and more precisely as a 
normative claim, the vote of a principal group responsible for a 
nonprofit institution’s mission has a presumptive weight unless there 
is a manifest conflict of interest on the part of the group expressing 
lack of confidence. A vote that is part of a larger power struggle that 
(1) does not concern a group’s mission-driven expertise or governance 
role or (2) serves as late-stage virtue signaling by a previously passive 
faculty does not carry the same force as a vote arising from group 
knowledge gained from the group’s execution of its mission.41 Like 
those of the large shareholder, the views of the mission-bonded group 
effectuating the work of a nonprofit carry weight. Those responsible 
for executing the mission have motives to monitor academic managers 
by using their asset of firm-specific knowledge about managers’ 
conduct. A manager’s loss of support from the professionals he or she 
must lead ordinarily has a sound basis. Without the support of a 
professional group responsible for a mission, when the problems 
underlying the loss of support threaten the capacity of a leader to 
function with any success, a formal claim on position becomes hollow. 
Hence, a sometime shorthand conclusion—“it’s political”—
obscures more than it reveals. In nonelective, nonprofit groups, the no 
confidence vote is the only mechanism for a solution to bad leadership 
that is immune to formal internal processes for correction. The resort 
to the no confidence motion is constrained by the social price and 
perceived risk of tearing down a smooth social surface, which is 
increased by the common absence of a codified recognition of the 
process.42 The lack of regularity, in the sense of the group action’s 
 
 40. See infra Subsection II.B.2 (discussing the #MeToo movement and its 
role in corporate sexual harassment). 
 41. In the context of power struggles, close calls could theoretically arise in 
institutions with specialized missions that were established at the founding and must 
be maintained by the internal expert group. An example might be a law school 
founded to pursue a distinctively public interest mission. If the faculty attempted to 
redirect the school’s mission by revamping the curriculum and a dean overruled the 
effort, a vote of no confidence would fall within their expertise, but the weight of that 
expertise would be compromised by the faculty’s sabotage of an agreed-upon mission. 
In addition, the import of the no confidence vote would be undermined by its role as 
a tactic in a power struggle rather than as a statement about the fitness of a leader. In 
the case of late-stage virtue signaling, the internal group is situated no differently than 
outsiders who develop an opinion based on public information. 
 42. A particularly high social price is a factor in the entire silence of 
faculties—defined here by the lack of votes of no confidence to precipitate disclosure 
and accountability—about sexual predation of the several types.  
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being unauthorized, is paradoxically a strength derived from a form of 
weakness. When a vote takes place, it is a signal of deep organizational 
distress. The group has found the wherewithal to improvise a process, 
despite the lack of a set of rules that guide and reassure the group of 
the propriety and organizational approval of their deployment of 
voice.43 Voice emerges from a shared sense of crisis that brings a group 
to take unaccustomed risk, organize in an atmosphere of stealth and 
unease, and make a moral claim. As will be discussed in the 
comparison to litigation, however, the weakness is true weakness if 
the group cannot mount a successful effort, despite the existence of a 
seriously damaging state of affairs in the leadership of the entity.44 
B. The Model: Normative Content, Parliamentary Origin, and 
Application to Private Entities  
First, let us address the ideal model for a process leading to a 
vote by faculty to reject a leader and evaluate how well it serves a core 
function in the academy—supporting a robust exercise of free speech 
and academic freedom in connection with university governance. A 
further function that it may serve has a tint of republican ideals in it, 
one of expressing public norms supportive of moral, ethical, and 
competent leader conduct. That function is also democratic, but the 
republican hue demands that the reason for the vote be more than 
individual interest. Rather, the purpose is to hold leaders accountable 
by virtue of a collective voice shaped by public motives and 
concerns.45 That effort serves an epistemological purpose of 
 
 43. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (suggesting the incomplete 
articulation in some sectors of group rights to acquiesce to a leader’s installation as 
well as understandings about acquiescence expressed in law school governance 
standards); see also infra note 226 (regarding faculty no confidence motions’ potential 
use as “branding efforts” undertaken by faculty members in the wake of public 
scandal).  
 44. See infra Part III (recounting the lead up to, and the conduct and 
consequence of, a resort to litigation by a professor of law to address a sexual 
harassment scandal about which the faculty remained quiet). 
 45. See, e.g., Emma Vandelinder, MU English Department Votes No 
Confidence in Chancellor’s Leadership, COLUMBIA MISSOURIAN (Nov. 4, 
2015), https://www.columbiamissourian.com/news/higher_education/mu-english-
department-votes-no-confidence-in-chancellors-leadership/article_4c8a52d6-8327-
11e5-9ef3-5725103d82ec.html [https://perma.cc/JSM4-9HJS] (describing the 
University of Missouri’s English Department voting no confidence in the school’s 
chancellor, in part because of the chancellor’s “lack of transparency and cooperation 
in decision-making, . . . his slow response time to major issues [such as racism] and 
for bowing to outside political pressures”). Public voices expressed through a no 
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constructing a foundation of knowledge by unearthing and 
disseminating knowledge about patterns of behavior in organizations 
that carry substantive content and create an impact on social outcomes 
and on the formation of citizenship as broadly influenced by the role 
expectations internal to the organization.46 The standard internal 
channels for issues to be debated do not lend themselves to the airing 
of the knowledge of deep dysfunction about which an organization 
successfully maintains a culture of silence. Internally managed, 
decorous speech lacks the revelatory power of blunt description 
unleashed from the hesitations of the parlor, the boardroom, and the 
faculty meeting conference room. 
1. History of the Vote of No Confidence 
The ideal, the name, and the model for the vote of no confidence 
is the parliamentary motion of censure developed in England in 1741, 
arising from an attempt to dislodge Sir Robert Walpole from a position 
he had gained as a leading minister for the King.47 Because the Prime 
Minister came to be seen as the King’s agent in Parliament, the vote 
of no confidence against the person appointed to the role was 
conceived as deeply controversial.48 Therefore, it was seen as an attack 
 
confidence vote also arise from student and faculty outcry over such matters as alleged 
mishandling of race issues. See Kyle Arnold & Max Denning, Update: Ithaca College 
Students Vote No Confidence in Rochon, ITHACAN (Nov. 30, 
2015), https://theithacan.org/news/ithaca-college-students-vote-no-confidence-in-
president-rochon/ [https://perma.cc/MX8E-3HBU] (describing racial incidents on 
campus and concern about presidential leadership); see also Faith Meckley & Kyle 
Arnold, Ithaca College Faculty Vote No Confidence in President Rochon, ITHACAN 
(Dec. 14, 2015), https://theithacan.org/news/majority-of-ic-faculty-vote-no-
confidence-in-tom-rochon/ [https://perma.cc/V5AD-JA5M] (reporting a vote of no 
confidence by faculty of 77.8% of voters in president over race issues, following a 
vote of no confidence by 71.75% of students responding to a poll). 
 46. See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text. 
 47. See JOHN P. MACKINTOSH, THE BRITISH CABINET 52–61 (1st ed. 1962) 
(stating that Robert Walpole succeeded in initial resistance, though he eventually 
resigned and became the Earl of Oxford). For a thorough account of the unprecedented 
nature of the motion, which was called Sandys’ motion after its proponent Samuel 
Sandys, and the response by Walpole, as well the idea of Kingly prerogative in 
choosing the First Minister, see TAPANI TURKKA, THE ORIGINS OF PARLIAMENTARISM: 
A STUDY OF SANDYS’ MOTION 34–44 (2007). The motion was later applied to Lord 
North in 1778 after the role of a leading minister had clearly become that of Prime 
Minister. See id. 
 48. See MACKINTOSH, supra note 47, at 64 (“[A]n address to His Majesty to 
remove one of his servants, without so much as alleging any particular crime against 
436 Michigan State Law Review  2020 
on the prerogative of the King, a figure still partially symbolic of 
sovereignty despite the emergence of parliamentary counterpower in 
the Glorious Revolution in the seventeenth century.49 Though Walpole 
had originally been a proponent of a radical view of the Glorious 
Revolution as a movement away from the existing system of 
monarchial rule and toward popular sovereignty, he altered his view 
when he gained power in Parliament.50 He turned to a rejection of the 
idea that England had been transformed into a nation ruled by popular 
sovereignty.51 So the vote to dismiss Walpole because of the wishes of 
members of Parliament directly challenged a view dismissive of 
Parliament as a representative body responsible to serve the popular 
will. In effect, in power, Walpole began to embrace a top-down elite 
authority that denied absolutism but did not yield to a claim that the 
people ruled.52 The resulting no confidence debate in Parliament began 
tentatively with rules against transcription of debate and gradually 
evolved into a transparent process that drew on ideas of honor and 
accountability to force the resignation of both a prime minister and his 
or her government. The British vote in Parliament achieves a degree 
of democratic discipline from its beginnings in a heavily contested 
attack on what was perceived to be top-down authority.53 The idea of 
 
him, is one of the greatest encroachments that was ever made upon the prerogatives 
of the Crown.”). 
 49. The history of kings in England is beyond the scope of this Article. It is 
worth noting, however, that the idea of the king as the embodiment of sovereignty, 
with a color of divine authority, did not simply vanish at the time of the Glorious 
Revolution. In his book on the American Revolution, Eric Nelson argues that there 
was sentiment among the American colonists to restore a monarchical rule in protest 
of Parliament’s intrusion into colonial affairs. See ERIC NELSON, THE ROYALIST 
REVOLUTION: MONARCHY AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 1 (2014). Royalism in 
England, with the tint of divine authority, did not die overnight, thus lending added 
weight to the resistance to an effort by members of Parliament to oust the King’s First 
Minister. In an important work arguing that the Glorious Revolution was more radical 
and violent than has been thought, Steve Pincus addresses differing views by 
historians on the extent to which the Anglican Church retained its prerevolutionary 
notion of “true divine right Protestant[ism].” See STEVE PINCUS, 1688: THE FIRST 
MODERN REVOLUTION 401 (2009); see also LEANDA DE LISLE, THE WHITE KING: 
CHARLES I, TRAITOR, MURDERER, MARTYR xxvi–xxx (2017) (describing the 
complicated mixture of British acceptance of both the king and Parliament as a source 
of sovereignty in a period of religious conflict). Whether remnants can be found in 
unstated claims by university administrators to special rights immune to human 
interference is also beyond the scope of this Article. 
 50. See PINCUS, supra note 49, at 16–17. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See id. at 17. 
 53. See id. 
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honor implicates the resignation with grace of the target of the vote.54 
The tradition long remained unwritten yet subject to norms that 
disciplined the use of no confidence votes by way of strong consensus 
within the relevant political class.55 As democracy emerged in Great 
Britain, the first impulse had been to suppress the circulation of 
information about debate in Parliament, which thereby applied to the 
basis of the protest against Walpole, as well as the arguments and 
counterarguments.56 As with votes of no confidence in contemporary 
organizations, the formally available mechanism for discourse was not 
friendly to the epistemological work that might build a new foundation 
of knowledge about the disputes over inner workings of an 
organization, in this case Parliament, as a body consonant with a 
democratic ethos.57 If the debate was not known to the public, new 
structures of knowledge would not take form on which to build 
democratic practices. Over time, the premises for ongoing 
 
 54. The resignation of Lord North in response to a later vote of no confidence 
provides the example of an honorable concession to democratic feedback. See PETER 
WHITELEY, LORD NORTH: THE PRIME MINISTER WHO LOST AMERICA 196–204 (1996) 
(accounting the parliamentary maneuvers, Lord North’s reactions, and the King’s 
resistance to North’s resignation); see also TURKKA, supra note 47, at 37 (describing 
the argument that the exercise of power should not be contrary to the people’s will, 
thereby making “general satisfaction or dissatisfaction . . . the criterion in judging of 
the exercise of power”). 
 55. See ALPHEUS TODD & SIR SPENCER WALPOLE, PARLIAMENTARY 
GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND: ITS ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT, AND PRACTICAL OPERATION 
120 (Marston & Co. 1892) (stating that expulsion without a reason was understood to 
be reserved for only extraordinary necessity, or, in the words of the treatise, “for great 
occasions”).  
 56. From the second half of the sixteenth century the British Parliament 
prohibited all reporting and publishing of its proceedings. The Parliament believed it 
should deliberate in private and regarded any attempt to publicize its proceedings as 
a serious, punishable offence. See About Hansard, PARLIAMENT OF VICTORIA (July 17, 
2009, 1:24 PM), https://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/hansard/about-hansard 
[https://perma.cc/RDN9-G4F6] (“By the late 18th century dissension among more 
progressive members of Parliament, the growing weight of public opinion and the 
increasingly outspoken attacks of the press persuaded the Parliament to relax its 
stance. In 1803 the House of Commons passed a resolution giving the press the right 
to enter the public gallery.”). 
 57. See generally WILLIAM CORBETT, COBBETT’S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY 
OF ENGLAND FROM THE NORMAN CONQUEST, IN 1066, TO THE YEAR 1803 (1807) 
(describing the various sources used to compile a parliamentary history that are 
thought to be accurate). Workarounds defeating the formal rules seemed to have 
existed in published transcriptions of the debates that later have been pronounced 
authentic in various compilations. See id. These workarounds provide an early 
example of improvisation to channel protest outside the formal rules available for such 
voice. See id. 
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epistemological work to emerge from a format for accountability were 
embedded in parliamentary usages, and even recorded on an 
information-rich website.58 
These aspects of the ideal no confidence vote as it has developed 
in Parliament are not realistic in private organizations in the United 
States. First, those participating in the vote are employees. No matter 
how strong their assurance of tenure and however much the entity is 
tied to the liberal values of open inquiry and commentary, they face 
danger to their security of position. Constitutional law as a protective 
venue for faculty, either as individuals or participants in group efforts, 
offers weak protection to faculty whose exercise of voice often 
produces retaliation damaging to their standing and access to 
resources. For that reason, faculty whose livelihood depends on their 
remaining in favor with those in command of the machinery of a 
university, for example, perceive the risk of helping canvass sentiment 
against the hierarchy to be high.59 And in known instances of internal 
expression about a leader problem, they have been high.60 Second, the 
circumstances that might produce open debate organized under the 
bylaws of a university are not common. While some votes do occur in 
formal faculty meetings, as took place at Harvard in 2005 and was 
scheduled for a repeat in 2006,61 the genuine debates take place in 
 
 58. See generally U.K. PARLIAMENT, https://www.parliament.uk/ 
[https://perma.cc/XN67-YK42] (last visited Apr. 13, 2020) (displaying an 
information rich website for the United Kingdom’s parliament). 
 59. See Telephone Interview with Anonymous, Faculty Member, Major 
Univ. (July 28, 2018) [hereinafter Telephone Interview July 28] (“My tendency is to 
see this fear, there is definitely fear if you want to talk about emotions, there’s 
definitely a deep-seated anxiety that people have about their situation should they 
speak up. But I think it’s fully rational. I think it’s probably fully rational to believe 
that. Again, it would be irrational to think you would be fired perhaps, for speaking 
up against the university president, but again, the university can make your life 
miserable in myriad ways if it wants to. I think people really fear being on the outside, 
right? More than anything, they [feel] like, well, you want to be in the good graces of 
the administration, of the president, of the provost, of the dean. You don’t want to 
have a hostile relationship with these people because they can make life difficult. 
Maybe you won’t get that promotion. Maybe you won’t get that raise next year, if 
these people don’t like you. I think that’s a realistic fear which people have, and as I 
say, it’s really no different than any other employee has in our capitalist society.”). 
 60. See infra Section III.C (describing the retaliation against Associate Dean 
Ray Ku, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, when he reported concerns 
about the dean of the law school of Case Western Reserve University to Case Western 
administrators, and additional retaliation against an administrative assistant to the 
dean). 
 61. See Summers Gets Vote, supra note 1. The 2005 vote was followed by a 
prompt statement of approval by the Harvard Corporation. See Sara Rimer, 
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gatherings of a group with sufficient trust among the members to share 
views openly and without concern for negative repercussions. 
Deciding which colleagues can be trusted to engage in open discussion 
is a matter of fraught discussion among those first considering a no 
confidence action. For that reason, the current practice in universities 
does not follow a tradition of open, robust debate as might occur in a 
parliamentary style. 
 
Professors, in Close Vote, Censure Harvard Leader, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 16, 2005), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/16/education/professors-in-close-vote-censure-
harvard-leader.html [https://perma.cc/P8NW-U6TU]. For an account of the 
resignation by President Summers to avoid an embarrassing second no confidence 
vote scheduled for late February 2006, see Marcella Bombardieri & Maria Sacchetti, 
Summers to Step Down, Ending Tumult at Harvard President Faced Revolt; Bok to 
be Interim Head, BOSTON.COM NEWS (Feb. 22, 2006), http://archive.boston.com/ 
news/education/higher/articles/2006/02/22/summers_to_step_down_ending_tumult_
at_harvard/ [https://perma.cc/XVW2-2ZNL]. 
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2. Donors, Money, Sex, and Silence: The Missing Group Voice 
The factors that prevent the vote of no confidence in American 
universities and other nonprofit institutions from developing the same 
maturity of convention and broad understanding that is possible in 
Parliament are strongest in connection with sexual misconduct by 
persons with power inside the organization. The normal risk aversion 
to speaking against power is undoubtedly strengthened by broader 
cultural toleration for sexual misconduct by men, and even today 
women, with power. The sense of solidarity does not develop as it does 
when other kinds of misconduct or simple incompetence pose a direct 
challenge to the professional norms and mission-defined 
commitments of the group. It is unfortunate to say that the protection 
of the vulnerable from sexual predation has not been a professional 
norm but it appears impossible to deny the obvious. Where the harm 
to the victims is not understood as a systemic assault on the shared 
professional role to advance the mission, the group is not moved to 
action by an altruistic duty to rescue. Though I have argued that the 
vote of no confidence is not about mere private interest and that 
participating in one requires civic courage, the group’s action typically 
cannot be said to arise from simple altruism.  
Further, it is always possible that knowledge of such conduct is 
not widespread because the conduct is surreptitious and because the 
disapproval of what some would call gossip about sexual behavior can 
be strong. The impulse to look away at an embarrassing scene is 
regarded as good manners, a lesson in etiquette than can be only too 
readily misapplied in the workforce when the embarrassment would 
accrue to someone in power. One properly trained in etiquette may be 
inclined to avert his or her eyes at the sight of the boss manhandling 
his secretary. The individual alarm needed to bring a group into 
communication about a leader problem may never be sounded, thereby 
making outcry a victim of the comfort afforded by manners as well as 
by the ease granted by ready rationalization in preference to the 
afflictions of civic courage. In such a moment, etiquette shows 
integrity the door. Sadly, the possibility that unwillingness to speak 
can also be a feature of monetary advantage cannot be dismissed. 
Certain nonprofits, aside from universities, may be even more 
subject to sexualized mistreatment of employees. In entities heavily 
organized around private fundraising, employees may have absolutely 
no recourse because of the array of incentives created by the need to 
cultivate donors. As anyone involved in a setting in which donors 
contribute significant resources would recognize, donors are spoken 
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of with something akin to reverence. A recent report concerning the 
lack of any power on the part of female fundraisers in nonprofits to 
stop sexual harassment by donors they must approach is troubling.62 
One fundraiser said that the result is less money for the charity she is 
working to fund.63 The encouraging word is that fundraisers who know 
the problem have formed group efforts to change the culture.64 
Presumably, open speech about abusive donors, or litigation, is 
entirely impractical, so the method being used is that of education 
about the problem in general, rather than confrontation that would 
result in even greater losses of funding to charitable organizations.  
Before the series of university sex scandals affecting students, 
there was already a long-standing problem involving career-damaging 
or -ending sexual harassment and retaliation against female faculty. 
Strong women faculty were in some cases driven out of one university 
to another one, and other women left academia entirely.65 Faculty 
 
 62. See Debra Nussbaum Cohen, Women in Jewish Fundraising Say 
Harassment is Pervasive, JEWISH TEL. AGENCY (Feb. 26, 2018, 4:17 PM), 
https://www.jta.org/2018/02/26/news-opinion/united-states/for-women-in-jewish-
fundraising-harassment-is-an-occupational-hazard?utm_source=JTA%20Maropost 
&utm_campaign=JTA&utm_medium=email&mpweb=1161-3106-207459 
[https://perma.cc/D3DT-BCNS] (“At the end of the day, in the nonprofit world, 
donors hold nearly all the power. Most big-money donors are male.”). 
 63. See id. 
 64. See id.  
 65. See Tom Bartlett & Nell Gluckman, She Left Harvard. He Got to Stay, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/interactives/ 
harvard-harassment [https://perma.cc/AG2K-X9DV] (describing the sexual 
harassment by Jorge Dominguez); see also James S. Bikales, Protected By Decades-
Old Power Structures, Three Renowned Harvard Anthropologists Face Allegations 
of Sexual Harassment, HARV. CRIMSON (May 29, 2020), 
https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2020/5/29/harvard-anthropology-gender-issues/ 
[https://perma.cc/H8LJ-PREA] (reporting their denials); Joey Garrison, Harvard 
Bans Ex-Professor After Finding ‘Unwelcome Sexual Conduct’ Spanned Four 
Decades, USA TODAY (May 11, 2019, 2:44 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/ 
news/nation/2019/05/09/harvard-university-professor-jorge-dominguez-sexual-
harassment-misconduct-metoo-title-ix/1154497001 [https://perma.cc/BMK7-5U6E] 
(stating that Dominguez has been asked to leave the faculty). Though harassment has 
been and likely is still a factor in departures by talented women from the academy, 
those who leave should not be understood as “unworthy” of an academic post. A 
reader commented as follows: “[One should not imply that] flight from the 
unfavorable circumstance [of sexual harassment] is due to the women in question not 
being as ‘worthy’ to continue their academic careers, which elides the possibility of 
some women deciding in the wake of being harassed or worse that academia isn’t 
worth the headaches/doesn’t deserve them/had its chance and blew it. There’s an 
unfortunate tendency by academics to regard those who moved from in-group to out-
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members with sufficient power—who are often male—in many 
instances commanded access to significant monetary resources (rich 
grants or other forms of donor aid) to the university.66 In addition, 
sexual harassment of students by male faculty was far from unknown, 
and targets who made an issue of it were in some cases subjected to 
severe expressions of disapproval.67  
The fact that sexual transgression against women occurred, and 
that once a woman was targeted and resisted she could not recover her 
standing in an academic institution against the displeasure of a 
powerful male, is well known by the generation who began to enter 
the academy as graduate students and then as junior faculty in the 
1970s.68 The denial of tenure was a fairly standard scenario, sometimes 
having been preceded by sexually inappropriate treatment of these 
women. Heightened standards applied to their tenure case were 
frequently in contrast to a more forgiving standard that had been 
applied to the males who considered their candidacy or to the men who 
followed in the tenure queue. For women academics who reported 
sexual harassment, the regimen of federal anti-discrimination law 
under Title IX was inadequate and even perverse.69 Despite 
interpretations of changing mores as between men and women 
purportedly explaining behavior that was shielded from accountability 
and finally confronted by #MeToo, toleration of male sexual predation 
was not a fit for much of the wider culture outside the academy or 
other institutional settings. Were it not the case that norms of sexually 
 
group as castoffs rather than successful migrants to less-oppressive environs.” See 
Statement of Anonymous Copy Editor (June 3, 2020). 
 66. See, e.g., Stephanie Saul, Harvard Professor Resigns Amid Allegations 
of Sexual Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2018), https:www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/03/06/us/harvard-professor-resigns-sexual-harassment.html 
[https://perma.cc/5UBD-D44J]. 
 67. Feminist writer Naomi Wolf provides a striking example of the deep 
inclination within the broad culture to rally to protect the male whom a student target 
“outs” for sexual harassment. In the case of Wolf, she disclosed after twenty years 
that the eminent Yale Professor Harold Bloom had invited her to his home for 
scholarly interaction and had placed his hand on her thigh. See Naomi Wolf, The Silent 
Treatment, N.Y. MAG. (Feb. 20, 2004), http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/features/ 
n_9932/ [https://perma.cc/EA8J-43EC] (recounting the negative commentary about 
Wolf’s revelation about Bloom and her attacks on her alma mater’s response when 
she complained after twenty years). 
 68. See, e.g., Bartlett & Gluckman, supra note 65. 
 69. See generally Anne Lawton, Between Scylla and Charybdis: The Perils 
of Reporting Sexual Harassment, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 603 (2007) (describing 
the failure of university investigative procedures to protect the victim of sexual 
harassment by a fellow faculty member). 
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proper and respectful behavior exist and have existed, the predicate 
for #MeToo would be entirely absent. Hence, the record of long-
standing unchecked misconduct in institutional settings must be seen 
as a form of institutional malfunction or systemic corruption in which 
many individuals are implicated, some perpetrating, others 
facilitating, and the many tolerating passively. If manners explain 
some portion of the silence about sexual misconduct, it cannot entirely 
account for the Epic Failures involving institutionally sheltered 
predation. 
These highly visible institutional failures—long-term tolerance 
of sexual abuse of students being the most stunning and well 
publicized—provide a contextual basis to examine a cultural failure in 
universities, one that is unaddressed by the existing formal 
accountability mechanisms. 
3. Where Votes of No Confidence Happen Today 
If faculty votes were part of the ordinary governance process in 
most universities, a no confidence vote might require some 
preliminary private consultation, but it could soon become an occasion 
for the faculty to join together to debate and draft a resolution against 
their president, vote, and, if it passes, publish it in the proceedings of 
the faculty body, which would be readily available to the whole 
community.70 Ideally, the president would accept the verdict of her 
peers in the academy with grace.71 Admittedly, the foregoing depicts 
the epistemic ideal. One should not underestimate the depth of fear 
even within regularized proceedings in a university in which the target 
 
 70. At Harvard, the vote of no confidence in President Summers was noticed 
for a regular faculty meeting and passed in the meeting, but it was by no means an 
ordinary use of the notice procedure for a meeting of the Harvard faculty of arts and 
sciences. See Summers Gets Vote, supra note 1 (stating that the resolution was unheard 
of in Harvard’s modern history). In 1939, President James Conant averted a planned 
motion that was understood to constitute a vote of no confidence by apologizing to 
the faculty at the beginning of the meeting in which the motion was to be lodged. He 
also pleaded that the faculty not allow his mistakes to harm Harvard for years to come. 
JENNET CONANT, MAN OF THE HOUR: JAMES B. CONANT: WARRIOR SCIENTIST 170–72 
(2017). 
 71. Lord North was the first British Prime Minister to accept the principle, 
upon learning of a vote of no confidence against him in Parliament, to acknowledge 
that the government had collective responsibility for policies and hence could be 
attacked “as a whole” by demanding the removal of a minister. See MACKINTOSH, 
supra note 47, at 64. This history, though not well known, is embedded in the oral 
tradition by which faculties expect the recipient of notice of a motion of censure to 
yield to its significance as a critical loss of needed support.  
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of a vote of no confidence may be thought likely to retaliate, and in 
which the notion of a cultivated voice seems incompatible with an 
attack on a person regarded as a colleague. The tension between an 
elite monopoly on public reason and an attempt at input by the average 
person is replicated even in the rarefied precincts of Harvard 
University.72  
Instead, many such votes in America occur in improvised private 
settings, such as, for small colleges, reserved meeting rooms in 
restaurants or a faculty member’s home.73 In others, members find 
some means of using the university system for email communication, 
sometimes without assurances that such a use by faculty for entity-
wide communication is permissible.74 Moreover, faculty members of 
American institutions must sometimes work against efforts by the 
university to inflate the balloting list by including in it the staff of the 
administration.75  
 
 72. See Richard Posner, Summers’ Resignation and Organization Theory, 
BECKER-POSNER BLOG (Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.becker-posner-
blog.com/2006/02/summers-resignation-and-organization-theory--posner.html 
[https://perma.cc/38MF-PFRM] [hereinafter Summers’ Resignation] (explicitly 
arguing that the trustees are solely capable of assessing Harvard interests for the long 
term). See ROSENFELD, supra note 7, at 37–38 (describing “the history of modern 
democracy” as “riven with constant tension between the rule of expert truth, on the 
one hand, and the rule of majority instincts, on the other”).  
 73. My own law college has experienced votes over a period of many years 
in such locations. The use of an off-campus location can be controversial, especially 
if the institution is subject to open meetings laws, but in any event, the meeting can 
be treated by critics as clandestine and hence discreditable to the group. Such 
responses play a role in the efforts by administrators to dismiss the vote as lacking all 
meaning for official action. 
 74. See Telephone Interview July 28, supra note 59 (explaining that the 
faculty senate “was not interested or willing to take up the question, and they certainly 
weren’t willing, as it were, to call for, authorize or sponsor this kind of vote” and that 
the group that did a no confidence vote contained “senators with a right to send out 
email messages to all faculty by email [and] [s]o that’s how we did it . . . because I 
doubt very much that the administration would have given us the emails”).  
 75. It is a common responsive tactic after a vote of no confidence has 
occurred with majority support for the motion for the officials in the target’s 
institution to argue that the denominator is too small, because it should include certain 
others, including non-tenure-stream faculty members and staff. In a long-running 
conflict at the University of Louisville regarding President James Ramsey, the 
president seemingly took matters into his own hands, or those of his helpers. In an 
Insider Louisville reader poll, Insider Louisville reported significant ballot stuffing 
that occurred in the online poll. See Joe Sonka, IP Addresses That Skewed Ramsey 
No-Confidence Poll Located at U of L’s Grawemeyer Hall, Where President Office Is 
Housed, LOUISVILLE FUTURE (Apr. 13, 2016), https://insiderlouisville.com 
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Finally, despite the provenance of the vote of no confidence in 
British parliamentary history, such votes in American nonprofit 
organizations have not developed in tandem with the parliamentary 
practice.76 Unlike the British context, the typical American nonprofit 
group or state university is not a self-governing body that creates a 
government understood to be responsible to its members.77 In the 
 
/government/ip-addresses-of-users-who-skewed-ramsey-no-confidence-located-of-
u-of-ls-grawemeyer-hall-where-presidents-office-is-located/ [https://perma.cc/ 
C6MH-GGGN]. The paper did a kind of electronic exit poll analysis, summarizing 
the voting patterns and locations as follows: 
After the first 24 hours, well over 80 percent of voters supported 
a no-confidence motion, but in the span of two hours, the results 
suspiciously flipped to 78 percent supporting Ramsey. Of the 
1,000 votes cast before the poll was taken down, 68 percent came 
from IP addresses on U of L’s campus within a two-hour span on 
the day after the poll was posted—all supporting Ramsey. Based 
on Insider Louisville’s IP data, up to 15 votes per minute were 
cast from the same computer, which the head of our IT 
department said suggests a script potentially was used to subvert 
the survey. At the very least, a user would have had to turn off his 
computer’s “cookies” to override IL’s intended one-vote limit 
and proceed to cast many votes in quick succession. Nearly half 
of the total votes in the survey came from three IP addresses at 
Grawemeyer Hall in the same two-hour timeframe; 146 votes 
came from two wireless users on the Belknap campus.  
Id. Notably, the University of Louisville open records administrator denied a request 
by Insider Louisville for location and user information about the respondents. See id. 
Nonetheless, because Insider Louisville already had email address information, the 
media outlet was able to reconstruct an exit poll. See id. 
76.  See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text. 
 77. As noted, by comparison to a parliamentary body, the governing structure 
of institutions of higher education in the United States have many variations in their 
governance, but the common factor is a governing structure that lacks an obvious logic 
for maintaining legitimacy in the face of negative opinion within “the body” 
responsible for its mission. See id.; see also Colleges and Organizational Structure of 
Universities, STATEUNIVERSITY.COM, https://education.stateuniversity.com/pages 
/1859/Colleges-Universities-Organizational-Structure.html#ixzz5PoNenCpy 
[https://perma.cc/8HGW-XZ3P] (last visited Apr. 13, 2020) (“While a private liberal 
arts college may have a large board of trustees, and a public research university nested 
in a state system no trustees of its own, the vast majority of public and private 
universities are overseen by an institutional or system-wide governing board. . . . A 
university’s governing board, also known as the trustees, regents, or board of visitors, 
possesses fundamental legal authority over the university. The authority of the 
governing board is vested in it by the state wherein the school resides or, particularly 
in the case of older, private institutions, by legally binding royal or colonial 
charters.”). Notably, “[p]rivate boards are generally self-perpetuating, with new 
trustees chosen by the membership of the standing board.” Id. Though public 
universities have boards nominally representative of the public, the process by which 
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British parliamentary context, “[a] government cannot operate 
effectively unless it can command a majority within the House of 
Commons. Should it fail to enjoy the confidence of a majority of the 
House, it has to hold a general election.”78 The government’s 
legitimacy derives from the election of the members of the 
representative body that continues to support the prime minister.79 
For American nonprofit entities, there is no transparent logic as 
to how its governance structure makes it legitimate.80 Rather, nonprofit 
bodies of the sort under discussion here typically consist of a 
governing board, a principal administrator named by the board, and a 
large body of professional members primarily responsible for the work 
of the entity.81 Their basic case for the maintenance of legitimacy is 
 
such faculty opinion can be transmitted for purposes of accountability to an informed 
body, such as members of the House in Great Britain or an engaged board of trustees, 
lacks the obvious vigor and tight logic of a parliamentary vote of no confidence. See 
id. A vote by faculty expressing a loss of confidence carries some clout, though the 
clout is qualified by the “fuzzy” accountability logic in the university. See id. A self-
perpetuating board is among the most insulated of governance structures possible, as 
a simple matter of logical implication from fact. See id. 
 78. HOUSE OF COMMONS INFORMATION OFFICE, PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, 
FACTSHEET M7, MEMBERS SERIES, (2010). 
 79. See John D. Huber, The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary 
Democracies, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 269, 270 (1996) (“The confidence vote 
procedure is part of a broad class of institutional arrangements that formalize a prime 
minister’s dependence on majority support in the legislature.”). Huber provides useful 
explanation of the phenomenon of government-initiated confidence votes, in which 
the government places pressure on its supporters in a parliamentary body to express 
confidence in specific policies or programs. See id. at 269. Although Huber calls these 
procedures formal, for a table of Confidence Vote Procedures in Eighteen 
Democracies, he uses as his sources “the Constitution, the standing orders of the lower 
house, and interviews with at least one member of the permanent staff of the 
legislature.” Id. at 271. Thus, the parliamentary procedures are, in a certain sense, a 
hybrid of formal (authorized) and informal (belonging to the body without written 
documentation). See id. 
 80. My coauthor and I will provide a case study of an organization with 
governing documents that enabled the members to elect replacements for a board after 
obtaining their resignation through a vote of no confidence. See KUYKENDALL & 
MCKINNISS, supra note 26. The organization is the Ontario Medical Association, a 
large membership group that advances the interests of Ontario physicians by helping 
strengthen resources for their public mission but does not function as an operational 
body responsible to deliver services. See id. Given its organizational format with 
governance rules that resemble corporate election practices, the Association did have 
clarity about the ultimate source of legitimacy, but it took considerable work and the 
revelation by the members to recognize their capacity to supplant the board and then 
alter the bylaws for more responsive paths to board membership. See id. 
 81. Votes of no confidence occur in certain public service organizations, such 
as fire departments, police departments, libraries, and health organizations. These 
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their contribution to society by adherence to their mission and to 
standards of decent conduct. For both of those tests, the most well-
informed group to attest to the retention of legitimacy, under the 
governance provided by the boards and the named leaders, is the 
professional group responsible for the mission and for the welfare of 
its beneficiaries. Nonetheless, given the large numbers of such 
organizations, the variety in form, and their dispersed locations, the 
understanding of the role of the professional group in attesting to or 
rebutting the bona fides of the organization as it is being governed by 
the incumbent leaders is not well formed. In the British Parliament, 
the practice evolved away from initial outrage against an effort to oust 
a leader approved by the King to an understanding that the Prime 
Minister was a result of an election of the members who stood for 
office with him as the standard bearer.82  
Given the relatively shallow history of the American practice in 
nonrepresentative entities and the long history of the development and 
refinement of the practice in the British Parliamentary tradition, the 
American version of the no confidence vote lacks the maturity and 
clarity supplied by a cohesive British political culture. The case for the 
vote of no confidence in the situations and cultures described above is 
subject to confusion and controversy.83 The formation and execution 
 
have members with special skills that give the members a sense of solidarity around 
a common calling and the requirements for them to pursue that calling competently 
and with the respect due to any person. Id. See Excerpts From ‘No Confidence’ Letter, 
HANFORD SENTINEL (Dec. 27, 2010), https://hanfordsentinel.com/news/local/excerpts 
-from-no-confidence-letter/article_b0e76f5e-11ec-11e0-9597-001cc4c002e0.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZE4L-573M], for a statement, with a bill of particulars, of a group 
of department heads in Hanford, Connecticut. Libraries often experience votes of no 
confidence and are a target of the usual critique. See John N. Berry, III, Editorial, The 
“No Confidence” Vote: A New Weapon for Library Staff, Effective but Dangerous, 
LIBR. J., Sept. 1, 2006, at 8 (“Used carelessly or too often, the no confidence vote can 
create the workplace equivalent of mob rule and thus undermine the credibility of the 
strategy and those who use it.”).  
 82. Recent events in the British Parliament have unusual features that are 
beyond the scope of this Article.  
 83. The vote of no confidence that resulted in the resignation of President 
Larry Summers from his presidency at Harvard University created significant 
confusion and antagonism at Harvard within the faculty, among alumni of Harvard, 
and on the part other observers of Harvard as “a case study in the ability of college 
presidents to exercise management control in a historically collegial and decentralized 
environment.” Lois Romano, Embattled Harvard President to Resign, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 22, 2006), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006 
/02/21/AR2006022101842_pf.html [https://perma.cc/YU4R-XZ6F] (quoting 
Professor of Law Alan Dershowitz as charging that “one group of faculty managed a 
coup d’etat not only against Summers but against the whole Harvard community”).  
448 Michigan State Law Review  2020 
of a no confidence vote is a process often fraught with anxiety about 
and ignorance of the process.84 The ignorance of the process sends 
those considering a no confidence action on a search for information 
and analysis.85 Absence of knowledge causes anxiety by those faced 
with a possible need for group voice. Moreover, the administrative 
hierarchy’s reaction to a no confidence vote is typically formulaic, 
indifferent, and/or brusque.86 In an extreme response, a law school 
board fired all the untenured faculty after such a vote, even though 
none of these junior faculty had participated.87 Votes of no confidence 
 
 84. Sean McKinniss, the coauthor of my forthcoming book, and I have 
spoken with faculty members who shared details of clandestine meetings to discuss 
no confidence votes at their respective institutions. One faculty member was said to 
have demanded to discuss a no confidence vote from his home because he thought his 
office telephone was wiretapped. See KUYKENDALL & MCKINNISS, supra note 26. 
While some observers may view such a concern as unduly mired in conspiratorial 
thinking and even paranoia, facts about the atmosphere in many universities and other 
institutions make the fear understandable, whatever the facts of a university’s 
willingness to spy on faculty members. Similar concerns exist regarding the use of 
institutional email services. See id. 
 85. Some faculty members provide information for others through 
professional publication of accounts of a vote of no confidence in which they were 
involved. See Zack, supra note 20, for a good example. The need of such information, 
and analysis of the reasons that such votes occur, with a basis in organizational logic, 
is considerable. My coauthor and I were told by a leader of a vote of no confidence 
by doctors in Canada that our advice about consulting one’s conscience about one’s 
true motives—moral and ethical or simple self-interest—gave her the fortitude to 
proceed. Telephone Interview with Anonymous, Member Physician, Canadian 
Doctors’ Ass’n (Oct. 2, 2017) (noting that, “[p]articularly at that point—where many 
of us were wondering, “Do we stop, or do we keep pushing forward?”—your words 
really helped”). 
 86. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Statement from Martin Lipton, Chair, NYU 
Board of Trustees, NYU (May 2013), http://www.nyu.edu/about/leadership-
university-administration/board-of-trustees/statement-from-martin-lipton--chair--
nyu-board-of-trustees.html [https://perma.cc/JU8Y-FBA6]. The President of the New 
York University Board of Trustees quickly issued a strong response to a vote of no 
confidence by faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences in the President, John 
Sexton. See Kevin Kiley, Not Your University, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Dec. 19, 2012), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/12/19/nyu-vote-no-confidence-
highlights-divergent-views-faculty-role-governance [https://perma.cc/J2TC-TDDY] 
(“‘I have widely consulted my colleagues on the board, and their observations align 
with mine: John’s stewardship has been superb, he is widely and rightly 
acknowledged as an international leader in higher education, and he — and the 
strategic direction he has set for the university — enjoys the support of the board,’ 
said board Chairman Martin Lipton in that statement.”). 
 87. See KUYKENDALL & MCKINNISS, supra note 26 (referring specifically to 
the vote of no confidence in the dean of the Detroit College of Law, the corporate 
predecessor to Michigan State College of Law).  
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in universities are often denounced as nothing more than the self-
serving behavior of an insulated and privileged faculty.88  
This standard attack resembles one of the methods discussed by 
Tamar Frankel in her book on trust and [dis]honesty in American’s 
business culture as a means by targets to debunk charges of 
dishonesty.89 The practice of graceful exit by the resignation of the 
target, in a concession to the notion of a gentleman’s honor, may have 
been lost to the mists of time in today’s American leadership culture. 
The result of the shallow roots in a culture quite different from the 
cohesive British political class is that groups struggle to understand 
the normative place of the vote of no confidence. In the university and 
other nonprofit institutions, the mixture of authority, lack of true 
ownership, reliance on expert groups responsible for mission, and 
periodic crisis caused by poor leaders leaves faculties and other 
professionals grasping for a guide to legitimate responses appropriate 
to a guardianship role for the entity’s mission. Simplicity is not to be. 
Yet an intriguing pattern of successful faculty efforts has 
emerged, even without the normative understandings that have given 
the original model its acceptance as a functional feature of democracy 
as practiced in the English Parliament (and in many others).90 Even so, 
success does not foster widely accepted norms. An oral tradition 
within universities and other organizations provides a poorly marked 
pathway through the thickets of a modern bureaucratic forest in which 
dangers haunt the imagination of faculty torn between the unknown 
dangers of speech and the continuing costs of silence. Scores of 
faculties have held votes that resulted in leadership changes.91 Still the 
process of developing and implementing a no confidence vote may 
 
 88. Judge Richard Posner expressed such views in commenting on a vote of 
no confidence by Harvard faculty members in President Lawrence Summers. See 
Richard Posner, The Summers Controversy and Academic Governance, BECKER-
POSNER BLOG (Feb. 27, 2005), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2005/02/the-
summers-controversy-and-university-governance.html [https://perma.cc/A76P-
VXRA] (arguing that the interests of the trustees, as well as their time horizon and 
primary focus, are in better alignment with the interests of the university than those 
of the faculty); see also Summers’ Resignation, supra note 72 (referring to the Harvard 
faculty as “a faculty many of whose members are both smug and superannuated”). 
 89. See also infra Part III (discussing votes of no confidence at universities). 
See generally FRANKEL, supra note 32 (discussing methods of debunking claims of 
widespread dishonesty). 
 90. See Sean McKinniss, No-Confidence Vote Database, 
SEANMCKINNISS.ORG, http://www.seanmckinniss.org/no-confidence-vote-database/ 
[https://perma.cc/ETM4-GF2B] (last visited Apr. 13, 2020) (displaying a database of 
successful votes of no confidence). 
 91. See id. 
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generate dread and confusion, as well as inspire retaliation or 
falsehoods. We may anticipate not the oft-invoked specter of unduly 
frequent and poorly justified votes, but rather the likelihood of 
underproduction of the group statements that provide alerts to 
leadership pathology. From this incongruity arrives a question that is 
the focus of this Article: what can be done when a no confidence vote 
is warranted, but faculty, out of fear or, worse, passivity, will not 
pursue it? Is there a substitute for the no confidence vote?  
III. EPIC FAILURES IN THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: PROBLEMS AND 
RESPONSES IN THE UNIVERSITY TO SEXUAL PREDATION 
In the United States, except for the for-profit corporation, 
accountability logic is failing in critical organizational sites in which 
much of the nation’s collective life occurs.92 Nonprofit corporations 
depend on weakly motivated boards of directors for monitoring the 
leaders of the organization. In addition to the formal availability of a 
monitoring board, such organizations develop internal mechanisms 
that purport to place leaders under potential scrutiny for misconduct 
or general failure as leaders. Unfortunately, these mechanisms have 
shown a pattern of failure in recent scandals. Universities are the 
disturbing exemplar of weak internal checks that have in recent years 
produced near-catastrophic failures of internal oversight, with 
sustained social harms of an extreme nature only ended by public 
exposure and outcry.93  
 
 92. The for-profit corporation has become increasingly accountable to 
investors who seek high returns, in part because of a reform of rules to make more 
efficient pressure on boards by activist shareholders seeking positions. See Loop et 
al., supra note 9. The primary metric of accountability in these profit corporations is 
share price, which is driven mainly by decisions about the business approach. 
Nonetheless, the access of motivated shareholders to the pressure points on boards 
also creates incentives for management to prevent scandals that create legal liability 
for money damages or regulatory financial penalties. See Len Sherman, Why Boards 
Must Step Up to Deter Corporate Scandals, FORBES (Mar. 13, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/lensherman/2017/03/13/why-boards-must-step-up-to-
deter-corporate-scandals/#29c446f11b79 [https://perma.cc/2VFH-UPXL]. It is 
nonetheless notably the case that money is the coin of the realm for such shareholders, 
not morality or ethics. See generally FRANKEL, supra note 32 (discussing the driving 
motivation of corporate shareholders). 
 93. As this Article has been in draft, new revelations about cover up of 
widespread sexual assault of children in the Catholic Church has come to light. See 
Catholic Church Sexual Abuse Scandal: 7 Excerpts From the Grand Jury Report, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/us/catholic-
priests-pennsylvania-church-jury.html?action=click&module=MoreInSection 
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The most recent of these scandals have coincided with the 
emergence of the #MeToo movement, a cultural phenomenon thought 
to constitute a sea change in attitudes toward the right social, cultural, 
and legal response to sexual predation.94 These #MeToo scandals in 
universities are a grim revelation of the burden of a flawed 
administrative environment in the American university, but they also 
provide a ray of hope. The public responses to the facts of sexual 
predation and harassment, long in duration in certain universities, 
demonstrate that students, as a sympathetic class of complainants, can 
achieve a period of sustained public accounting. It is yet to be 
determined whether student voice can achieve actual change in the 
conduct of the administrative class, in addition to one-time class 
settlements in compensation for injuries or a related one-time set of 
administrative resignations and pledges of a new determination to be 
accountable. 
The recent highly publicized and deeply damaging scandals in 
several universities have revealed a gap in accountability sufficient to 
insulate the culture of a leading nonprofit sector from scrutiny needed 
to prevent social damage.95  
 
&pgtype=Article&region=Footer&contentCollection=U.S [https://perma.cc/4H4S-
4S52]. The duration over years—seventy years is alleged—and the geographic 
dispersion—worldwide is alleged—portrays successful resistance to accountability in 
self-governed organizations, free of outside monitoring even by criminal authorities. 
See id. The record of such duration and persistence of abusive conduct demands 
renewed attention to the shortcomings of internal organizational checks implicitly 
reliant on a morally attuned cultural atmosphere. See id. Further, some of the facts—
priest pedophile rings and use of whips on children being abused—beggar the 
imagination as they also inform a new understanding of the extent of misconduct that 
organizations are capable of producing and concealing. See id. A Pennsylvania grand 
jury wrote a 900-page reporting that began, “[w]e, the members of this grand jury, 
need you to hear this.” Id. 
 94. See RJ Wolcott, #MeToo Founder Tarana Burke Speaks at MSU: ‘This 
is a Survivor’s Movement’, LANSING ST. J. (Apr. 19, 2018, 8:53 PM), 
https://www.lansingstatejournal.com/story/news/local/2018/04/19/metoo-msu-
burke/534083002/ [https://perma.cc/28JM-ZFB7]; see also Kristen Jordan Shamus, 
#MeToo’s Tarana Burke Speaks at MSU for Survivors, not for Spin, DETROIT FREE 
PRESS (Apr. 19, 2018, 8:44 PM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/2018/04/19/ 
metoos-tarana-burke-appears-msu-survivors-not-spin/533259002/ [https://perma.cc/ 
MK8B-BX9T].  
 95. See generally Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 
Again, YALE L.J.F. (June 18, 2018) https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/ 
reconceptualizing-sexual-harassment-again [https://perma.cc/G85X-FJ4G] 
(addressing the #MeToo movement in connection with the broad issues raised by the 
sexual harassment scandals in Silicon Valley and Hollywood). Schultz develops 
analysis (with a resemblance to analysis I have developed) concerning the psychology 
of authority in certain settings. See id. She cites a number of studies on the sources of 
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A. A Preliminary Overview of Recent Sexual Scandals in Universities  
The facts of the university sexual scandals can only be called 
damning. The revelations that a respected university gave a sexual 
predator access to its facilities for abuse, disguised as medical care and 
committed on student athletes and local teen gymnasts, have shocked 
and galvanized public opinion and created massive liability for the 
institution. One other university sustained large financial liability and 
saw its president imprisoned.96 At least two other universities await 
further development of the facts.97 The public reaction has brought a 
new clarity to the role demanded of university administrators and their 
boards: strong protection of students, faculty, staff, and visitors to a 
campus from sexual assault or molestation, importuning for sex, and 
other unconscionable treatment; timely exit of leaders not capable of, 
 
male entitlement, with implications for a psychology of unaccountable power. See id. 
Schultz emphasizes gendered patterns in lack of accountability through a “worship” 
of maleness. See id. For her treatment of maleness worship, see id. at n.138 and 
accompanying text (citing Noah Berlatsky, It’s Time to Stop Worshipping Powerful 
Men, QUARTZ (Oct. 14, 2017), https://qz.com/1102376/its-time-to-stop-worshipping-
powerful-men [https://perma.cc/FK72-7MZZ]). I have not addressed maleness but 
aspects of ritual in settings of power. 
 96. See Marc Tracy, With Paterno Revelations, Ruling Deals Hit to Penn 
State’s Wallet, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05 
/07/sports/ncaafootball/joe-paterno-jerry-sandusky-penn-state-ruling.html 
[https://perma.cc/4AZH-SDWW]; Aria Bendix, Former Penn State President 
Sentenced to Jail Over Sandusky Scandal, ATLANTIC (June 2, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/06/former-penn-state-president-
sentenced-to-jail-sandusky-scandal/529044 [https://perma.cc/9V4P-C973].  
 97. Facts are under investigation at Ohio State regarding the impact on male 
victims of sexual violation, heightened by political coverage of the denials of 
wrestlers’ charges by Congressman Jim Jordan that he knew and ignored the 
molestation of wrestlers while a coach at OSU, statements by Jordan calling the 
wrestler’s dishonest, and the filing of a lawsuit by one wrestler. See Rachael Bade & 
John Bresnahan, ‘A Cesspool of Deviancy’: New Claims of Voyeurism Test Jordan 
Denials, POLITICO (July 6, 2018, 5:32 PM), https://www.politico.com/story 
/2018/07/06/jim-jordan-harassment-ohio-state-wrestling-699192 [https://perma.cc/ 
U94D-D9ME]; see also Catie Edmondson, Two Lawsuits Against Ohio State Keep 
Jim Jordan in the Cross Hairs, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/18/us/politics/jim-jordan-ohio-state-sexual-
abuse.html [https://perma.cc/QPE4-3PUC]. The University of Southern California 
has been facing revelations of medically abusive sexualized treatment of female 
students, which led to the resignation of the president of the university. See Karma 
Allen, University of Southern California President Steps Down Amid Sex Abuse 
Scandal, ABC NEWS (Aug. 8, 2018, 7:53 AM), https://abcnews.go.com 
/US/university-southern-california-president-steps-amid-sex-abuse/story?id= 
57103822 [https://perma.cc/UG2Y-3J3U].  
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or committed to, protecting basic norms of respect for those with weak 
or no power in the organization; and care for institutional ethical and 
moral integrity throughout the institution. At the schools enumerated 
above, that minimum expectation is acknowledged not to have been 
met in connection with the safety of students.98  
B. A Very Sad Story: Leader Failures and Social Harm at Michigan 
State University  
At Michigan State University (MSU), the failure of the culture 
during the Larry Nassar scandal was catastrophic, clearly and 
painfully on display during every step of the scandal’s timeline. On an 
unknown day in 1992, Larry Nassar, a medical student at MSU, 
allegedly molested a twelve-year-old under the guise of providing 
medical treatment at a gymnastics facility near MSU.99 In 1994, 
Olympic medalist Jamie Dantzscher allegedly began to experience 
molestation under a similar pretense of medical treatment.100 The 
molestation continued for a period of six years.101 In 1997, Larissa 
Boyce, a sixteen-year-old high school student, complained to 
gymnastics coach Kathie Klages that she was molested as part of 
medical treatment and was disbelieved.102 In 1999, a student reported 
assault but was told that Nassar was “an Olympic doctor” and “knew 
what he was doing.”103 In 2000, a student told three university athletic 
trainers and one staff member of sexual misconduct and was told “she 
was fortunate to receive the best medical care possible from a world-
renowned doctor.”104 Fourteen years later, in 2014, the university 
investigated a Title IX complaint and declined to find that Nassar had 
 
 98. See Letter from Mich. House of Representatives, Law and Justice Comm. 
and Appropriations Subcomm. on Higher Educ., to Tom Leonard, Speaker, Mich. 
House of Representatives (April 5, 2018); Tim Arango, 5 Women Sue U.S.C., Alleging 
Sexual Abuse by Campus Doctor, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/21/us/usc-doctor-abuse-lawsuits.html 
[https://perma.cc/KG9D-CSMN]; Ken Belson, Abuse Scandal Inquiry Condemns 
Paterno and Penn State, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2012/07/13/sports/ncaafootball/13pennstate.html [https://perma.cc/Z3QD-RETF]. 
 99. See James Dator, A Comprehensive Timeline of the Larry Nassar Case, 
SBNATION (July 31, 2019), https://www.sbnation.com/2018/1/19/16900674/larry-
nassar-abuse-timeline-usa-gymnastics-michigan-state [https://perma.cc/V337-9H7J]. 
 100. See id. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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violated any policy.105 MSU President Lou Anna Simon received 
notice of the resolution of an issue about an unnamed doctor.106 
President Simon did not treat it as an action item but a matter for a 
routine informational referral.107 
 
 105. See Matt Mencarini, MSU Hid Full Conclusions of 2014 Nassar Report 
from Victim, LANSING ST. J. (Jan. 26, 2018, 1:52 PM), 
https://www.lansingstatejournal.com/story/news/local/2018/01/26/michigan-state-
larry-nassar-title-ix/1069493001 [https://perma.cc/7FNU-XR3Z]; see also 
Gaslighting, NPR (Nov. 12, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/transcripts 
/666227595 [https://perma.cc/9LAP-74PS]. 
 106. See Dator, supra note 99. President Simon’s account is in conformance 
with ordinary usage in a large university bureaucracy. The President in a large 
bureaucratic university receives reports and relies on subordinates to advise her 
whether action is required. In investigations of misconduct being undertaken by 
university investigatory bodies, the President’s role does not permit intervention, 
either to protect or harm the subject of the investigation. President Simon’s account 
was given in Congressional testimony and in an interview with detectives of the state 
of Michigan. See infra note 117. The latter resulted in criminal charges against her on 
the grounds that, in failing to state that she knew not merely that that there was a 
problem with a doctor but that the doctor’s name was Larry Nassar, she lied to a 
detective. In the brief in opposition to bind over of the charges, lawyers for President 
Simon presented testimony by the detectives acknowledging that they did not inform 
former President Simon of specific criminal charges they were investigating, a 
predicate, according to the belief of Simon’s attorneys, of a criminal charge. See 
Defendant’s Brief in Opposition to Bind Over at 11–14, Michigan v. Simon, No. 18-
2261-FY (56-A Dist. Ct. 2018). Nonetheless, the case was bound over for trial after a 
preliminary hearing in a county near the location of Michigan State University. For 
an explanation of the process of bind over in Michigan and the process that resulted 
in a bind over, see Tyler Silvestri, What Simon’s Bindover for Trial Does and Doesn’t 
Mean, ON THE BANKS https://onthebanksmsu.com/simon-bindover/ 
[https://perma.cc/8HCR-SSGN] (last visited June 18, 2020) (providing commentary 
at the time of the bind over and containing links to transcripts of the hearings) On May 
3, 2020, Michigan Circuit Judge John D. Maurer dismissed all charges against Simon. 
See Kim Kozlowski, Judge Dismisses Charges Against Former MSU President Simon 
in Nassar Case, DETROIT NEWS (May 13, 2020 12:15 PM) 
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2020/05/13/judge-
dismisses-charges-against-former-msu-president-simon-nassar-case/5183418002/ 
[https://perma.cc/M8NQ-THMG] [hereinafter Judge Dismisses] (containing an 
embedded opinion of Judge Mauer’s holding that the District Court Judge abused her 
discretion in holding there was probable cause that Dr. Simon committed the crimes 
charged arising from her responses to questions in the interview). In his opinion, Judge 
Maurer left undisturbed the finding of the lower court that the detectives informed 
former president Simon of specific criminal charges under investigation. See id. On 
June 29, 2020, the Attorney General of Michigan filed a notice of appeal. See Claim 
of Appeal of People of the State of Michigan, Michigan v. Simon, No. 19-20329-FH 
(Eaton County Cir. Ct. 2019), appeal docketed (Mich. Ct. App. June 29, 2020). 
 107. See Preventing Abuse in Olympic and Amateur Athletics: Ensuring a Safe 
and Secure Environment for Our Athletes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
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On August 4, 2016, the Indianapolis Star published a story on 
sexual abuse in Gymnastics USA.108 On August 29, 2016, gymnast 
Rachael Denhollander filed a police report alleging sexual assault by 
Nassar committed on her in 2000 when she was fifteen years of age.109 
The next day Nassar was relieved of clinical duties.110 Throughout 
2017 and 2018, multiple Olympic gymnasts and medal winners 
announced they were molested by Nassar.111 In March 2018, William 
Strampel, Dean of the College of Osteopathic Medicine and former 
boss of Nassar, was arrested and charged with one felony count 
involving misconduct of a public official (of a sexual nature toward 
students) and three misdemeanors, one involving Strampel’s alleged 
personal sexual assaults (for which he was acquitted) and two for 
willful neglect of public duty for not monitoring Nassar after the 
physician/predator had agreed to follow a protocol designed to protect 
students whom he treated.112  
After conviction in federal court and state court, Nassar listened 
to victim testimony for eight days in the courtroom of state Judge 
Rosemarie Aquilina.113 As the sense of community injury and outrage 
mounted, President Simon yielded to the drumbeat from politicians 
and others, including faculty members who organized a planned vote 
of no confidence against her.114 She submitted her letter of resignation 
 
Consumer Prot., Prod. Safety, Ins., and Data Sec. of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., 
and Transp., 115th Cong. (2018), 2:07:57, https://www.commerce.senate.gov/ 
2018/6/preventing-abuse-in-olympic-and-amateur-athletics-ensuring-a-safe-and-
secure-environment-for-our-athletes [https://perma.cc/7P8H-PLEN] (statement of 
Lou Anna Simon, former President of Michigan State University). 
 108. Marisa Kwiatkowski et al., A Blind Eye to Sex Abuse: How USA 
Gymnastics Failed to Report Cases, INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Aug. 4, 2016), 
https://www.indystar.com/story/news/investigations/2016/08/04/usa-gymnastics-
sex-abuse-protected-coaches/85829732/ [https://perma.cc/TMM4-45M8]. 
 109. See Dator, supra note 99. 
 110. See id. 
 111. See id. 
 112. See id.; see also Beth LeBlanc, Strampel Guilty of Misconduct in Office, 
Not Guilty of Criminal Sexual Conduct, DETROIT NEWS (June 12, 2019, 10:21 AM), 
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2019/06/12/strampel-
guilty-misconduct-office-not-guilty-criminal-sexual-conduct/1429780001 
[https://perma.cc/2LY5-A52P]. 
 113. See Dator, supra note 99. 
 114. See id. See infra note 226 (noting the phenomenon of late faculty votes 
of no confidence following scandal exposed by outside investigation); see also Tyler 
Silvestri, Nearly 1,900 Pages of Former President Simon’s Nassar-Related Emails 
Released, https://onthebanksmsu.com/nearly-1900-pages-of-former-president-
simons-nassar-related-emails-released/ [https://perma.cc/DM6D-K3XC] (last visited 
June 18, 2020) (describing the mixed content of outrage and affection in the emails 
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as President of Michigan State University, ending her term of service 
from 2005 until 2018 as the first woman President of MSU.115 On June 
4, 2018, former President Simon testified to a Senate subcommittee 
on possible flaws in university systems that legalize bureaucratic 
routine:  
I think going forward, we have to think very seriously about how we think 
about the voices and how we hear them; the processes that are very 
bureaucratic and done for lots of reasons including legal reasons that may 
have cumulated into the wrong, unintended consequences; and we have to 
continue to try to make systems better with people and with encouragement 
to have the highest standards. That is our collective responsibility, that is 
our moral responsibility and I keep thinking about ways in which voices . . 
. can be heard differently.116 
Among the revelations of the long-continuing sexual abuse of MSU 
students by a doctor for gymnasts was the impossibility of getting 
anyone in an administrative position to take action. The first failures 
occurred by supervisors of the doctor early on. They believed him and 
hired experts who said he provided medical treatment, not sexual 
predation. They did not believe young women who knew they were 
being molested. Other failures occurred as the problem continued and 
higher-level administrators overlooked and gradually denied the facts 
and failed to act on them with the requisite urgency. Toward the end 
of the scandal, President Simon saw the problem primarily as one of 
legal liability and public relations.117 The result of the inadequacy of 
 
received by President Simon during the period leading to her resignation and 
providing a link to them); see also RJ Wolcott, MSU Faculty Call for Vote of No 
Confidence in MSU President Simon, LANSING ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2018, 5:32 PM), 
https://www.lansingstatejournal.com/story/news/local/2018/01/23/msu-faculty-call-
vote-no-confidence-msu-president-simon/1058471001/ [https://perma.cc/HUK5-
3CRC]. 
 115. See Dator, supra note 99. Simon’s retirement followed over a year later. 
See Julie Mack, Former President Lou Anna Simon Retires from Michigan State 
University with $2.45M Payoff, MLIVE (July 31, 2019), 
https://www.mlive.com/news/2019/07/former-president-lou-anna-simon-retires-
from-michigan-state-university-with-245m-payoff.html [https://perma.cc/A3TE-
K9QZ]. 
 116. Sexual Abuse of Olympic and Amateur Athletes, C-SPAN, 2:14:50 (June 
5, 2018), https://www.c-span.org/video/?446373-1/usa-gymnastics-president-steve-
penny-invokes-abuse-hearing [https://perma.cc/6MUM-4CCN]. 
 117. To her credit, in Senate testimony, the President acknowledged flaws in 
the systems of lawyering and bureaucratic routine that have been built in large 
universities. See Preventing Abuse in Olympic and Amateur Athletics: Ensuring a Safe 
and Secure Environment for Our Athletes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Consumer Prot., Prod. Safety, Ins., and Data Sec. of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., 
and Transp., 115th Cong. (2018) (displaying the statement of Lou Anna K. Simon, 
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accountability mechanisms internally was that young women were 
abused for years and the president, who was otherwise thought to be 
successful, was forced to step down.118  
After the doctor was convicted and leadership was changed at 
the top, the continuing revelations mounted with shocking and 
cumulative effect. As noted, the dean of the medical school was 
arrested after having already been terminated from his deanship.119 The 
severity of the charges against him, which implicated him in personal 
misconduct as well as neglect of duty to protect students treated by 
Nassar, multiplied the sense there had been unchecked predation at the 
 
President Emeritus, Michigan State University). That said, the MSU culture in which 
she had made her entire career was not one of transparency, or safety for those who 
attempt to report misconduct upward. The University had a Title IX rebuke in its 
record concerning the treatment of women who reported sexual assaults by MSU 
athletes. See RJ Wolcott, Feds: MSU Mishandled Sexual Assault Complaints, 
LANSING ST. J. (Sept. 1, 2015, 7:02 PM), https://www.lansingstatejournal.com/ 
story/news/local/2015/09/01/msu-agrees-bolster-response-sexual-violence/71528172 
[https://perma.cc/F6LQ-9JA2]. One response was to crack down on faculty members 
if they made jokes about “going postal” or “killing” someone for repeating time-
consuming mistakes. The policy was called “zero tolerance” and was enforced against 
faculty members for jokes while Dr. Nassar was continuing to molest MSU students, 
after students had complained over the years. For the 2015 rebuke, see Press Release, 
U.S. Dept. of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, Michigan State University Agrees to 
Changes Its Response to Complaints of Sexual Harassment, Sexual Violence (Sept. 
1, 2015), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/michigan-state-university-agrees-
change-its-response-complaints-sexual-harassment-sexual-violence 
[https://perma.cc/MZG9-XGLS]; Resolution Agreement, OCR Docket Nos. 15-11-
2098 and 15-14-2113, Michigan State University, (Sept. 1, 2015); Resolution Letter 
from Meena Morey Chandra, Director, U.S. Dept. of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, 
to Kristine Zayko, Deputy General Counsel, Michigan State University (Sept. 1, 
2015), https://www2.ed.gov/documents/press-releases/michigan-state-letter.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QV3B-M8T2]; Jason Cody, MSU Improves Timeliness of Title IX 
Investigations as Government Report is Released, MSU TODAY (Sept. 1, 2015), 
https://msutoday.msu.edu/news/2015/msu-improves-timeliness-of-title-ix-
investigations-as-government-report-released [https://perma.cc/JW4F-P5W3], for 
activities relating to the Title IX action and response.  
 118. Simon resigned on January 24, 2018. See Dator, supra note 99. For 
support Simon had long enjoyed, see David Jesse, MSU Board: Lou Anna Simon to 
Stay as President, is ‘Right Leader’ for MSU, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Jan. 19, 2018, 
3:12 PM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2018/01/19/msu-
simon-president-right-leader-msu/1049238001/ [https://perma.cc/UL85-T5U2]. 
Shortly before her resignation, longtime Trustee Joel Ferguson voiced strong support 
for President Simon’s performance (since her appointment in 2005). See Lacy & 
Jesse, infra note 205. 
 119. See David Jesse & Gina Kaufman, Sources: Police Arrest Larry Nassar’s 
Michigan State University Boss, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Mar. 26, 2018, 7:58 PM), 
https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2018/03/26/larry-nassar-william-
strampel-arrest/460785002 [https://perma.cc/U42H-BX79]. 
458 Michigan State Law Review  2020 
largest, by enrollment, public university in Michigan.120 The provost 
of the University acknowledged that she reappointed him despite a 
record that included facts about his vulgarity toward students and 
faculty.121 The University was reported to have invested $500,000 in 
having a company monitor the Facebook accounts of the victims.122 
C. Case Western Reserve University School of Law Previews 
#MeToo: Individual Faculty Litigation as a Substitute for Group 
Voice 
Another Epic Failure in the university setting came to light in 
connection with the dean of Case Western Reserve University School 
of Law, and it involved litigation undertaken in 2013 by a faculty 
member as a type of one-man vote of no confidence.123 Though the 
facts that prompted the lawsuit had been rumored in the law school 
community, with coverage in the alternative press, one faculty 
member, then Associate Dean Ray Ku, had a first-person experience 
 
 120. See Cheyna Roth, Ex-MSU Dean Who Oversaw Larry Nassar is Found 
Guilty of Multiple Charges, NPR (June 12, 2019, 12:15 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/06/12/731985152/ex-msu-dean-who-oversaw-larry-
nassar-is-found-guilty-of-multiple-charges [https://perma.cc/89BD-5PTQ] (reporting 
that Strampel “was cleared of felony second-degree criminal sexual conduct”). 
 121. See David Jesse, Michigan State University Provost Abruptly Resigns in 
Wake of Nassar Report, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Sept. 5, 2019, 12:34 PM), 
https://www.freep.com/story/news/education/2019/09/05/msu-provost-june-youatt-
resigns/2220940001/ [https://perma.cc/EZW9-V9AP] (quoting Youatt’s defense of 
her review of Strampel and her concession that she knew of “several accounts of 
inappropriate remarks and a number of concerns about uncouth and sometimes 
offensive language during the review period”).  
 122. See MSU Paid Firm $500,000 to Monitor Larry Nassar Victims During 
Sentence Hearing, GUARDIAN (Mar. 28, 2018, 4:55 PM EDT), 
https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2018/mar/28/michigan-state-university-
consulting-fees-larry-nassar-abuse [https://perma.cc/34NR-QAQT].  
 123. See Doug Brown, Sex, Politics and Revenge: Lawrence Mitchell was 
Supposed to Bring Stability to Case Western Reserve University’s Law School, Not 
Treat It as His Personal Pickup Playground, CLEVELAND SCENE (May 6, 2014), 
https://www.clevescene.com/cleveland/sex-politics-and-revenge-lawrence-mitchell-
was-supposed-to-bring-stability-to-case-western-reserve-universitys-law-school-not-
treat-it-as/Content?oid=4307875 [https://perma.cc/TQ7P-7YNR] (reporting Ku’s 
lawsuit against Mitchell and the University); see also Paul Caron, Shanghai Law 
Students Seek to Oust Former Case Western Dean, Say #MeToo Movement Should 
Apply in China, TAXPROF BLOG (Feb. 7, 2018), https://taxprof.typepad.com/ 
taxprof_blog/2018/02/chinese-law-students-seek-to-oust-disgraced-former-case-
western-dean-say-metoo-movement-should-in-ch.html [https://perma.cc/44UZNF4J] 
(describing Mitchell’s resignation “amidst a lawsuit alleging rampant sexual 
impropriety and retaliation against a professor who tried to blow the whistle”). 
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in connection with the uproar that followed the installation of a new 
dean in the Cleveland school.124 
The beginnings of a crisis started in August 2011 at a party held 
in Cleveland, Ohio, at the home of the newly installed dean of Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law, Lawrence Mitchell.125 
The party was an auspicious moment for a law school that had suffered 
short tenures by recent deans.126 The new dean was a distinguished 
scholar with a strong track record as a scholarly entrepreneur.127 
Unfortunately, his conduct that night became an opening note in 
stories in the Cleveland alternative press, which reported student 
descriptions of drunken decanal behavior at their events in bars and 
purported propositions by the dean for “threesomes.”128 What had 
begun with high hopes for a new leader with transformative ideas and 
with staying power was quickly becoming a decanal crash landing as 
the new dean squandered goodwill.129 As the August 2011 partygoers 
disbanded for their homes, they took impressions with them of a dean 
whose manners and persona raised eyebrows.130 They soon were aware 
that the word among students was more than an eyebrow raiser.131 It 
was alarming.  
One party attendee, Associate Dean Raymond Ku, eventually 
concluded that the dean’s behavior on the evening of the party was no 
anomaly.132 His concern with what he saw and experienced at the party 
grew quickly as he worked with the new dean. He sought help from 
Case Western administrators with respect to what the Cleveland 
alternative press has since called “rampant sexual impropriety and 
retaliation.”133 The administrators at Case Western Reserve University 
 
 124. See Brown, supra note 123 (describing an incident in which Mitchell 
allegedly made sexual comments to Ku). 
 125. See id. (stating that Ku’s genitals were brought up to him by the Dean at 
a faculty party at Dean Mitchell’s house). 
 126. See id.  
 127. See id.  
 128. See id.  
 129. See id. (describing the many positive changes Mitchell had made at the 
law school before sexual behavior came to light). 
 130. See id. 
 131. See id. 
 132. See id.  
 133. Sam Allard, Disgraced Former CWRU Law Dean Lawrence Mitchell is 
Now a Professor in Shanghai, CLEVELAND SCENE (Feb. 6, 2018, 12:50 PM), 
https://www.clevescene.com/scene-and-heard/archives/2018/02/06/disgraced-
former-cwru-law-dean-lawrence-mitchell-is-now-a-professor-in-shanghai 
[https://perma.cc/RTE2-65XZ] (describing the aftermath of Mitchell’s behavior at 
Case Western Law).  
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had, as noted, faced problems in the past with the performance of 
deans at the law school.134 In this instance, their inner response at 
facing a report from an associate dean about sexual harassment by a 
dean must have been less a vision of the recent past than a faint 
foreshadowing of the lament today of edgy administrators, hearing an 
explosive charge against a colleague: “Et tu, #MeToo?” The 
questioning exclamation would have been an anachronism when Ray 
Ku entered the office of the official at Case to whom he made his first 
report. Little did Case Western’s administrators know, but they were 
experiencing the leading edge of the coming movement for targets of 
sexual aggression to name their tormentor and demand recourse. 
Unlike Brutus, #MeToo is not an old friend or ally, but the blow it 
strikes the administrative class is heavy. 
Upon hearing from Professor Ku, the university conducted an 
investigation but announced that Ku’s reports of misconduct were 
unsubstantiated.135 The next day, Ku resigned as associate dean.136 
After a sabbatical, Ku returned to campus and learned that the dean 
had relieved him of an administrative leadership position with Case 
Western’s Center of Law, Technology, & the Arts.137 During this 
period, students also began to speak out about the dean’s allegedly 
inappropriate behavior, but the faculty seemingly preferred to avoid 
conflict.138 Nevertheless, the whirlwind of complaints and allegations 
accelerated to maximum speed. Ku shocked the city of Cleveland, the 
Case Western community, and the legal academy by filing a no-holds-
barred narrated complaint that laid out chapter and verse of alleged 
bad conduct.139 A period ensued in which Case Western officials and 
the dean strongly denied all allegations, including an allegation that 
Ku’s report to Case Western officials of his concerns had led to instant 
retaliation by the dean.140 After a siege of muted warfare between the 
dean and Ku’s lawyer, with continuing affirmation by the university 
 
 134. See Brown, supra note 123. 
 135. See id. 
 136. See id. 
 137. See id. 
 138. For an extraordinary account of the alleged retaliatory conduct by 
Mitchell against an assistant to Mitchell who reported the student complaints, as well 
as the retaliation against Ku for his reporting, see generally Affidavit of Daniel J.N. 
Dubé (Nov. 14, 2013) (on file with author) (alleging several instances of sexual 
misconduct against Mitchell). 
 139. See Brown, supra note 123. 
 140. See id. 
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of support for the dean, the parties reached a settlement.141 In addition, 
the dean announced his departure, which Mitchell asserted resulted 
from his recognition that he could not continue in light of 
distractions.142 Even after the resignation and before the suit was 
settled, Case Western law faculty members still demurred on the 
question of Mitchell’s conduct.143 
The Ku litigation and its denouement are of interest for two 
reasons. First, the subject of the lawsuit is significant in light of the 
emergence of the #MeToo movement. As is widely known, not only 
are current harassment problems being exposed and acknowledged by 
employers, but even past misconduct is subjecting individuals to 
accountability. An episode of litigation about sexual harassment, 
occurring in the relatively recent past at a major university law school, 
casts light on recent organizational responses to a recurring issue in 
the workplace, including in universities. The university is a setting that 
might be expected to foster a protective environment free of the sorts 
of concerns that result in a faculty member’s decision to file risky 
litigation and endure the potential fallout in recrimination and gossip. 
Yet sexual harassment does occur in the university, and it is not 
necessarily confronted by administrators when they learn of 
complaints. Second, private, individual litigation, such as Ku’s, is 
commonly viewed as impractical for many reasons—personal cost in 
time and stress, the relatively small damages that a faculty member 
can claim for mistreatment in the absence of termination of 
employment, the potential difficulty of finding the right lawyer for the 
problem, and the resources that an institutional target can array against 
an individual. That individual litigation can become a functional 
replacement for a vote of no confidence during Epic Failures is an 
insight worth exploration.  
1. Introduction: Individual Litigation in Place of Group Voice 
The Ku litigation provides a mini case study of individual 
litigation as a substitute mechanism for a vote of no confidence, which 
depends on moral suasion rather than the potential power of a court’s 
 
 141. See David Lat, A Super Salacious Lawsuit, Settled: What Do the Parties 
Have to Say About the Settlement in Professor Raymond Ku’s Lawsuit Against Larry 
Mitchell, Former Dean of Case Western Law?, ABOVE L. (July 8, 2014 12:13 PM), 
https://abovethelaw.com/2014/07/a-super-salacious-lawsuit-settled/ 
[https://perma.cc/UG8L-A4T6]. 
 142. See Brown, supra note 123. 
 143. See id. 
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mandate, including mandates requiring depositions and production of 
records. The Ku example illustrates the institutional drive to control 
the narrative of an entity’s history and permits consideration of the 
comparative resources of administrators as against either collective 
voice in a no confidence vote or individual litigation. The story of 
Professor Ku’s choice to proceed alone highlights the individual 
courage and creativity in a faculty member’s solitary action to bring 
about accountability in the university setting.144 Risk aversion is part 
of the story in any effort by a group or by one of its members to oppose 
a leader’s problematic conduct.  
Professor Ku’s lawsuit ended with the departure of the dean.145 
The departure occurred after the public exposure of an alleged 
problem that, if true, rendered the dean’s continuing service 
objectionable on a normative and practical basis. The nature of the 
problem could have brought about an opportunity for faculty to cohere 
around a group moral voice. As discussed previously, votes of no 
confidence are customarily used when groups, using their collective 
voice and wisdom, reject their leader.146 At Case Western, no such vote 
occurred. Nonetheless, Ku’s actions, as detailed below, partially 
replicated the experience of a no confidence vote. The events at Case 
Western provide a striking instance of the presentation of concerns 
within a faculty by one individual, in litigation, as a personal demand 
for a judicial intervention and as a mechanism to publicize claims 
regarding a leadership crisis.  
This instance of individual litigation that served a public purpose 
has a resonance with litigation of individual cases by lawyers whose 
efforts can impose sufficient costs on those municipalities that target 
minority residents for the collection of revenue to finance government. 
Individual legal defense of minor misdemeanor and even civil charges 
in Ferguson, Missouri, brought political attention to systemic injustice 
through misuse of the police and courts as a means of collecting fines 
and penalties to avoid the use of taxes to fund municipal services.147 
 
 144. See generally Former Case Western Dean Reportedly Leaves Shanghai 
University After Controversial Appointment, JONATHON TURLEY (July 18, 2019) 
https://jonathanturley.org/2019/07/18/former-case-western-dean-reportedly-leaves-
shanghai-university-after-controversial-appointment/ [https://perma.cc/R2FQ-J6QD] 
(discussing Professor Ku’s actions in relation to the Case Western dean). 
 145. See id. 
 146. See supra Part I.  
 147. See generally Beth A. Colgan, Lessons from Ferguson on Individual 
Defense Representation as a Tool of Systemic Reform, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1171 
(2017) (explaining how legal defense of minor offenses in Ferguson brought 
nationwide attention to systemic injustice). 
 Looking for a Life Raft 463 
Such defense brings individual relief to targets of abusive practices in 
the police and courts and also exposes patterns of illegal treatment of 
defendants and creates political discussion.148 While the plight of a 
poor population, unable to defend itself against police enforcement of 
minor offenses for improper purposes is a civil rights concern, with all 
that that portends, the persistence in universities and other 
organizations of sexual harassment that goes unaddressed has been 
recognized in the recent past as a serious problem.149  
The sense that sexual aggression toward women, and sometimes 
men, was just part of the fabric of organizational and work life, has 
been no more justified than the understanding that poor areas have no 
means of defense against overly aggressive law enforcement. In both 
instances, lawyers have a potential role to play in making such conduct 
costly by imposing high transaction costs on each instance, where 
possible, and exposing the individual instances and the responses by 
administrators to efforts by targets to bring about organizational 
intervention. Lawsuits help expose and document the pattern of 
mistreatment that goes unopposed by authorities with the power to 
intervene.  
The vote of no confidence is a form of pure self-help, done 
without legal aid.150 Litigation applies the lever of the lawyer’s skills 
and resources to force public accountings. In the case of Ferguson, the 
limitation is simply resources: the number of lawyers available to 
handle low-stakes offenses that become a predicate for jailing poor 
people and accumulating new monetary fines.151 In the university 
setting, the limitation is, similarly, the small monetary stakes, the 
sense within faculties that litigation is futile, and the lack of interest 
on the part of many lawyers in representing faculty suing a university, 
 
 148. See id. at 1230–32. 
 149. See, e.g., Deirdre Fernandes, In the Wake of Harassment Case, Harvard 
Report Finds ‘Prolonged Institutional Failure,’ BOS. GLOBE (May 2, 2019, 7:08 PM), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2019/05/02/wake-sexual-harassment-case-
harvard-report-finds-prolonged-institutional-failure/acxNoEklqC9HaJhobwltRJ/ 
story.html. (describing a decades long siege of sexual harassment of women faculty 
and students by Harvard star Professor Jorge Dominguez about which Harvard 
appeared not to care and subjecting “[h]undreds of students, staff, and junior faculty” 
to the consequences); see also Bikales, supra note 65. 
 150. See supra Part I. 
 151. See Colgan, supra note 147, at 1247. 
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which limits the pragmatic possibilities of individual resort to 
lawsuits.152  
So, problems of leader accountability in nonprofit institutions 
and similar problems of accountability by municipalities or other state 
institutions for wrongful use of local civil and misdemeanor 
enforcement against targeted groups share characteristics. They 
display recurring patterns of weak or unethical leadership,153 long 
periods of dysfunction or misapplication of power,154 an absence of 
means by which a public voice from those suffering from 
maltreatment or other systemic failure can be shaped and heard,155 and 
 
 152. For evidence of futility in tenure denial lawsuits, see Robet Hamill, To 
Sue or Not to Sue, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 14, 2010), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/advice/2010/05/14/sue-or-not-sue [https://perma.cc 
/SR5X-72UB] (finding in a review of 70 judicial opinions that “for those cases that 
went to trial or were appealed, the plaintiff lost nearly every time”). Though American 
courts are not fairly lumped with Courts of Chancery of Charles Dickens’s England, 
Dickens nonetheless provides a perennially pertinent picture of litigation against 
“monied might” as an invitation to endless misery. 
This is the Court of Chancery, which has its decaying houses and 
its blighted lands in every shire, which has its worn-out lunatic in 
every madhouse and its dead in every churchyard, which has its 
ruined suitor with his slipshod heels and threadbare dress 
borrowing and begging through the round of every man’s 
acquaintance, which gives to monied might the means abundantly 
of wearying out the right, which so exhausts finances, patience, 
courage, hope, so overthrows the brain and breaks the heart, that 
there is not an honourable man among its practitioners who would 
not give—who does not often give—the warning, “Suffer any 
wrong that can be done you rather than come here!” 
CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 3 (1853). 
 153. See BARBARA KELLERMAN, BAD LEADERSHIP: WHAT IT IS, HOW IT 
HAPPENS, WHY IT MATTERS 37–38 (2004) (listing seven types of bad leaders, e.g., 
rigid, insular, intemperate, incompetent, callous, corrupt, and evil). 
 154. See JEAN LIPMAN-BLUMEN, THE ALLURE OF TOXIC LEADERS: WHY WE 
FOLLOW DESTRUCTIVE BOSSES AND CORRUPT POLITICIANS—AND HOW WE CAN 
SURVIVE THEM 82 (2006) (describing preference to retain leaders rather that to permit 
their casual removal). 
 155. There is ambiguity about the level of employment or other protection 
afforded to faculty for speech about governance rather than issues having to do with 
academic freedom in scholarship and teaching. See generally Garcetti v. Ceballos, 
547 U.S. 410 (2006) (providing employee-speech jurisprudence opinion limiting 
protected employee speech declining to address the implications for academic 
speech). For expressions of concern, see Oren R. Griffin, Academic Freedom and 
Professorial Speech: Post-Garcetti World, 37 SEATTLE L. REV. 1, 2 (2013). See 
generally Bridget R. Nugent & Julee T. Flood, Rescuing Academic Freedom from 
Garcetti v. Ceballos: An Evaluation of Current Case Law and a Proposal for the 
Protection of Core Academic, Administrative, and Advisory Speech, 40 J.C. & U.L. 
115 (2014) (advocating for the clarification of Garcetti’s holding to provide “[c]ore 
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the possession of considerable resources and will to suppress 
information and to rationalize and perfect systems of denial and 
evasion.156 For that reason, alternative means of resistance, whether in 
a group, as in a university faculty under a perceived siege, or among 
citizens subjected to governmental bad conduct, demand to be 
analyzed and explained to enable wider awareness of self-help tools 
often dismissed as impractical.  
In reviewing a book on lies by employers to mislead employees 
about rights, including rights to disclose violations of legal rules, 
Cynthia Estlund emphasizes the problem that employees lack 
knowledge or, if informed, fear reprisals if they speak, despite legal 
protections.157 She thus affirms that “employees’ knowledge of the law 
is a necessary if not a sufficient condition for their own pursuit of a 
remedy, and thus for enforcement of the entire edifice of employment 
law.”158 Employees of universities have varying levels of 
sophistication, but they flounder in seeking legal redress of 
mistreatment, as do students subjected to assaultive behavior.159 
Despite the serendipitous character of matches between the right 
lawyer and an individual’s legal need that could provide knowledge-
enhancing exposure of system problems, it is worth recognizing the 
functional role of an individual lawsuit to correct accountability 
shortfalls. In examining the similarities between an instance of 
individual faculty litigation against a law school dean and the typical 
pattern of a faculty vote of no confidence against a university 
 
[a]cademic [s]peech” of scholarship and teaching, but remitting “[a]dministrative and 
[a]dvisory [s]peech” to advocacy of internal protective mechanisms that universities 
may adopt). 
 156. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 
71 IND. L.J. 101, 119 (1995) [hereinafter Free Speech] (asserting that in light of her 
careful assessment of the values of employee speech and the needs of employers that 
“the available evidence strongly suggests that employees continue to experience 
retaliation and the threat of retaliation for speech that the law purports to protect and 
that employee silence resounds where speech should be free”) (citing ALEXIS DE 
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 61 (J. P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., 
1965) (examining the workplace meticulously as “a school for democracy”)). 
 157. See Cynthia Estlund, Response, Truth, Lies, and Power at Work, 101 
MINN. L. REV. 349, 351 (2017) [hereinafter Response]. For the article under review 
by Professor Estlund, see generally Helen Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace: 
Employer Speech and the First Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 31 (2016) (discussing 
lies told to employees by their employers). 
 158. Response, supra note 157, at 351; see also Free Speech, supra note 156, 
at 122–23. 
 159. See supra Section III.B (describing the long duration of university-
employed athletic doctor’s molestation of female gymnasts). 
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administrator, important factors include faculty risk aversion, 
shortfalls of group voice for faculties who consider a vote of no 
confidence, and the formation of public views about a claim by faculty 
that a leader has engaged in conduct that should result in his 
dismissal.160 Though personal litigation does not demand dismissal, as 
does a vote of no confidence, the urgency of a leader’s termination can 
be implicit in an individual legal action for personal injury.  
As noted, allegations of the kind brought against the Case 
Western law dean have since become far more prominent and less 
easily dismissed by institutions inclined to circle the wagons and target 
the complaining person rather than the alleged wrongdoer.161 The 
recent abuse tragedy at Michigan State University was a stunning 
revelation of the failure of vigilance in a higher education 
institution.162 While victims were not targeted, they were chastised by 
MSU personnel to whom they reported sexual penetration disguised 
as medical treatment by MSU’s Dr. Larry Nassar.163 The cultural cues 
within the ranks at MSU did not bring the statements by the young 
women to the attention of higher administrators, and when it began to 
become public, the president perceived her job as that of managing 
university liability rather than responding with a visible demonstration 
of remedial action to a crisis within the culture of the university as 
well as immediately offering the full force of university resources to 
help the women victimized while in their care.164  
The legal framework in which a university functions, as a large 
legal entity with resources to manage and obligations on the part of 
those tending to them to protect the fisc, causes top administrators to 
be innately cautious when facing claims that could implicate financial 
liability. After vigilance in the ranks has failed, the managerial effort 
to assess and respond to the scale of the wrongdoing is unlikely to 
keep pace with that demanded by the accelerating public reaction. 
Large entities have embedded cultural dysfunctions and are often 
clumsy as well. 
 
 160. See discussion supra Section II.A. 
 161. See discussion supra Section III.C. 
 162. See Kim Kozlowski, What MSU Knew: 14 Were Warned of Nassar 
Abuse, 8 Women Reported Abuse Claims, At Least One of Which Reached President, 
DETROIT NEWS (Jan. 18, 2018, 12:00 AM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/tech/ 
2018/01/18/msu-president-told-nassar-complaint-2014/1042071001/ 
[https://perma.cc/BN6S-ESKG]. 
 163. See id. 
 164. See id. 
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In a smaller setting with lesser financial stakes, an institution 
may move more quickly, albeit after resistance, to liquidate its 
exposure to bad publicity and lower money stakes. As demonstrated 
by Professor Ku’s lawsuit, in an instance of wide knowledge of bad 
conduct but passive group behavior in a small setting, it is possible for 
one person to create an effect similar to that of a no confidence vote.165 
A lawsuit for individual harm to one person can be leveraged to place 
on the public record a statement about an alleged pattern of behavior 
that is outside the norms of conduct for a leader.166 The situation 
involving Professor Ku, Dean Mitchell, the law school, and its 
assorted constituents is instructive because it illustrates how one 
person can instigate and employ a no-confidence-vote-like measure to 
success. Professor Ku was able to defy conventional thinking and 
prevail over the common advice against all such attempted lawsuits 
by faculty members experiencing uncorrected abusive behavior. It is 
true that, according to his legal complaint, Professor Ku initially faced, 
alone, the denigration from the hierarchy that faculty proponents bear 
collectively, as well as from the uninformed gossip among casual 
observers who assumed Ku was simply a weak administrator 
complaining about the dean’s exercise of discretion to dismiss and 
replace administrators.167 Litigation creates a high risk for an 
individual who undertakes it, but it also confers a communicative 
capacity that can overcome expressions of disdain for the motives of 
the faculty member while also providing a full airing of the alleged 
misconduct of the leader. 
2. The Ku Lawsuit: A Brief Account 
After a period of absence from the law school, Professor Ku took 
action by filing his lawsuit.168 The litigation he filed overcame the 
limitation of the no confidence motion as group-improvised speech. A 
highly competent lawyer filed a complaint filled with explosive 
factual allegations, in great and disturbing detail.169 The complaint 
contained a compelling narrative, one discrediting to both the dean and 
 
 165. See generally Brown, supra note 123 (describing the lawsuit brought by 
Professor Ku). 
 166. See supra Section III.C. 
 167. See Complaint with Jury Demand at 13–16, Ku v. Mitchell, No. CV-13-
815935 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Oct. 23, 2013). 
 168. See id. 
 169. See supra notes 137–153 and accompanying text. 
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the university.170 So discrediting were the allegations about the dean 
that he filed a motion in court asking to have the complaint suppressed 
on the grounds that the charges were “immaterial, impertinent and 
scandalous.”171  
Because complaints are privileged from charges of slander, the 
motion may well have been meant to invoke a normative claim about 
permissible discourse and institutional manners to influence the 
relevant community’s response to the filing and thereby reinstate 
institutional protocol. But silence had been broken with the 
thunderclap made by a shaming burst of speech. Commitments to 
etiquette within faculties (unlike the permission for impertinence court 
filings grant) are one factor in the difficulty of persuading faculty 
members to organize a group effort. The motion was denied by the 
court,172 thus underlining that the claims on faculty manners that 
constrain internal group self-help have no force within the judicial 
forum.  
The complaint also placed the university administrators’ conduct 
in disrepute.173 It alleged that rather than check the conduct of the dean, 
the Case hierarchy instead permitted the dean to engage in reprisals 
against Professor Ku, who was frozen out of law school activities in 
which he would normally play a role.174 Of particular bad odor was the 
charge that the retaliation began after Professor Ku advised the higher 
administration of the dean’s allegedly bad behavior toward various 
women as well as Ku himself.175 
The aftermath of the filing conformed, in part, to the sequence 
of statement and response and partial resolution often associated with 
a no confidence vote. First, the fact of the lawsuit became public by 
way of press printings of a press release and quotations from the 
complaint.176 The press release by Ku’s lawyer was, however, unlike 
the typical announcement of a vote of no confidence. Faculty groups 
 
 170. See generally Complaint with Jury Demand, supra note 167 (outlining 
Ku’s causes of action). 
 171. Defendant’s Motion to Strike at 1, Ku v. Mitchell, No. CV-13-815935 
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Nov. 7, 2013). 
 172. See Denial of Defendant’s Motion to Strike, Ku v. Mitchell, No. CV-13-
815935 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Nov. 7, 2013). 
 173. See Complaint with Jury Demand, supra note 167, at 9. 
 174. See id. at 19–20. 
 175. See id. at 9. 
 176. See David Lat, Law School Dean Accused of Sexual Harassment Takes 
Leave of Absence, ABOVE L. (Nov. 6, 2013, 10:15 AM), https://abovethelaw.com 
/2013/11/law-school-dean-accused-of-sexual-harassment-takes-temporary-leave-of-
absence/ [https://perma.cc/HHM6-3TWS] [hereinafter Dean Accused].  
 Looking for a Life Raft 469 
generally do no more than announce the fact of a vote of no 
confidence. They usually decline to provide a bill of particulars. 
Reasons include the fact that such a bill of particulars merely provides 
targets for the administration to rebut by speaking into a void created 
by the inability of faculty to deploy voice in response to claims by 
well-staffed administrators. In addition, the faculty lacks a common 
understanding of what type of statement is most likely to be 
persuasive. There is no standard for such a statement by faculty acting 
in an improvised form of self-help. The fact of no confidence stands 
as the undeniable truth: the leader can no longer lead. With litigation, 
the facts can be contained in the filing and do not stand as an 
undeniable truth. Rather, they enable a strong voice to provide chapter 
and verse of charges against the leader. They also provide the faculty 
member with a voice, that of his lawyer, for responding to counter 
speech by administrators. Ku’s lawyer was equal to the moment. 
Second, upon the filing of the complaint, Case Western promptly 
issued a strong denial of the allegation of retaliation, presumably 
based on a crimped legal view of Professor Ku’s protectable 
employment rights, in time for inclusion in the first stories about the 
suit:  
This situation is categorically not an instance of retaliation. Professor Ku 
continues to hold a full time, tenured faculty position at the School of Law. 
The lawsuit itself includes inaccuracies, as well as an inflammatory flier 
that has been found to be materially false. The university will have 
additional comment upon more thorough review of the suit and opposing 
counsel’s press release.177 
After a brief period, Dean Mitchell issued a standard “catch-my-
breath” styled announcement of a temporary leave, expected to be 
brief, and a confirmation of his record as dean: 
To Faculty, Staff, and Students: 
The past two and a half years have been a time of great progress and 
achievement for our law school. The recent initiation of litigation against 
the university and me, however, has proven to be a distraction to all of us. 
In order to allow us to continue the work we have begun without further 
disruption, I have asked the university to permit me to take a temporary 
leave of absence. This will allow the university to conduct its independent 
review of this matter. I am confident that this review will be done 
 
 177. Rachel Dissell, Case Law Professor Sues Dean Lawrence Mitchell and 
University, Says He Was Retaliated Against for Reporting Sexual Harassment of 
Students and Staff, CLEVELAND.COM (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.cleveland.com 
/court-justice/index.ssf/2013/10/case_law_professor_sues_dean_l.html 
[https://perma.cc/C8NT-7YQ7]. 
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expeditiously and that this review, again, will affirm that neither I nor the 
university have done anything wrong or improper. I am also confident that 
it will put this behind us. I intend to take full advantage of the legal process 
to seek justice. 
We have dramatically improved admissions efforts, broadened our global 
reach, and developed and implemented an innovative new curriculum. The 
momentum is just beginning. I look forward to continuing our work 
together. Thank you for all that you have done, and all that you will do. 
Best, 
L178 
The Case Western President followed the announcement by 
Mitchell with an email to the students, interpreted by some as placing 
some distance between the university and Mitchell.179 The first 
paragraph established a tone of calm, with a hint of apology in the first 
sentence of the second paragraph: 
To the Students of the School of Law: Earlier today you received an email 
from Dean Mitchell announcing that he is taking a leave of absence. We 
believe he made the right decision for the school, as it allows all of you to 
focus more squarely on the important work of learning and gives your 
faculty and staff greater opportunity to concentrate on guiding and 
supporting you in preparing for your future. It also gives the dean the 
opportunity to concentrate more completely on his own situation. 
We regret the distractions you have experienced in recent weeks, as well as 
the sense of disruption this new transition may create.180  
The email closed by promoting a new, recently adopted 
curriculum and praising recent accomplishments of the Case Western 
law students.181 
From November 2013 until March 2014, the school went 
through the predictable interim period during which the administration 
states for the record that the leader will return, while those in the rank 
fret about whether the promise of a return is true.182 The delay in 
acknowledging the fact of a permanent removal, commonly 
announced as a voluntary resignation, can prolong tension among 
those who have feared the administrator and hoped for a departure. 
The time spent in an atmosphere of uncertainty is damaging to faculty 
 
 178. Dean Accused, supra note 176. 
 179. E-mail from Case W. Reserve Univ. to the Students of Case W. Reserve 
Univ. (Nov. 7, 2013) (on file with author) (regarding Dean Mitchell’s leave of 
absence). 
 180. See id. 
 181. See id. 
 182. See Brown, supra note 123. 
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morale and perhaps to productivity but is generally not counted as a 
cost to the institution. It is even possible that, in some instances of 
group voice demanding exit, there may be a motivation to demonstrate 
to the rank that relieving them of uncertainty is not a priority. In those 
situations, group voice against the preferences of the hierarchy can be 
punished by indirection and unreadable delays. A determined 
hierarchy might even threaten to appoint a much worse leader as a 
means of emphasizing the lack of control by the faculty over 
managerial prerogative.  
Certain features of the standard playbook in a response to a vote 
of no confidence were deployed by Dean Mitchell. Generic claims of 
personal, discreditable motives are often made in response to a vote of 
no confidence by the official hierarchy’s statement against the entire 
group.183 Indeed, writing by figures such as Judge Posner and others 
generically charge that all votes of no confidence by tenured faculty 
members are the result of an entrenched, self-serving group that has 
succeeded in writing its own employment rules and which lacks a 
needed long-term time horizon for assessing leadership.184 The dean’s 
demand for suppression of the complaint as “scandalous” was of that 
kind.185 
In response to an individual lawsuit, the only target of attack is 
the person filing the lawsuit. The logical source of the attack is the 
individual defendant, in the Case Western instance, the dean.186 But 
the general claim in an attack on an individual is generic with some 
added detail about an alleged special motive of the person lodging 
charges. As the lawsuit freed Ku to make concretely discrediting 
charges that would not be made in a statement of no confidence, the 
dean could seize upon legal filings to make damaging claims about Ku 
of the sort that universities always decline to make about “personnel 
matters.”  
 
 183. FRANKEL, supra note 32, at 179 (“Attributing bad motives to the 
opponent is a well-known defensive practice against the accusation of criminal 
behavior. . . . [T]o justify their own behavior dishonest people will attribute dishonesty 
to their victims . . . .”). 
 184. See Summers’ Resignation, supra note 72 (referring dismissively to the 
perspective of the Harvard faculty). 
 185. See Michelle Park Lazette, Lawrence Mitchell’s Attorneys File Motion to 
Strike ‘Scandalous’ Material from Lawsuit Against Him, CRAIN’S CLEVELAND BUS. 
(Nov. 7, 2013, 1:30 AM), http://www.crainscleveland.com/article/20131107/ 
FREE/131109844/ [https://perma.cc/Z954-3KSA]. 
 186. The dean did indeed launch an attack on Ku’s motives, claiming Ku was 
disappointed he was not chosen as dean rather than Mitchell and that his lawsuit was 
to distract from his performance. See id. 
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In the motion to strike, Mitchell argued that Ku made “irrelevant 
and salacious allegations” out of resentment for not being named dean 
and in order “to cover up and distract from his unsatisfactory 
performance” as associate dean and director of an IP program.187 In 
opposition, Ku replied that “[d]efendant Mitchell’s motion . . . was a 
publicity stunt: he used the judicial process to have his lawyers and 
expensive corporate public-relations consultants at Dix & Eaton make 
a media splash by impugning [P]rofessor Ku’s motives for filing suit, 
without offering a shred of evidence supporting his ascription.”188 
Though the underlying facts remain disputed by Mitchell, it is 
nonetheless the case that the attack on Ku is similar to attacks on 
groups that launch no confidence votes, in that prefabricated 
countercharges generically and without evidence are sometimes used 
to impugn the motives of the group as only narrowly self-interested. 
Yet the factors that weigh against successfully coordinated group 
effort, in an atmosphere of perceived risk by group members, and 
against an individual lawsuit sure to attract assertions of professional 
incompetence on the part of the complainant, render such generic 
claims spurious. Without specific evidence that the motives for the 
action are merely to obtain better, more advantageous job terms for 
the group or for an individual, the attacks are unconvincing. 
3. Denouement: Exit as Dean, Promise to Return as Faculty 
The denouement of the Mitchell example of a lawsuit as a means 
of dislodging a leader reached the final stage in March 2014, when 
Mitchell resigned his deanship after a period of approximately three 
months following his leave of absence because of “distraction.”189 In 
his March resignation letter, Mitchell described a lack of enthusiasm 
for his role as dean of the law school: 
Upon thorough reflection, I have concluded [that] I cannot return to my job 
as dean with the same energy and enthusiasm that characterized my earlier 
service. . . . At this point, it is in the best interest of the law school for me 
to step down as dean. I will retain my position as tenured professor and 
continue to seek to serve the school however I can.190  
 
 187. See id. (detailing specific allegations in Mitchell’s attorneys’ motion to 
strike). 
 188. Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Strike Under Fed. R. Civ. 
Proc. 12(f), Ku v. Mitchell, No. CV-13-815935 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Nov. 7, 2013). 
 189. See Brown, supra note 123. 
 190. Id. 
 Looking for a Life Raft 473 
In this instance of the target’s final exit as administrator, it may 
have appeared that Case Western distanced itself from the resigning 
dean and let him make his own statement. In fact, though, through its 
regular e-newsletter, the University also issued a statement of 
formulaic but weak praise: “Mitchell’s decision to step down to 
support the best interests of the [law] school is the most recent of a 
series of examples that demonstrate his dedication to the institution, 
which Mitchell will continue to support as a faculty member and 
scholar at the school.”191 
The article has no university official associated with it but speaks 
in the voice of the University. The statement devoted several 
paragraphs to praising accomplishments of Mitchell, including praise 
for launching a women’s leadership initiative.192 Given the frequency 
with which top officers of an institution issue a release praising the 
resigning official and giving a color of regularity to the departure as 
unrelated to any effort to dislodge or discredit him, the impersonal 
character of the announcement may involve some distance. The 
student newspaper did not detect distancing but saw the University 
“align[ing] itself with Mitchell” and editorialized: 
The article published by The Daily on March 4 is an embarrassment to the 
university’s name and should be removed from the public view. As an 
editor, it is beyond me why the institution didn’t limit that post to a short 
announcement about the dean’s resignation—nothing more, nothing less. 
Instead the university placed itself on the wrong side of the fence.193 
Notably, the administrative “dance” associated with Mitchell’s 
departure was typical of a departure by a leader after a vote of no 
confidence. Leaders depart with praise by the next level above them. 
The vote against them is said to have been unrelated to the exit. It is 
not unusual to represent that the departing leader will return to the 
institution as a faculty member and for the person in fact not to return. 
The failure of return fades into history, unannounced.194 
 
 191. Lawrence E. Mitchell Resigns as School of Law Dean, CASE W. RESERVE 
UNIV.: DAILY (Mar. 4, 2014), https://thedaily.case.edu/lawrence-e-mitchell-resigns-
as-school-of-law-dean/ [https://perma.cc/Q7VV-6WQT]. 
 192. See id. (noting his creation of the Women’s Law and Leadership 
Institute). 
 193. Tyler Hoffman, University’s Handling of Dean’s Departure Is a 
Disgrace, OBSERVER (Mar. 22, 2014), http://observer.case.edu/universitys-handling-
of-deans-departure-is-a-disgrace/ [https://perma.cc/L9ZW-5EDZ]. 
 194. A 2007 resignation of the law school dean at Michigan State University 
College of Law followed that pattern. A letter from the President of the Law College 
was released asserting that the vote of no confidence lacked any basis and indicating 
that the dean’s departure was not related to the vote. The letter emphasized that the 
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Litigation of the kind undertaken by Ku disrupts, but does not 
suppress, the reassertion of narrative control by the administrative 
hierarchy over the institutional history. The specifics of Ku’s 
allegations remain on the public record. The civic memory within 
Cleveland is occasionally refreshed by updates in the alternative press 
of Mitchell’s activities.  
D. Et Tu, #MeToo? Administrators Feeling Ambushed 
Administrators who work to keep a cap on faculty reports of 
administrative abuse are surely shell-shocked when a slumbering 
public is aroused by reports of sexual abuse of students and young 
minors entrusted to the medical care of a doctor at the institution they 
administer. As #MeToo gathers steam, more than one top 
administrator has been confronted with public outcry about long 
existing but somehow unprevented and unpunished sexual predation 
against students.195 Institutions tend to protect those whom they have 
elevated to prominence and have often displayed a willingness to 
discount and tolerate significant dysfunction, even denying 
misconduct in office or by others critical to the organization or 
protected by customs of deference.196 #MeToo delivers an unexpected, 
unwelcome blow, not from a betraying friend but from a sudden blast 
of disorderly speech. 
Sexual misconduct that continued without administrative 
intervention has also occurred at other prominent universities, 
including the University of Southern California, Ohio State 
 
faculty lacked authority to dismiss the dean. Letter from Clif Haley, President, Mich. 
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 195. See, e.g., supra Section III.B. 
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University, and Pennsylvania State University (Penn State).197 Each of 
these cases revealed a capacity within institutions of higher education 
to become the setting for sexual abuse of vulnerable persons, including 
in the case of Penn State, children brought to the athletic facilities by 
a football coach.198 At the University of Southern California, it was 
alleged that a gynecologist on the staff of the university used the 
pretext of medical examination to examine women without the 
ordinary protocols to protect them from sexualized invasion of their 
bodies by the doctor’s bare hands, in a manner inconsistent with any 
requirement of treatment.199 The facts of the Ohio State matter are still 
being developed, but they involved the sexual abuse by a university 
physician of male wrestlers who were subjected to handling of their 
genitals when they were treated by the doctor for matters unrelated to 
their sexual organs.200 As described, the law dean at Case Western 
Reserve University allegedly engaged in sexualized interactions 
involving demeaning language directed at some faculty members, 
inappropriate relationships with students, and retaliation against his 
associate dean for reporting certain of these matters to the Case 
Western administration.201 The court filings placed on the public 
record an account of institutional drama intended for erasure by Case 
Western administrators.202 Searing dramas internalized by victims 
without voice found a setting for their retelling. 
 
 197. See Scott Stump, USC Women Share Allegations of Sexual Abuse By 
School’s Former Gynecologist, TODAY (June 14, 2018, 8:17 AM), 
https://www.today.com/news/usc-women-share-stories-alleged-abuse-school-s-
gynecologist-t130966 [https://perma.cc/7JSV-57PS]; Catie Edmondson, More Than 
100 Former Ohio State Students Allege Sexual Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/20/us/politics/sexual-misconduct-ohio-
state.html [https://perma.cc/8RCP-UJY6]; Belson, supra note 98. 
 198. See Belson, supra note 98. 
 199. See Stump, supra note 197; Matt Hamilton, 30 More Women Sue USC 
over Former Gynecologist As New Interim President Welcomes Freshmen to Campus, 
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2018, 6:40 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-
usc-lawsuits-20180815-story.html [https://perma.cc/2VNZ-WYNV]. 
 200. See Edmondson, supra note 197; Catie Edmondson & Marc Tracy, ‘It 
Can Happen Even to Guys’: Ohio State Wrestlers Detail Abuse, Saying #UsToo, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/02/us/politics/ohio-state-
wrestlers-abuse-me-too.html [https://perma.cc/N8ZC-X5EW].  
 201. See David Lat, Lawsuit Accuses Prominent Law School Dean of Sexual 
Harassment (and More), ABOVE L. (Oct. 23, 2013, 12:39 PM), 
https://abovethelaw.com/2013/10/lawsuit-accuses-prominent-law-school-dean-of-
sexual-harassment-and-more [https://perma.cc/83FH-7EDQ] [hereinafter Lawsuit 
Accuses Dean]. 
 202. Unfortunately, there is an inherent capacity for humans to deny or 
whitewash unpleasant facts, from sexual misconduct in genteel university settings in 
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In the Michigan State example, the courtroom became the outlet 
for catharsis and the airing of previously submerged social knowledge. 
Impossible to convey in its full emotional effect, the courtroom 
outpouring afforded narrative power to student victims and other 
victims of a predatory doctor who had long [mis]treated female 
athletes.203 The testimony of victims occurred over a period of eight 
days.204 The steady drumbeat of outrage led to the resignation of the 
President of Michigan State University after years of command over 
the board and the faculty.205 In defiance of the expressed wishes of the 
faculty, the university board of trustees immediately named as a 
replacement a former governor of Michigan.206 In response, the faculty 
at the university voted no confidence in the board, a fruitless effort to 
dislodge the political power of elected officials.207 The matter did not 
recede from newspaper coverage or public memory. Events reviving 
 
the present to past atrocities in states or to dysfunctional family disputes. See, e.g., 
Antoon De Baets, Combatting Crimes Against History, HIST. NEWS NETWORK (Feb. 
10, 2019), https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/171033 [https://perma.cc/KM7U-
HQQ5]. 
 203. See Meghan Louttit, Giving Larry Nassar’s Victims Their Own Voices, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/insider/larry-
nassar-victims.html [https://perma.cc/7ATF-37P2]. 
 204. See Dator, supra note 99. 
 205. See id. The sense that Simon had been a success amid the complications 
of a massive academic enterprise was expressed by one trustee when pressure for her 
departure begin to grow. See Eric Lacy & David Jesse, As Pressure Grows to Dump 
Lou Anna Simon, 7 of 8 Trustees Remain Supportive of MSU President, LANSING ST. 
J. (Jan. 21, 2018, 8:14 PM), https://www.lansingstatejournal.com/story/news/local/ 
2018/01/21/msu-trustee-foster-says-board-majority-supports-lou-anna-simon/ 
1051873001/ [https://perma.cc/NAY4-374B] (“[Trustee Joel] Ferguson added there 
would be ‘terrible collateral damage’ if Simon is no longer president and described 
her as ‘the best president we’ve had in my over 30 years on the board.’”); see also 
Roger Groves, Michigan State Got It Right with President Lou Anna Simon, FORBES 
(June 17, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogergroves/2013/06/17/michigan-
state-got-it-right-with-president-lou-anna-simon/#56ac78ab2290 [https://perma.cc/ 
KSX8-QPRT] (stating in an admiring profile that “Simon has been president since 
January 2005 [and] I was curious about why MSU experienced consistent success 
(albeit not always as part of the super elite) during her tenure”). 
 206. See id.; Fernanda Zamudio-Suaréz, Top Faculty Committee Upset with 
Michigan State’s Choice of Interim Leader, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 31, 2018), 
https://www.chronicle.com/article/Top-Faculty-Committee-Upset/242397 
[https://perma.cc/G49K-DU5Z].  
 207. See Dan Murphy, Michigan State Faculty Delivers No-Confidence Vote 
on Board of Trustees, ESPN (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.espn.com/college-
sports/story/_/id/22424667/michigan-state-faculty-delivers-no-confidence-vote-
board-trustees [https://perma.cc/M26R-AM7L] (discussing the faculty’s decision to 
make a no confidence vote despite having no power to remove the trustees from their 
positions). 
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memories of the perceived incompetence and even bad faith of MSU, 
including after the installation of an interim president, have continued 
and will continue.  
In contrast to the types of problems brought to light by faculty 
votes of no confidence, sustained coverage of the aftermath, as well as 
the emergence of new victims, wrested control over the narrative from 
university officials. The story has found multiple occasions for news 
coverage: criminal charges against university officials,208 final 
settlements with litigants, controversial statements by the now-
departed interim president, the search for a new president, and 
additional human interest stories about the victims, many of whom are 
prominent in the world of gymnastics. The loss of President Simon’s 
well-regarded stewardship of the university on other dimensions is of 
considerable weight. That loss, in part, cancels the narrative that had 
built up around her long incumbency, celebrated in the university’s 
sense of history as having augmented university resources, with 
perceived coups such as winning large government grants for 
science.209 The need to replace her in a crisis mode rather than as a 
smooth transition to a new leader inflicts real damage to the university, 
as well as reputational injury. The erasure of the narrative of success 
of a first woman President at MSU, with replacement by a narrative of 
the Epic Failure in connection with sexual predation, is an unusual 
total displacement of institutional narrative control. The effort by the 
interim president to maintain institutional control over “the story” and 
his eventual forced departure deepened the transfer of narrative 
control to forces beyond the university’s capacity for erasure of social 
knowledge and focus. 
The impact of all of these scandals, except the Ohio State 
wrestling matter, was the forced departure of a top leader. As has been 
recounted, the president of MSU resigned under pressure. At Penn 
State, the president resigned, and, as a result of evidence of his 
 
 208. See Matt Mencarini, Kara Berg, & RJ Wolcott, Ex-MSU President Lou 
Anna Simon Charged with Lying to Police About Nassar Investigation, LANSING ST. 
J. (Nov. 20, 2018, 2:18 PM). In late 2018, former President Simon became one of the 
targets of criminal charges. Id. Those charges were eventually dismissed. See Judge 
Dismisses, supra note 106. 
 209. See, e.g., Lindsay VanHulle, Simon Leads 10 Years of Growth at MSU, 
LANSING ST. J. (Feb. 7, 2015, 9:22 PM), https://www.lansingstatejournal.com/story 
/news/local/education/2015/02/07/simon-leads-years-growth-msu/23045365/ 
[https://perma.cc/LE2N-7HN5] (providing a laudatory description of her ability to 
attract visionary projects and move the university into a leadership role in technology 
and the state economy). 
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personal knowledge, he was convicted of a criminal charge.210 The 
president of the University of Southern California resigned under 
pressure after having allowed the problematic doctor to resign quietly 
and receive a sum of money.211 The dean of the law college at Case 
Western resigned in connection with the settlement of a lawsuit 
brought against him and the university by the former associate dean.212 
The extent of harm from these Epic Failures is incalculable—to 
the victims, to society in general, to the institution, and to those leaders 
and credulous persons whose habits of maintaining a surface of 
normalcy brought them loss of careers, reputation, and possibly even 
personal liberty. 
E. Empirical Treatment of Votes of No Confidence 
Votes of no confidence are not rare, and they are not futile.213 
Such votes enjoy a degree of success but are also little documented, 
analyzed, or theorized with any scholarly diligence. We have found 
considerable evidence of their basis in a collective sense by faculty 
groups at many schools of a problematic culture.214 This type of culture 
works to disempower faculty, and often succeeds in rendering 
faculties passive, on the belief by faculty that engagement is futile, and 
that the fear of open dissent or critique of administrators is a normal 
response to the power of administrators.215 The culture descends into a 
 
 210. See Aria Bendix, Former Penn State President Sentenced to Jail over 
Sandusky Scandal, ATLANTIC (June 2, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/news/ 
archive/2017/06/former-penn-state-president-sentenced-to-jail-sandusky-scandal/ 
529044/ [https://perma.cc/C3BM-ZD84]. 
 211. See Susan Svrluga, USC President Steps Down, Effective Immediately, in 
Wake of Sex-Abuse Scandal, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2018, 2:20 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2018/08/08/usc-president-
steps-down-effective-immediately-in-wake-of-sex-abuse-scandal/?utm_term=. 
2bdaee663a69 [https://perma.cc/4EQP-TGPM]. 
 212. See Allard, supra note 133. 
 213. See KUYKENDALL & MCKINNISS, supra note 26. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Telephone Interview July 28, supra note 59. One faculty member at a 
major university explained: 
I think we all feared that the vote of no confidence could end up 
being merely symbolic and would not really turn into anything 
more structural or substantive. That was the fear for concern all 
along. It never really dampened our enthusiasm to have that vote. 
But I think we knew that getting a vote of no confidence was 
going to be a whole lot easier, really than changing the university 
as a whole in some fundamental way. And that the latter would 
take a lot of energy and commitment. And in the end it just wasn’t 
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cynicism that might be regarded as antithetical to the aspirations of the 
university as an incubator of liberal values in a democracy. The 
mixture of administrator overreach and faculty defeatism cedes 
academic choices, the academic culture of the university, and the 
welfare of students to administrators guided by business models and 
authoritarian impulses. The result of the climate created is instances 
of bad conduct by university administrators that go unaddressed in the 
absence of faculty voice as a check, many of these being well 
known.216 In some institutions, the atmosphere has so degenerated that 
an overpowering tyranny has “broken” the faculty. The vote of no 
confidence occurs when the just-right mixture of administrative 
wrongdoing and residual faculty spunk meet. 
Our research confirms that votes of no confidence in higher 
education perform a function, at least in the timing of leader 
departures. My coauthor has amassed data on nearly 180 faculty votes 
 
there on the part of people to move forward. . . . Now another 
thing I learned is that in a very interesting way there are a lot of 
faculty who are every bit as timid and cowed by authority as 
minimum wage workers. 
Id. 
 216. See generally LIONEL S. LEWIS, WHEN POWER CORRUPTS: ACADEMIC 
GOVERNING BOARDS IN THE SHADOW OF THE ADELPHI CASE (2000) (addressing an 
extraordinary scandal that illustrated the powerlessness of a faculty as well as students 
against a President backed by a supine board chosen and dominated by a president 
bent on empire building and self-enrichment). A long running siege of Adelphi 
University, a commuter school on long Island, bled faculty, lost student enrollment, 
and reduced classes for students as staff numbers increased and the presidential salary 
ballooned and was punctuated in 1995 by a faculty vote asking for the President’s 
resignation. The New York Times advocated new leadership in response. See The 
Plundering of Adelphi, N.Y. TIMES ARCHIVES (Oct. 14, 1995), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/14/opinion/the-plundering-of-adelphi.html 
[https://perma.cc/8AKN-9ZRE]. The crisis only ended when the Regents of New 
York removed the board and named a new board that then fired the President. Id. 
The state Regents removed 18 of the 19 trustees—most of whom 
were recruited by Dr. Diamandopoulos—for neglect of duty and 
misconduct on Feb. 10. The Regents cited the trustees for granting 
excessive compensation to Dr. Diamandopoulos, for failing to 
evaluate his performance and for allowing some trustees to 
engage in private business with the university. The old board 
contested the Regents’ ruling for three days, and then resigned, 
clearing the way for the new board to take over. 
Bruce Lambert, New Trustees of Adelphi U. Dismiss Embattled President, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 21, 1997), https://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/21/nyregion/new-trustees-of-
adelphi-u-dismiss-embattled-president.html [https://perma.cc/D5ZF-XMPL]. 
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of no confidence against college presidents.217 Leaders who receive a 
vote of no confidence often leave within a year of their vote.218 Thus, 
the evidence supports a view of no confidence votes as an effective 
tool for not only voicing displeasure with leaders but also compelling 
a leader’s ouster. Despite the part of our story that tells of success, the 
limitations are both (1) probable underproduction of public statements 
about a leader crisis and (2) the fact that a no confidence statement is 
ordinarily relatively bare of information about the leader problem.219 
The usual choice of impromptu groups announcing a vote is to avoid 
a bill of particulars by a flat notice to the relevant decision group about 
the leader’s tenure. I offer the following formulation as a typical 
attempt by a group to limit the content of the statement and thereby 
avoid a set of allegations that would be subject to immediate 
contestation: “NAME group lacks confidence in 
Mr./Ms./Dean/President Name.”220 The reticence is rational, since the 
gravamen of a vote of no confidence is the simple fact that the leader 
lacks a capacity to lead. The institutional refusal to credit that fact 
 
 217. See Sean McKinniss, No-Confidence Vote Database, HIGHER EDUC. 
GOVERNANCE, http://www.seanmckinniss.org/no-confidence-vote-database/ 
[https://perma.cc/SAT2-SKQZ] (last visited Apr. 13, 2020).  
 218. See KUYKENDALL & MCKINNISS, supra note 26. In our dataset, over half 
of college presidents who received a no confidence vote departed within a year of 
their vote, though they rarely attributed their exit to the no-confidence vote. Id. 
 219. Underproduction can be achieved by administrative guile. See Cory 
Weinberg, Law Faculty Plotted to Oust Dean, GW HATCHET (Feb. 25, 2013, 3:24 
AM), https://www.gwhatchet.com/2013/02/25/law-faculty-plotted-to-oust-dean/ 
[https://perma.cc/L2G6-AHHU]; see also Elie Mystal, How to Oust the Dean of Your 
Law School: A Law Dean Who Says He Wasn’t ‘Ousted’ Was Probably Freaking 
Ousted, ABOVE L. (Feb. 25, 2013, 2:49 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2013/02/how-
to-oust-the-dean-of-your-law-school/. [https://perma.cc/B96W-A45X]. At the law 
school at George Washington University, an effort by faculty to bring a vote of no 
confidence was thwarted by preemptive administration plotting—by means of 
elevating the target, dean of the Law School, to a higher administrative position. After 
contentious communications with the dean concerning his leadership style and its 
impact on faculty governance, half of the faculty signed petitions, in accordance with 
Faculty Senate provisions, contained in sealed envelopes. Were these delivered, a 
formal vote would occur in which a vote of half the faculty would then present the 
President of the University with a demand for removal of the dean. Before the 
envelopes could be delivered, the dean was suddenly elevated to vice provost of the 
University. Though the remedy of removal succeeded de facto, the remedial feature 
provided by open pressure resulting in a removal was thwarted, as was the chance for 
a public faculty statement of governance principles and core institutional values. The 
student paper refuted the cover story enabled by the sudden promotion of the dean 
before the vote could occur. See id. 
 220. A group formulating a vote of no confidence typically avoids any content 
other than the basic statement of no confidence provided above. 
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amounts to a concession that the person has been awarded a position 
that is one of command, even edict, not leadership. 
F. Limitations and Alternatives to Avoid Epic Failures 
Despite the function of no confidence votes as a gap-filling 
process where accountability is lacking, they are not a sure solution 
when a leader is creating a sense of crisis in a group, for reasons of 
incompetence, poor fit for the organization, or lack of ethical or moral 
standards.221 Because it is sometimes impractical to organize a group 
response, faculties or individuals harmed by problematic leaders 
sometimes turn to formal legal remedies for unresolved problems 
affecting the proper functioning of an organization.222  
In general, despite low frequency and uncertain effect, the 
picture that emerges is that votes of no confidence perform a function 
in specific instances in which leader exit does result. Their occurrence 
helps add to a public record (aided by our compilation) of problematic 
conduct in public interest entities. Among our findings are evidence 
of the misuse of resources to obscure forms of regular dysfunction as 
well as the occasional extraordinary scandal, the instinct and practice 
of protecting leaders and intimidating those who wish to report 
misconduct, and the not-unusual payout to bad leaders when a vote of 
no confidence results in a resignation.  
We also find instances of formal resignation but retention of 
power and emoluments. Public exposure, in which the reason for 
departure and the reform of organizational power arrangements in 
which the problem leader participated, is a critical test of how a 
particular path to forcing a leader out contributes to long-term 
accountability in an institution. A leader’s exit constitutes a form of 
personal accountability. But, when done without a genuinely open 
inventory and admission of the facts surrounding the departure and the 
plans for remediation, if the problem appears to be symptomatic of a 
general organization failure, the departure is not redemptive or 
reparative. It is a relief, however, for the group that suffered the bad 
conduct. That relief is not to be minimized. 
Votes of no confidence arise as a last resort, when a group 
perceives no other means of holding a leader to account for a pattern 
of behavior that the group sees as unacceptable, even intolerable. They 
do not occur in every instance of problematic leadership that causes 
 
 221. See supra Parts II, III. 
 222. See supra Part II. 
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group disaffection. The disincentives that prevent sufficient trust 
within a group fearful of the power of an administration to retaliate 
may well underproduce the check on leaders by collective voice. In 
addition, periods leading up to outcry inflict long stretches of 
institutional drift. The waiting game dissipates internal focus on the 
work of the body. Attention is diverted to speculation about how a 
perceived crisis will end. Despite concern that votes of no confidence 
can be overused and deployed as a form of mob rule for petty reasons, 
the fear factor in professional groups is likely far from trivial. Faculty 
with a conservative temperament may disapprove of efforts to 
undermine or reject the authority of a hierarchy. Such cautious faculty 
members may well discount the type of complaint against an 
administrator as involving an overreaction and oversensitivity to a 
normal range of human behavior.  
In the instance of sexually aggressive behavior by a male with 
power over women, and on occasion subordinate males, there has 
been, until quite recently, a cultural willingness to dismiss such 
conduct as expectable but somehow tolerable manifestations of human 
sexuality. The #MeToo movement has made the extent of this problem 
readily apparent and insisted on ending normalization. In some 
instances, faculty may agree there is a problem but encounter 
differences among subgroups about the nature or urgency of the 
problem. The sensitivity of charges of sexual misconduct likely 
curtails open speech about a colleague. Hence, many schools and other 
entities have failed to assure respectful treatment of faculty in 
connection with their right not to be subject to retaliation for speaking 
truthfully about seriously disabling flaws in a leader,223 even including 
failure to intervene where evidence of sexual impropriety is brought 
to a leader’s attention by another administrator.224 Sexual impropriety 
particularly challenges the capacity of universities for self-policing 
and even raises an issue about the vote of no confidence as a safety 
valve when formal accountability mechanisms fail. 
 
 223. See Telephone Interview with Anonymous, Faculty Member, State Univ. 
Secondary Campus (May 30, 2018) [hereinafter Telephone Interview May 30] (“I lost 
my cool, I just jumped up and started screaming. I was like, why y’all doing this to 
me because I was unable to sleep and unable to eat.”).  
 224. See supra Section III.C (describing retaliation by the dean of Case 
Western Reserve University Law School against the associate dean for reporting 
concerns about his allegedly improper sexualizing of the workplace). 
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G. Summary 
The #MeToo movement adds public momentum to the 
realization that sexual misconduct in university settings demands 
better systems of accountability—and an internal culture capable of 
treating power abuse involving sex as a matter of group protection of 
institutional integrity and even moral acceptability. The #MeToo 
rubric makes the issue of response to poor leadership particularly 
salient in universities. The sexual predation scandals present powerful 
demonstrations that institutions have failed to respond to information 
requiring immediate action to protect the members as well as student 
athletes in the university. Yet the absence of votes of no confidence 
also suggests the possible limitations of group commitment to the 
health of an institution, either due to members being unaware of 
misconduct or unwilling to publicly address it or even to risk private 
discussion and acknowledgment.  
These scandals are thus the tip of the iceberg in connection with 
university and nonprofit leadership. Faculty members have often 
found themselves searching for a means of addressing the refusal of 
those who might remove a bad leader and somehow forcing the exit 
of the leader as immediate relief from an atmosphere associated with 
that person. As discussed, the vote of no confidence has often been 
chosen to fill the accountability gap presented by an unyielding 
support of a hierarchy for a bad leader. In simplest terms, the no 
confidence vote is a self-help public declaration, taken as a last resort 
by a group that has concluded it has no other recourse.225 Since top 
university administrators are expected to function as a leader to the 
faculty, often called a first among equals, the announcement means 
the “leader” is no longer a leader for faculty colleagues. Votes of 
confidence that occur because of a public scandal stand on a different 
footing in terms of bringing institutional self-knowledge, or bottom-
up epistemological truth, to the surface.226  
 
 225. A “vote of no confidence” is defined as “a formal vote by which the 
members of a legislature or similar deliberative body indicate that they no longer 
support a leader, government, etc.” Vote of No Confidence, MERRIAM-WEBSTER 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2018). This is a simple dictionary definition that refers to the 
origin of the organizational vote of confidence that has developed in democracies as 
an extension of the practice that developed in the British Parliament starting with a 
vote against the leadership of Robert Walpole. See supra Part II for an account of the 
background of votes of no confidence, the form they typically take, and the role they 
play in making leaders in nonprofit bodies accountable. 
 226. Notably, a vote of no confidence brought against a leader as a response 
to an unanticipated scandal does not fit this classic use of the no confidence vote as 
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The no confidence motion has had a visible but opaque role in 
institutions of higher education.227 The no confidence vote is 
nonetheless controversial, to some degree, because of generic 
arguments made against it by administrators and others resentful or 
skeptical of the ability of faculties to “fire their boss.”228 Most 
employees assume they have no means to fire their boss, not even a 
very bad boss. In a strong economy, quitting and getting another job 
is a solution that works for many. Nonetheless, the Internet produces 
advice to employees on what do to about a bad boss, including trying 
to have her fired.229 For those who have no say about throwing out their 
boss, the question can arise, “why can faculty members fire their 
boss?” This reaction is at its most forceful where the issues relate to 
faculty concerns about governance, academic values, and other less 
well appreciated aspects of academic culture. 
In our forthcoming book, my coauthor and I argue that faculty 
voice has force as an unregulated outlet capable of declaring a crisis 
of competence, ethics, or even morality. Arguments against such 
extraordinary, unauthorized resort to public voice mistakenly 
presume, without evidence, the existence of a sound state of affairs 
 
the capstone of a period of unrest and disaffection about a leader. If there has been no 
undercurrent of a movement against a leader, a vote of no confidence brought after 
outside signaling of a crisis, such as a sexual scandal, is not necessarily the end point 
in a leader’s effectiveness because of a systemic concern by the group. In such a fact 
pattern, the vote is more akin to “virtue signaling,” and may or may not represent a 
genuine statement that the group has formed a consensus that a leader is corrupt, 
abusive, or ineffective. Depending on the facts, the vote has an element of what is 
loosely called “branding,” meaning that the group wishes, by disassociating with the 
leader, to protect the brand. 
 227. See Schmidt, supra note 35 (discussing the lesser clarity about the 
function and effect of the vote of no confidence outside the original context of a 
representative body such as Parliament). 
 228. See, e.g., William G. Tierney, Averting the Nuclear Option, 93 ACADEME 
49, 49–50 (2007) (calling the no confidence process of removal of a university 
president “lamentable” and suggesting no confidence votes result from 
“communications failures”); Kenneth A. Shaw, A Vote for Confidence in College 
Presidents, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 8, 2005), https://www.chronicle.com 
/article/A-Vote-for-Confidence-in/12228 [https://perma.cc/J2HQ-5FA6]; Joseph 
Petrick, No Confidence in No-Confident Votes, 93 ACADEME 52, 52–53 (2007) 
(advocating that means be found to avert no confidence votes by solving leadership 
problems in ways that are less damaging to the institution than no confidence votes). 
 229. See Sherrie Campbell, 6 Effective Tactics for Handling a Toxic Boss, 
ENTREPRENEUR (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/320696 
[https://perma.cc/GXM7-C35Q]; Glassdoor Team, How to Get Your Boss Fired, 
GLASSDOOR (Feb. 21, 2012) https://www.glassdoor.com/blog/boss-fired/ 
[https://perma.cc/H6KW-TH8U]. 
 Looking for a Life Raft 485 
amenable to harmonious resolution. The view of a normal state of 
affairs in the typical instance of such faculty initiatives is unwarranted. 
The sexual scandals, long kept quiet but now being heard, have 
belied the notion of organizational regularity and revealed that even 
as certain groups, women, minorities, gay men and women, the young, 
and others have been brought into the academic and professional 
world, they have in truth been excluded from building an 
organizational epistemology that incorporates their knowledge. What 
they have known has been treated as trivial and akin to gossip that 
cannot inform the communal truth of the organization. If insiders with 
power do not tell the story for groups lacking in voice within an 
organization, are there outsiders capable of filling the void with 
compelling accounts of the organizational wrongs? 
IV. NARRATIVE BLACK HOLES: LOSING CONFIDENCE IN NO 
CONFIDENCE? 
Scandals that resonate with #MeToo have hit universities and 
other institutions with financial liability and potentially corrosive 
reputational damage. No internal mechanism, official or improvised, 
has been adequate to the need for moral response. The stranglehold on 
epistemic authority in institutions that have adopted closed systems 
disempowering unmanaged voices from below the top tier of leaders 
shuts off open speech about sexual wrongs. The bland speech 
produced by the administrative class crowds out unwelcome 
messages. Blunt naming of sexual molestation of vulnerable students 
or recounting the use of crude language to subordinate faculty or other 
professionals is off-key and harsh. The danger such speech poses to 
the speaker’s security of position and sense of acceptance by peers 
produces an excess of self-policing that maintains seeming 
normalcy—until a scandal erupts. After a scandal is exposed, the 
policing goes underground, with the same managerial impulse to 
maintain harmony and propriety, and with new recruits protecting 
surface harmony from the disruptive effects of truth. 
A. Narrators and Their Limitations—Then and Now, Paradoxes of 
Secrecy Over Time 
Before the #MeToo voices brought pressure to bear on nonprofit 
administration, faculties, and other professional groups had long 
turned to the vote of no confidence to expose leaders whose 
misconduct or incompetence attracted their protest. These votes had 
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some success, but they did not receive heavy press coverage. In light 
of the university’s prestige, the no confidence vote at Harvard 
University received significant attention.230 But the effort at New York 
University, despite its location in the voracious media market of New 
York City, received minimal coverage.231 Unlike the issues with which 
faculty and other groups are often concerned, the recent #MeToo and 
rankly sexual scandals have brought intense national attention to an 
accountability shortfall in institutions with responsibility for critical 
social functions.232 Religious bodies, fundraising groups, and other 
bodies responsible for the welfare of vulnerable persons have been 
found callous, unfeeling, and ruthless. Without transparency in an 
institution’s normative superstructure, a sense of impunity can infect 
the institution’s administrators. Time and context empower and 
disempower narrators within an institution. At the top, potential 
narrators maintain silence about what they know or fail to know. New 
managers do not want to know about seamy facts of occurrences 
before their arrival. From the ranks, social knowledge remains locked 
in the knowing looks or warnings from colleagues about the known 
but unspoken story of shared secrets, unspoken because unspeakable. 
The persistent deflection of institutional accountability for individual 
conversions of institutional power into personal sexual power poses a 
mystery about speech along dimensions of time, silence, fear, and 
motive. 
B. Motives to Speak? 
1. Inside Organizations 
Some unit leaders engage directly in wrongful conduct. Others 
choose to protect perpetrators of wrongful conduct for reasons that 
resist a single explanation. Motives may include personal friendship, 
perceived class solidarity, indifference to the effect on those subject to 
abusive conduct, belief in the wrongdoer’s net value to the 
 
 230. See, e.g., Rimer, supra note 61. 
 231. But see Goodwin, infra note 250 (constituting one of the sole published 
accounts of the NYU imbroglio); see also E-mail from Anonymous N.Y. Univ. 
Employee to author (May 31, 2020) (on file with author) (asserting that, “[t]he vote 
of no confidence in Sexton—or rather, the several *votes* of no confidence—
received little media attention. There was a story or two in The New York Times and 
an op-ed, but that was about it. The vote at Harvard was considered much more 
newsworthy.”) 
 232. See supra Section III.D. 
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organization, or a preference to maintain control in the form of silence 
within the ranks about the empirical connection between authority and 
habits of abuse.233 The meta-message of #MeToo is that there has been 
a widespread collective willingness to silence the targets of sexual 
misconduct and to protect the predators. A hackneyed response to 
revelations about long-past misdeeds against women has been, “it was 
a different era when the rules were different.”234 In a curious merger 
of a past and present perspective, self-nominated narrators of present-
day revelations purport to describe knowledge from the past that was 
kept secret. There is a suggestion that the method of secret-keeping, 
underpinning the rules of power and the required submission to it, 
were known, with the paradox that the institution’s secrets were not 
known and are also known as a shared social memory. About the 
history of the rules, strange knowledge reigns. We learn of a 
retrospective on the workings of institutional knowing: the rules have 
been not to know. The retrospective tone hints at a new day.235 When 
 
 233. See generally Memorandum from Gregg L. Bernstein et al., Zuckerman 
Spaeder LLP on Investigation of Bishop Michael Bransfield, Former Bishop of 
Diocese of Wheeling-Charleston to William E. Lori, Archbishop, Archdiocese of 
Balt. (Feb. 21, 2019) (reporting sexual misconduct within the Catholic Church 
surrounding Bransfield). A secret report commissioned by the Catholic Church and 
unearthed by the Washington Post offers a reason for silence surrounding a person 
given authority in a nonprofit institution, specifically an allegedly abusive Catholic 
bishop. See id. at 3 (“The Vicar General and Judicial Vicar, in particular, 
acknowledged that they were aware of Bishop Bransfield’s tendencies and sexual 
harassment, but took no steps to prevent it based on a combination of fear and loyalty 
toward the Bishop.”).  
 234. See Elizabeth C. Tippett, Weinstein May Be a Monster, But the Lawyers 
Who Enabled Him Are the Real Villains in #MeToo Takedown ‘She Said’, 
CONVERSATION (Sept. 12, 2019, 3:54 PM), https://theconversation.com/weinstein-
may-be-a-monster-but-the-lawyers-who-enabled-him-are-the-real-villains-in-metoo-
takedown-she-said-123481 [https://perma.cc/A8U9-7NAA] (describing the long 
running complicity of lawyers in helping Harvey Weinstein cover his tracks and 
quoting lawyer Lanny Davis saying, “powerful men of an older generation were 
changing their understanding of the meaning of the word consensual”); see also 
Jonathan Zimmerman, Where Does MLK Fit in Today’s #MeToo World?, BALTIMORE 
SUN (Apr. 6, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/opinion/op-ed/bs-ed-
op-0408-mlk-metoo-20180404-story.html [https://perma.cc/ZV5D-T9CN] (arguing 
that “we shouldn’t read our own values onto people like King, who operated under 
different norms and rules”). 
 235. “The only thing that’s surprising about Weinstein’s conviction for rape is 
that he has actually been convicted.” Hadley Freeman, With Harvey Weinstein’s 
Conviction, the Old Excuses No Longer Apply, GUARDIAN (Feb. 25, 2020, 8:11 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/feb/25/harvey-weinstein-rape-
conviction-movie-industry-hadley-freeman [https://perma.cc/KZ62-BTLJ]. 
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scandal reappears, volunteers come forward once more to explain the 
old rules governing institutional knowledge, and to herald a new day. 
Despite these belated recollections, the institutional 
management of knowledge about dysfunction and bad conduct 
reduces the volume of useful history of American universities.236 The 
official institutional history is cleansed of a recounting of the moral 
failures and governance flaws that would inform the judgment and 
understanding of future faculty members and provide a 
comprehensive public record of governance problems in universities. 
The purposeful erasures support an atmosphere of moral timidity 
within the academy.237 Administrators who may wish to expose 
 
The initial allegations that he raped women were so 
unsurprising—they felt almost inevitable, really—that as soon as 
they were published in 2017, first in the New York Times, 
followed days later in the New Yorker, Weinstein’s career was 
finished. There were no anguished discussions about giving him 
the benefit of the doubt, no solemn handwringing about how 
complicated relations between the sexes are these days. It was as 
if we all had always known—which, to a certain extent, many of 
us had.  
Id. 
For a deconstruction of the rhetoric around “a new day” and what we know and have 
known about “yesterday,” see Tim Mulkern, Mad Men: Justifying Sexism and Gender 
Roles Through Nostalgia, GLOBAL CRITICAL MEDIA LITERACY PROJECT (Mar. 24, 
2019), http://gcml.org/mad-men-justifying-sexism-and-gender-roles-through-
nostalgia/ [https://perma.cc/4XXW-239L] (arguing that the depiction of a time when 
the rules were different intentionally recreates and idealizes roles showing male 
dominance and romanticized sexual harassment of female careerists and treating 
skeptically the purported representation “of a former time period” as “normative” for 
the time yet presenting gender roles as models for emulation). 
 236. In a 1962 group of lectures, historian Allan Nevins produced eye-rolling 
accounts of clownishness and graft in the coming-of-age of the land grant universities. 
His narrative of a slice of university history in the United States departs from the bland 
or relentlessly celebratory tone of approved voices about the achievements of the 
Morrill Act. See generally ALLAN NEVINS, THE STATE UNIVERSITIES AND DEMOCRACY 
(1962) (presenting a new tone about academia). Delivered at the invitation of his 
University of Illinois alma mater to celebrate the centennial of the Morrill Act, Nevins 
produced prose about graft and anti-intellectualism that lacked the usual detachment 
of the professional historian and could have subjected him to critique for a flawed 
tone. A book review at the time nonetheless praised the book as inspiring and 
presumably not for being unsparing. See Roy Nichols, Book Reviews and Book Notes, 
31 PA. HIST. 380, 390–91 (1964) (reviewing NEVINS, supra note 236). 
 237. See DEBRA R. COMER & GINA VEGA, MORAL COURAGE IN 
ORGANIZATIONS: DOING THE RIGHT THING AT WORK xvi (Debra R. Comer ed., 2011) 
(developing the argument that organizations tend to make acting on the basis of moral 
concerns difficult and arguing for efforts to encourage the development of great moral 
courage in organizations in the interests of ethical behavior). 
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morally significant poor behavior or cover-ups appreciate that their 
task is defined as preventing disclosures that discredit the university 
culture, protecting other administrators, and keeping alumni happily 
uninformed and generous with pledges of monetary support. Faculty 
members learn to adopt language that conceals more than it reveals, 
and thus to stay in line with administrative wishes. Civic courage is 
replaced by falseness and courtier behavior, or silence. Talk among 
faculty members laments the futility of reports up the chain and 
skitters away from admitting or sharing the futility of lamentation. 
Faculty members and epistemic democracy, unlike fools and their 
money, part their way by choice. 
In the event of a vote, the hierarchy employs standard means of 
controlling the public narrative and attempts to deflect, in the 
immediate moment and thereafter, a narrative that departs from the 
preferred official story and would disrupt efforts at protecting the 
university brand. The faculty has few means of contesting the 
institutional narrative set out by university press officers.  
As a result, the public narrative of no confidence votes is 
standard, brief, and, generally, false. The private, enacted narrative is 
not admitted into the discourse of official keepers of the institutional 
persona and in the ordinary case, never reaches wide circulation 
among those who might form a judgment about the needs of the 
institution for moral reform or make demands for changing its 
adherence to the usages of hierarchical immunity.  
In addition, internal discussion that would inform newcomers 
about the episode is discouraged and even labeled “unprofessional.” 
The brief moment of shared work toward an improved epistemology 
of the organization fades. Scurrying away from the facts of the event 
becomes the norm as courage wanes among participants in a vote. 
Those who might claim a share of epistemic authority to narrate 
organizational history retreat into silence, leaving the institutional 
podium to be monopolized by the administrative class. 
When narrators from outside the mission-bonded, professional 
ranks emerge to force an abrupt ending to the old rules on sexual 
power and the rule of silence in organizations, a new dynamic forms 
around the catastrophic effect of public concern about something so 
odious as sexual molestation of students. Intensity of coverage from 
investigative journalism has a long-tail duration, with endless triggers 
for new interest. The list is long, with the opening focus with the trials 
of a predator, high-dollar settlements with victims, and charges against 
top administrators. The Michigan State scandal has produced 
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narrative-style books about the victims’ experience,238 board volatility 
with dismissals of an interim president,239 political posturing,240 
government-issued reports summing up the claims of bad conduct,241 
and the need for repeated administrative mea culpas and promises of 
reform.242  
A critical component of success243 by students who have been 
subject to sexual predation is the adoption of their cause by journalists 
who provide continuing coverage in an environment of fact-rich 
disclosures of wrongdoing so indecent and pervasive that no defenders 
come forth to claim propriety or consent. A typical no confidence vote, 
with less sensational or easily comprehended grounds, does not 
sustain journalistic coverage. Instead, it typically receives little more 
than a one-day use by a local paper of a press release announcing it, 
 
 238. See generally RACHAEL DENHOLLANDER, WHAT IS A GIRL WORTH?: MY 
STORY OF BREAKING THE SILENCE AND EXPOSING THE TRUTH ABOUT LARRY NASSAR 
AND USA GYMNASTICS (2019); ABIGAIL PESTA, THE GIRLS: AN ALL-AMERICAN 
TOWN, A PREDATORY DOCTOR, AND THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE GYMNASTS WHO 
BROUGHT HIM DOWN (2019). 
 239. See RJ Wolcott & Eric Lacy, Engler’s Impending Departure from 
Michigan State Prompts Strong Reactions, LANSING ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2019, 9:09 PM), 
https://www.lansingstatejournal.com/story/news/local/2019/01/16/msu-fire-john-
engler-michigan-state-larry-nassar-survivors/2581373002/ [https://perma.cc/2QL4-
NNNB] (“John Engler told the Detroit News Editorial Board that survivors of Larry 
Nassar’s abuse ‘who’ve been in the spotlight . . . are still enjoying that moment at 
times.’”). 
 240. See Maya Goldman, Here’s Why the Larry Nassar Scandal Has Become 
Part of the Gubernatorial Race, MICH. RADIO NPR (Sept. 23, 2018), 
https://www.michiganradio.org/post/heres-why-larry-nassar-scandal-has-become-
part-gubernatorial-race [https://perma.cc/NJ6Z-TKQM] (“Whitmer says Schuette 
and Republicans should not politicize this case. ‘I’ve had it with these guys who want 
to use this Nassar case as a political gimmick for their own sick political gain,’ she 
says. Schuette plans to speak about the issue at a campaign event Monday.”). 
 241. See Letter from Meena Morey Chandra, Reg’l Director, U.S. Dep’t of 
Educ., to Samuel L. Stanley, President, Mich. State Univ. (Sept. 5, 2019), 
https://msu.edu/ourcommitment/_assets/documents/OCR-MSU-Agreement-
2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/HU5H-85WL]. 
 242. See, e.g., Emily Guerrant, Stanley Sets Course of Action Following 
Federal Reviews, MSU TODAY (Sept. 5, 2019), https://msutoday.msu.edu/news/2019/ 
stanley-sets-course-of-action-following-federal-reviews/ [https://perma.cc/95WD-
95XF]; see also Samuel L. Stanley, Sept. 5, 2019: Message on U.S. Department of 
Education Investigations, MICH. ST. U. OFF. PRESIDENT (Sept. 5, 2019), 
https://president.msu.edu/communications/messages-statements/2019_community_ 
letters/2019_09_05_message_to_community.html [https://perma.cc/S4JG-P7NW]. 
 243. The term “success” is not intended to suggest that exposure of the wrong 
is sufficient to bring justice or erase the injury, one which lingers throughout the life 
of a victim of such predation. 
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with a dismissive response by an institutional spokesman.244 If the 
target eventually resigns, the newspaper will print an announcement 
provided by the press office of the university, typically carrying a 
claim that the resignation is not a result of the no confidence vote.245  
2. Public Attention 
Sex changes the operative principles of media attention. The 
general rule of journalism applies to university scandals: sex sells. The 
rule within the university, before journalism enters the mix, is pretend 
and avoid. The story begins to sell only if someone breaks through the 
passivity of newspapers that cover the university as a local story or 
finds an out-of-town paper happy to run a scoop. Years can pass with 
local papers declining to follow leads, until a critical cultural moment 
arrives. For sex to sell, a narrator must emerge, and the wall of silence 
must break. At ground level, the fascination with sex is expressed in 
the opposite of narration: a looking away that blocks revelation. These 
dynamics of avoidance display evidence of cultural durability, at least 
in the United States.246 
Nonetheless, unlike institutional votes of no confidence seeking 
to oust an incompetent academic or other nonprofit leader, public 
attention about sexual misconduct with real live victims can lead to a 
greater degree of publicity. This is deeply distressing to the leaders in 
those universities who treat it as an obstacle to the business of the 
university and move quickly to squelch public uproar with a mixture 
 
 244. See, e.g., Jordan Friedman, Nine ‘No Confidence’ Votes That Made 
Headlines in 2012-2013, HUFFINGTON POST (June 17, 2013, 1:46 PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/jordan-friedman/nine-no-confidence-votes-
_b_3448606.html. [https://perma.cc/K9CJ-8DFN]; Ariel Kaminer, Fourth No 
Confidence Vote for the President of N.Y.U., N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/11/education/fourth-no-confidence-vote-for-the-
president-of-nyu.html [https://perma.cc/EC98-BZLR]. 
 245. See Friedman, supra note 244; Kaminer, supra note 244. 
 246. By contrast, the #MeToo movement encounters significant cultural 
resistance in nations still protective of hierarchical prerogatives, particularly of males 
toward women, even on the street. See Kim Willsher, ‘They Just Don’t See Us As 
Human’: Women Speak Out on France’s Harassment Problem, GUARDIAN (Aug. 3, 
2018, 8:14 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/03/they-just-dont-
see-us-as-human-women-speak-out-on-frances-harassment-problem 
[https://perma.cc/Q25U-5B97] (describing how the #MeToo campaign, sparked by 
Hollywood producer Harvey Weinstein’s predatory and sexually abusive behavior 
with female actors, provoked a backlash in France, where cultural differences, among 
them French ideas of “seduction,” were cited to counter it). 
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of reassurance and stonewalling.247 A common locution, easily found 
in an internet search, is “we take allegations of [FILL IN THE 
BLANK] very seriously.”248 That statement cuts two ways. It can 
mean, “we are serious about rooting it out and holding offenders to 
account.” Or it can mean, “the charge is extremely serious and thus 
very hard to prove.” Reassurance and a stone wall can be made with 
the same building supplies. Nonetheless, the standard toolbox of 
media handlers can fail to stop the growing outside scrutiny. The vast 
public interest and journalistic stamina in covering these most 
discrediting sex scandals differ from the scant attention given by the 
press to statements about faculty disempowerment and questionable 
decisions by the top leaders of a university.  
For example, the vote of no confidence in the president of New 
York University raised serious issues about the need for a faculty role 
to scrutinize disfiguring mutations of the university by expansion into 
authoritarian nations, in which the values of the free academy would 
be at risk.249 Despite the importance of the issue, and the prominent 
players involved in the board’s support of the president, there was no 
continuing coverage of the dispute. The New York Times printed little 
more than press releases on both sides and minimal analysis. It also 
ran an op-ed by Professor Jeff Goodwin, a leading faculty proponent 
of the no confidence vote.250 By contrast, once the Indianapolis Star 
breached the silence about the abuse of athletes by a Michigan State 
University (MSU) doctor, coverage was extensive, even bringing a 
 
 247. See Kim Kozlowski, MSU Board Backs Engler As He Apologizes to 
Nassar Victim, DETROIT NEWS (June 21, 2018, 2:31 PM), 
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2018/06/21/engler-
apologizes-criticizing-nassar-victim-email/722315002/ [https://perma.cc/D4MN-
AL6S]. 
 248. Before settling the lawsuit with Associate Dean Ray Ku of Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law and following considerable outcry about the 
University’s backing of the dean against his associate dean, with detailed allegations 
of retaliation against Ku in the complaint, Case Western issued the following 
statement: “First, the university takes seriously all allegations of sexual misconduct.” 
See Brown, supra note 123. 
 249. See Kevin Kiley, Not Your University, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 19, 
2012), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/12/19/nyu-vote-no-confidence-
highlights-divergent-views-faculty-role-governance [https://perma.cc/R6JN-WJB4]. 
 250. See Jeff Goodwin, The War in Washington Square, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 
2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/opinion/the-war-at-nyu.html 
[https://perma.cc/2E32-Y7AY]. 
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Washington Post reporter to East Lansing for on-site investigatory 
work.251  
What is the result at MSU? There is a new president, but whether 
the culture of the University’s governance has a diagnosis for 
recovery, improvement, or entire reformation is questionable. The 
new President has announced initiatives, given reassurances, and 
labeled the previous administration flawed.252 Given the extent of the 
catastrophe, the statements are to be expected. Yet how likely might it 
be that the culture that maintained silence for years and then slowed 
the response as the facts became known will be transformed by a new 
university functionary, recruited from the presidency of another 
university? Could a deep cultural audit explain the resistance for years 
to see and report the threat to vulnerable female student athletes? 
Would the university that failed to protect the students be capable of 
performing one? The removal of a president who had been honored 
until she was present at the time the news broke, and for whom the 
worst charge voiced at the time of her resignation was that she just 
didn’t “get it[,]”253 may or may not correctly address where the failure 
lay. Skeptics are dubious. 
As these public spectacles erupt and produce aftershocks 
counted in years, the vote of no confidence remains the simultaneously 
dowdy and controverted primary outlet for the airing of internal 
organizational knowledge about nonsexual leader misconduct: the 
type of malfeasance or misfeasance that does not garner media 
interest. In local settings, the intensity of a gathering opposition to an 
administrator can become briefly a strong focus for local interest and 
opinion, spreading from faculty to a more general public. A siege 
involving city department heads in Hanford, California that became a 
regular topic in local news provides a good example of the kinds of 
issues that a vote of no confidence seeks to address with the forced 
exit of a leader.254 Though no confidence votes typically avoid a listing 
 
 251. E-mail from Susan Svrluga, Reporter, Wash. Post, to author (Jan. 25, 
2018, 10:45 EST) (on file with author) (advising author of scheduled trip to East 
Lansing on January 25, 2018). 
 252. See Stanley, supra note 242. 
 253. Matt Friedman, Column: Here’s What’s Wrong with Simon’s Resignation 
Letter, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Jan. 25, 2018, 5:08 PM), 
https://www.freep.com/story/opinion/contributors/2018/01/25/lou-anna-simon-
resignation-letter-msu/1067001001/ [https://perma.cc/JFY5-M7RF]. “The letter 
leaves a reader thinking that, when it comes to the sheer magnitude of the abuse crisis, 
that the ex-president didn’t ‘get it’ and has led a broken culture, leading to several PR 
missteps in recent days.” Id. 
 254. See Excerpts from ‘No Confidence’ Letter, supra note 81. 
494 Michigan State Law Review  2020 
of charges, where the entity seeking to oust a leader is a public service 
body that serves the citizenry, the group sometimes attempts to share 
a collective voice that produces a set of charges for public 
consumption.  
Fire departments and police departments, by their character, 
acquire a democratic connection with a local public. They expect 
commonality and solidarity if they publicize problems with which a 
general public could identify. In Hanford, California, city government 
employees produced a public bill of particulars against a city manager 
that typify the issues with which votes of no confidence are 
concerned.255 In a long-running scandal at Adelphi University that 
eventually resulted in official action dismissing the President and the 
board of trustees, faculty outcry helped bring significant corruption to 
public attention.256 The alleged offenses involved bypassing the 
faculty’s input, diverting resources away from the core mission of 
teaching and scholarship, and generally misusing power to benefit the 
president and to replace administrators with friends and at higher 
compensation.257 The scandalous diversion of resources and mission 
distortion was sufficiently understandable as ordinary corruption to 
attract media attention, which resulted in eventual action by higher 
state authority.  
Let us next consider the role of outside pressures as a possible 
source of useful social knowledge for society generally and for the 
epistemology within organizations exposed to public scandals. Does 
public exposure, with attendant mobilization of public interest and 
opinion formation, build a new framework of sustainable knowledge 
and vigilance? Does it advance the commitment of the citizens of a 
republican political order to develop and sustain active citizenship 
within organizations exposed to public scandal? Or do public 
accountings force only a sliver of knowledge into the controlled 
discourse of mission-bonded institutional life?  
Organizations today prefer control of voice from the ranks and 
suppression of internal input about dysfunction or wrongdoing. Can 
open scandal alter that calculation at the top, or might it only deepen 
the determination to control discourse, and provide a new context for 
control? Can it be a source for a renewed ethos in an organization 
situated in a nation with a democratic ethos and republican 
aspirations? What kind of epistemic work can scandal achieve? 
 
 255. See id. 
 256. See Lambert, supra note 209. 
 257. See LEWIS, supra note 216. 
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C. #MeToo: Social Knowledge in Search of a Voice 
With the emergence of the #MeToo movement and the 
movement’s airing of social knowledge revealed by the particulars of 
misconduct within these organizations, other monitoring mechanisms 
join the vote of no confidence as a means of seeking relief from 
ongoing wrongs. These mechanisms are evolving in the #MeToo 
context and have the capacity to command widespread, even national 
interest. The epistemological enterprise that the vote of no confidence 
has only partially fulfilled as a means of building knowledge within 
the organization is thus seemingly supplemented by an outside entry 
into the project. It gains momentum with lawsuits and public 
statements by student victims and the consequent required 
investigation by law enforcement previously unmotivated to root out 
sexual transgressions in local institutions. The lawsuits and the public 
statements convey an isolated and suppressed internal voice from the 
organization to the outside world. Though these public revelations and 
voices unavoidably enter into organizational channels as well as 
attract attentive listeners throughout the entity, they do not instantly 
transform the inner workings of the managerial approach to 
organizational self-understanding. The preference of the 
administrative hierarchy to control the sources that shape the 
organizational epistemology does not yield to the crisis of outside 
voices. Rather, the eruption of voices that cannot be silenced deepens 
institutional concern for control over public messaging, which also 
calls upon internal control as a go-to response. 
As major sexual scandals involving student molestations, faculty 
bodies, administrators, students, student newspapers, and boards of 
trustees inundate the narrative of institutional normality, the no-longer 
confident official narrators struggle to address the Epic Failure. The 
adequacy of the form by which epistemic democracy takes shape to 
absorb and make sense of the failure is unclear. An entity long devoted 
to restricting talk to prescribed channels while reposing epistemic 
authority in administrators invariably turns to administrators to make 
the kind of public comment that is meant to reestablish a sense of 
normalcy. Yet the intervention of politicized outside discussants—
enforcement agencies that impose fines, write damning reports, and 
charge administrators with crimes—is not necessarily a win for 
epistemic expansion pointing toward a shared moral community. 
Government agencies and their elected heads have political motives 
that can produce biased reports which are then received as 
authoritative by outsiders while insiders may give them lip service. 
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The findings may or may not be an acute or insightful account that 
would be produced by what might be made an ideal: an audit 
undertaken as an effort at psychological assessment of the dynamics 
that could produce extended silence about a sexual predator. 
Outside the context of civil penalties and government reports 
after investigation, prosecutors may play a role with criminal 
enforcement. Unfortunately, prosecutors have incentives to target 
administrators with political prosecutions,258 a move that may appear 
to be a useful form of accountability but may lack a sound basis in 
evidence. It may also exacerbate the internal tendency toward control 
over speech by risk-averse administrators. The end result may not be 
an advance of public knowledge about patterns of misconduct and 
organizational malfunction. The United States Department of 
Education is subject to crosscutting pressures that can affect the fact-
finding in a report about a university, pointing either toward a hard-
hitting exposé or a mild rebuke.  
Lawsuits offer a different venue for the isolated target of sexual 
harassment or sexually aggressive physical contact. They also have 
some potential appeal for less-fraught forms of mistreatment of faculty 
or violation of their rights to engage in open discourse in connection 
with their institutional governance role. The obstacles to success are 
considerable. The first problem is practical: finding legal 
representation for cases that may have low stakes. For faculty 
members concerned about threats to traditional academic values or to 
their own personal interests, stakes tend to be too low to make the 
lawsuit economically viable. A faculty member investigating the 
prospects for a lawsuit discovers that lawyers do not consider the case 
to have sufficient value to agree to a contingency fee arrangement. A 
faculty member, however certain of the injury, is reluctant to pay from 
often limited funds for an uncertain result.  
These considerations also vary with the nature of the problem. 
Courts do not necessarily provide an outlet for voices of individuals 
 
 258. I have published an op-ed arguing that the criminal prosecution of former 
Michigan State University President Lou Anna Kimsey Simon is political and is not 
well-based in facts or law. See Mae Kuykendall, Law Prof: Prosecuting Former MSU 
President in Larry Nassar Scandal is Unfair, DETROIT FREE PRESS (June 29, 2019, 
6:00 AM), https://www.freep.com/story/opinion/2019/06/29/nassar-msu-lou-anna-
simon/1514136001/ [https://perma.cc/PH8S-SPRA]; see also Judge Dismisses, supra 
note 106; Claim of Appeal of People of the State of Michigan, Michigan v. Simon, 
No. 19-20329-FH (Eaton County Cir. Ct. 2019), appeal docketed (Mich. Ct. App. 
June 29, 2020). 
 
 Looking for a Life Raft 497 
whose problem is not shared by the group and who must therefore 
pursue a solitary cause. Lawyers look for a clear and readily explained 
violation of a highly specific right and for an injury with quantifiable 
value. Unfairness or injustice alone is of minimal interest to a lawyer 
contemplating a contest with a large institutional target. Litigators 
consider how a jury would respond to a client’s claim of injury. The 
litigator is unsentimental. Does the potential client have a story of 
mistreatment that would garner the sympathetic interest of a jury? For 
a professor or other professional, much that occurs in a large 
institution is seamy, unfair, and unpleasant. Those there know it well. 
Communicating the institutional malaise to a jury or even a judge 
within the parameters of the requirements of pleading a legal injury, 
asserting a monetary loss, and presenting an appealing account of 
victimization worthy of repair is most often a near impossibility. The 
injury must be extreme, the facts outrageous, and the story eye-
popping. As much as the atmosphere in academic settings can become 
and often is toxic, it is a toxicity that eludes the understanding of the 
outside world.  
V. MOVING FORWARD AND NAVIGATING #METOO WITH VOTES OF 
NO CONFIDENCE 
The intervention of outsiders that follows an Epic Failure is 
episodic and the depth of coverage is often shallow, indifferent, or 
sensational. Unlike the vote of no confidence, such outsider 
interventions are not built on deep knowledge of the relevant facts of 
dysfunction within the organization. It is not clear how much they add 
to the voices that emanate from within the organization on the part of 
the victims of sexual predation. In certain respects, they feed 
unoriginal, unenlightening soundbites of outrage. They do not build a 
body of social knowledge for organizations, though they add to the 
historical record memorializing Epic Failures. In that sense, they 
provide the same messaging function of recurring votes of no 
confidence. Something is wrong in American nonprofit organizations.  
If media coverage of scandal provides an unstable combination 
of victim outcry and outsider inventions by the press and government 
bodies, might insider litigation, as took place as Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law, function as a means of forcing exits of bad 
leaders and thus a basis for organizational self-scrutiny through 
internal critique? In rare instances, a faculty member’s lawsuit against 
an administrator becomes an outlet for a formal exposure of wrongful 
sexual speech and conduct tolerated in the work setting. The obstacles 
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to open speech against administrators vary depending on the nature of 
the issue, with sexual misconduct most protected. The forms by which 
voice may emerge also vary with the nature of the issue and the fear 
of retaliation launched by the wrongdoer or the group. For all who 
wish to expose the abuse of power, the first barrier is the silencing 
message from entrenched rules protecting power itself and from a 
cultural disposition to avoid trouble and to disapprove of those who 
bring trouble. In the case of #MeToo, the barriers have been an 
unusually deep reticence about resisting male sexual power when it is 
paired with other claims to power. There has been a strong inheritance 
from a history that has been well recounted as part of the breaking of 
silence and that has been portrayed in popular culture, such as the 
cable program, Mad Men.  
A lawsuit by an individual seeking to act for the collective, with 
no buy-in or prescribed format, is unlikely. For deeply entrenched 
power that is structurally subversive of academic values as expressed 
in shared governance,259 the courts lack a template for intrusion into 
the internal politics of another institution. In the absence of legislation 
protecting university governance from the distortive influence of 
administrative aggrandizement, federal courts have no sense of any 
mandate or permission to referee university governance to prevent the 
creation of entrenched, unaccountable power. Even if what is called 
by some “the corporatization” of the university is alleged to harm the 
core mission of state-funded and/or controlled universities, the federal 
courts are simply not a venue for litigation and exposure of the un-
republican effects of trends in the university. The Republican 
Guarantee Clause of the Constitution has not provided a template for 
federal courts to claim a role in refereeing the dysfunctions of the 
nonprofit sector.260  
The #MeToo revelations pose a complication in discriminating 
a generalized culture problem from a problem caused by a leader. 
Indeed, the aftermath of the Michigan State sexual predation scandal 
 
 259. By comparison, for-profit corporations have a developed body of law that 
gives judges some mandate for review, however well, i.e., robust (or weak), one might 
adjudge the conventions by which judges are involved as corporate monitors. For 
information on this topic, see Mae Kuykendall, Good Greed: Do Activists 
Shareholders Force Internal Accountability in Profit Corporations? (on file with 
author), which provides a treatment of the incentive structure in profit corporations in 
comparison with the relative paucity of such incentives in non-profit corporations.  
 260. The potential of the undeveloped constitutional norm implicated in the 
Republican Guarantee Clause is beyond the scope of this Article. See supra note 33 
and accompanying text. 
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has shown the murkiness of the search for responsibility for a terrible 
harm to students that continued for years. The effort to hold the top 
leader—the former President—criminally responsible has foundered 
with a prosecution dismissed by a judge who found that no reasonable 
person could conclude that any evidence supported the crime 
charged—that of lying to the state police of Michigan.261 Because 
Michigan State has not produced all the documents that various parties 
have demanded, those who wish to assign criminal responsibility to 
the former President cling to the view that new and telling evidence 
lurks in the reams of paper passed between university administrators 
over the years of a man’s crime spree against the female athletes 
trusted to his care.262 The criminal law process, in its search for an 
individual who should bear the stigma of a harsh criminal penalty for 
the long failure of the university culture, lacks potential to build an 
epistemology of organizational dysfunction. The public drama—
perhaps a psychodrama—seeks a uniquely villainous individual to 
whom great moral blame can be assigned. Yet the effort by 
prosecutors, under pressure to yield satisfaction to a public lacking 
deep knowledge but convinced that moral evil must be avenged, is 
poorly designed to yield either organizational self-knowledge or 
deeper understanding of the pathologies of nonprofit entities. 
Communal truth goes begging once more as internal silence descends. 
The ongoing risk of an effort to exact such a price from administrators 
blocks the creation of new avenues within the entity for previously 
private knowledge to become embedded into the working 
understanding of the enterprise. Current administrators retreat to the 
hooded language of command and caution with a performance of 
humility and concern, former administrators subject to vilification 
remain quiet at risk of their liberty, and the institution evolves in the 
direction of secret proceedings against those whose conduct is brought 
into question.263 Developments relating to criminal proceedings 
 
 261. See Judge Dismisses, supra note 106; Claim of Appeal of People of the 
State of Michigan, Michigan v. Simon, No. 19-20329-FH (Eaton County Cir. Ct. 
2019), appeal docketed (Mich. Ct. App. June 29, 2020). 
 262. See Kate Wells, Here’s Why MSU is Keeping 6,000 Documents from 
Nassar Investigators, MICH. RADIO NPR (Dec. 25, 2019), 
https://www.michiganradio.org/post/here-s-why-msu-keeping-6000-documents-
nassar-investigators [https://perma.cc/JX63-94JW] (describing the basis in attorney-
client privilege and related insurance coverage concerns for MSU’s refusal to release 
certain emails and quoting a new trustee: “I just met with Rachael Denhollander, and 
she was saying the same thing: short of releasing these things, people are probably 
never going to be completely satisfied”). 
 263. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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against a former top leader are met with official statements explaining 
that comment is not possible.264 The proceedings of a criminal process, 
such as the preliminary hearing for former President Simon, may 
reveal information about the involvement and interactions of other 
administrators with the person charged, but the likelihood that press 
coverage would contribute to institutional knowledge is low. With the 
three-factor new speech performance—command language mixed 
with a posture of humility, the imposed silence of former 
administrators with the consequent loss of their social knowledge, and 
the turn to secret proceedings internal to the organization for entity 
self-protection against scandal—the norm of silence is fully restored, 
command logic and fear of open speech reinforced, and passivity 
given a new urgency. 
The vote of no confidence, by contrast, is muted when it happens 
and thereafter remitted to the narrative erasure of the institutional 
officials. In a no confidence vote, history is written by those who retain 
power and then pass it on to the like “guardians” of authorized 
institutional narrative. Nonetheless, for some who helped organize 
group voice and lodge a successful demand for a leader’s departure, a 
new understanding of their citizenship in the institution can arise. 
Despite mixed views among the group and even within one person, 
the exercise supports the development of “citizen” agency among 
some faculty members.265 The seeds of that new awareness can grow 
 
 264. Emily Guerrant, Statement on Charges Filed Against Former President, 
MICH. ST. U. (Nov. 20, 2018), https://msu.edu/ourcommitment/news/2018-11-20-
Simon-Charges-Statement.html [https://perma.cc/DK4B-XP9J]. 
 265. A faculty member who worked with others to bring a no confidence 
petition—despite being relatively pessimistic about the effect on her trust of others 
and the long-term impact of the effort, which caused a departure—concluded after 
discussion that the experience had some benefits in bringing about a greater 
connection with others and gaining knowledge: 
I am more pessimistic, I am less trusting. I did get some fabulous 
women friends out of it, and admiration for those women like you 
would not believe. I should have mentioned that earlier, cause that 
was the best thing for me personally, to come out of it, was the 
closer relationship with those women. I—I’m more—I’m way 
more likely to speak up on campus issues, and I have done ever 
since. And I never, you know I never bothered to even learn much 
about it before. And then I found myself, like people were asking 
me questions about my opinion on stuff. And that had—people I 
didn’t know before. And so, it changed other people’s view of me, 
it changed my own willingness to speak up. It changed my own 
desire to know stuff. 
Statement of Anonymous, Faculty Member, Regional State Univ. (June 20, 2019) 
[hereinafter Statement of Anonymous]. 
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or wither with time, die for lack of care, or find themselves among 
thorns that choke the tender roots of communal knowledge. The no 
confidence vote nonetheless provides, episodically and uncertainly, 
openings to a shared epistemic authority over the communal life and 
self-presentation of the entity.  
The relevance of the vote of no confidence to problems specific 
to ones perceived to have been brought to an organization by a leader 
leaves a possible doubt about its long-term efficacy. Aside from issues 
of specific individual memory and agency, those who bring such votes 
sometimes are unsure whether forcing a leader’s departure provides 
long-term relief from problematic trends that may have been present 
without regard to the specific issues making the leader unacceptable 
to the body. But they do not regret the no confidence effort, either with 
or without expulsion of the leader.266 The strengths of the vote are 
mixed with weaknesses. Because of the lack of a mature tradition, 
groups’ actions that depend on a type of volunteerism and 
improvisation are not reliable as a mechanism to address serious 
problems of leader misconduct, or cultural bad patterns. But they are 
a supplement, a safety valve, to the absence of good accountability 
practices in nonprofits. 
#MeToo is distinctively a problem of a culture that chooses 
silence in the face of certain kinds of abuse within the body. Whether 
they have direct knowledge or involvement with a specific instance of 
misconduct, leaders are not free of blame. Leaders bear responsibility 
for challenging the environment that led to #MeToo and creating an 
atmosphere that both discourages misconduct and moves group 
dynamics (reflective in part of the wider culture) away from a culture 
of silence around sexual misconduct or other abusive conduct harmful 
 
 266. Despite uncertainty about the long-term beneficial effect on an 
institution’s culture, there is reason to think that that forced exits of those who 
perpetrate or enable such misconduct can lead to more diverse replacements for them. 
See Audrey Carlsen et al., #MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful Men. Nearly Half of 
Their Replacements Are Women., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/23/us/metoo-replacements.html 
[https://perma.cc/GG73-EKVT]. Moreover, the sense that one person’s departure was 
critical to the institution can persist, even in the face of concerns over replacements. 
Michigan State University College of Law brought a vote of no confidence against 
the dean in 2006. He resigned in 2008. In my personal experience as a faculty member, 
despite a divisive period that followed with a new permanent dean, no faculty member 
who participated ever regretted the decision. But those most committed to the 
expulsion of the dean also viewed the trends within the law college in terms of faculty 
voice as negative. 
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to individuals’ dignity. A passive culture generally embedded in 
“command logic” is dangerous for larger reasons of citizenship 
development in society generally but especially dangerous for the 
project of building enterprise epistemology that begins to mesh the 
public speech of those with power with the hitherto segregated 
understandings of those without voice in the entity. Those without 
power have uniquely suffered from norms of silence in organizations. 
Those without voice have included persons with nominal stature but 
forms of knowledge gained from pathologies in organizational culture. 
Those lacking in all organizational power or standing have been 
without voice or protection. 
What about the profit motive? Though prone to drift and ethical 
laziness without something more to prick the conscience, profit 
organizations respond to a lever from investors over their pursuit of 
return. They gladly fall into patterns of comfortable, self-regarding 
managerial arrangements, but they face unhappy investors who 
demand accountability. In for-profit corporations, the matter of 
conscience, for the outside force, is money, and money does indeed 
talk. 
For universities, money also matters. But the imperative of 
fundraising, rather than investor return, changes what money can and 
does say to the recipients of funds. For the funding group or individual, 
“What’s in it for me” is not about financial return. As a result, the line 
between sources of money and a discipline over internal conscience is 
indirect at best and can be a source of pressure to protect wrongful 
conduct.267 Far from checking, it can fuel #MeToo bad conduct. That 
type of pressure is strongly associated with athletics in universities.268 
Those who contribute to the university and care about athletics can be 
sources of pressure to keep the athletes insulated from accountability. 
When scandal strikes, the outside force is the unorganized community 
at large, sometimes aroused, never empowered, and only on occasion 
 
 267. See Debra Nussbaum Cohen, Women in Jewish Fundraising Say 
Harassment is Pervasive, JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY (Feb. 26, 2018, 4:17 PM), 
https://www.jta.org/2018/02/26/news-opinion/united-states/for-women-in-jewish-
fundraising-harassment-is-an-occupational-hazard?utm_source=JTA% 
20Maropost&utm_campaign=JTA&utm_medium=email&mpweb=1161-3106-
207459 [https://perma.cc/V3EL-8PXM] (“At the end of the day, in the nonprofit 
world, donors hold nearly all the power. Most big-money donors are male.”).  
 268. See, e.g., Paula Lavigne & Nicole Noren, OTL: Michigan State Secrets 
Extend Far Beyond Larry Nassar Case, ESPN (Jan. 25, 2018), 
http://www.espn.com/espn/story/_/id/22214566/pattern-denial-inaction-information-
suppression-michigan-state-goes-larry-nassar-case-espn [https://perma.cc/4CXX-
VJ2X]. 
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capable of feeding and maintaining an atmosphere of crisis.269 It rarely 
is enough. 
CONCLUSION 
Problems of accountability and seriously bad behavior within the 
ranks or by leaders of nonprofit institutions are real and can persist 
over time without oversight. In the absence of adequate designs for 
regular accountability, gap fillers arise, but all have shortcomings. 
Each gap filler fails as a reliable check on bad behavior because it 
depends on improvisational responses, either by risk-averse or 
compromised insiders or by uninformed outsiders with mixed 
incentives, motives, and bona fides as narrators. There are no 
handbooks to guide groups considering a no confidence vote. Without 
guidance, the fear factor is a high barrier.270 Press coverage of 
universities and other nonprofits can be passive and then, if a scandal 
is broken, shallow and uncreative with stories that barely go beyond a 
headline new event. Criminal process comes after the damage has 
 
 269. Such an effect certainly occurred at the most salient of sexual scandals 
involving an abuse of authority by university staff. See, e.g., Steve Friess, Michigan 
State University Is Botching Its Reputation-Rehab, ATLANTIC (Mar. 19, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/03/michigan-state-university-
is-botching-its-reputation-rehab/555932/ [https://perma.cc/RL3P-SYY2]; see also, 
e.g., Michael Bérubé, At Penn State, a Bitter Reckoning, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/18/opinion/at-penn-state-a-bitter-reckoning.html 
[https://perma.cc/7E7E-938W]; Sarah Parvini, Paul Pringle & Harriet Ryan, Anger, 
Questions at USC After Second Medical School Dean Departs over Inappropriate 
Behavior, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2017, 8:20 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/ 
la-me-usc-varma-20171006-story.html [https://perma.cc/T9XK-ZD52]. But 
eruptions about allegations against individual athletes attract a mixed response, much 
of it preferring protection of star athletes for purposes of winning teams. See Walt 
Bogdanich, A Star Player Accused, and a Flawed Rape Investigation, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 16, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/04/16/sports/errors-in-
inquiry-on-rape-allegations-against-fsu-jameis-winston.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/ 
HU37-JFYT]. It is by no means clear that the #MeToo movement will fundamentally 
alter the storyline in alleged student-athlete sexual abuse of other students given the 
intense pressure by fans—the community—for winning teams. 
 270. See supra note 53 (“there is definitely fear if you want to talk about 
emotions, there’s definitely a deep-seated anxiety that people have about their 
situation should they speak up . . . it would be irrational to think you would be fired 
perhaps, for speaking up against the university president, but again, the university can 
make your life miserable in myriad ways if it wants to. I think people really fear being 
on the outside, right? More than anything, they [feel] like, well, you want to be in the 
good graces of the administration, of the president, of the provost, of the dean . . . I 
think that’s a realistic fear which people have, and as I say, it’s really no different than 
any other employee has in our capitalist society.”). 
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occurred and is subject to the political agenda, good faith, and 
competence of prosecutors. Individual litigation by a person targeted 
for mistreatment is rare because the resources to engage in a lawsuit 
against a well-funded institution are limited, and the courage to 
commence legal action is not common.  
The function of these gap fillers is not certain. Nonetheless, 
without them, serious misconduct would go unchecked, with harms to 
citizenship broadly conceived in the context of a democratic nation, to 
the mission of institutions conceived to serve the public interest, and 
to individuals left vulnerable to abusive uses of power, and corollary 
secretiveness. Rejected leaders would rule in the absence of support 
within the ranks for their leadership and inflict the damages associated 
with the inefficiency of lodging “command authority” in an individual 
whose undiluted rule destroys the beneficial effects of hierarchy and 
coordination that overcome the transaction costs of contracting in the 
free market.271 Rather than efficient coordination, the logic of 
command and obedience stymies the purpose of hierarchy as a means 
of embedding contract into institutional arrangements in service to a 
mission. Time with a leader who cannot achieve the advantages of 
hierarchy and coordination inflicts institutional loss and damages the 
organization as a source of models for civic capacity and engaged 
citizenship. 
The vote of no confidence enables groups to deploy their special 
understanding and knowledge of a bad leader to raise a claim for the 
person’s departure. The heart of the claim is that the leader no longer 
has followers and that consent by the group is an ongoing requirement 
for effective leadership. The claims in such votes also contain moral 
and ethical assertions about the type of conduct that is acceptable 
within an institution of mission-oriented undertakings. The voicing of 
norms of acceptable conduct is an important contribution of such 
group undertakings because it brings into light a value system that is 
an anchoring principle for the community—one which draws on 
common understandings about and supports the growth of a shared 
epistemic life within a genuine community. Votes of no confidence do 
not manage to create a public history of patterns of bad leader conduct 
or of methods by which unmanaged voice can arise but they permit 
periodic glimpses of organizational citizenship and signal that 
American nonprofits experience recurring leadership problems. Case 
 
 271. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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studies of such votes would preserve a greater store of public value 
from their periodic occurrence.272 
Though the press has brought to light problems not being 
addressed and scandals being covered up within organizations, 
journalism rarely creates public knowledge about systemic 
dysfunction. The press is better suited to revealing secrets than to 
providing deep knowledge of the entire pattern in which secrets are 
kept. The press’s limited function is to sound a fire bell alerting the 
public and the institution itself to sins of commission and omission. 
The result can be to bring a halt to misconduct, but the task of sorting 
out the inner world that fostered it is generally more than the press can 
achieve. 
Criminal process aimed at higher level officials has limited value 
as a knowledge-producing exercise. If not aimed at their own primary 
bad conduct or their direct personal proximity to the primary bad 
conduct, criminal prosecution of top officials may be more harmful 
than helpful, particularly if not well founded in law and facts. A charge 
based on an idea of what the person could have known, should have 
known, or speculatively did know cuts off the development and 
dissemination of institutional knowledge. Both the target of criminal 
prosecution and all others with a continuing official role or even a 
former role decline to speak in public or even in private. The target 
must not speak about the institutional flaws that led to the disaster. 
Before she was prosecuted, former President Simon testified to 
Congress and had the capacity to be a resource about the factors that 
may have enabled the long-running disaster of unchecked sexual 
abuse by a university doctor to take place at a great state university.  
Finally, litigation can be successful, as with the case of Associate 
Dean Ray Ku, who successfully sued an individual for his alleged 
primary bad conduct as well as the University for concealing it. Ku 
prevailed by reaching a settlement and placed his personal knowledge 
on the public record, circulating a narrative of the conduct in a legal 
complaint. Individual litigation, however, has very little chance of 
occurring. Further, in the nature of litigation, Ku has receded into 
public silence about the settlement and the case facts. Individual 
litigation cannot be considered to be a significant safeguard or source 
of widespread public knowledge of institutional patterns and 
problems. The Ku litigation does nonetheless provide a useful role 
model of civic courage by a person in such an institution where the 
 
 272. Case studies will be available in KUYKENDALL & MCKINNISS, supra note 
26. 
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leadership and the general culture are inadequate to expose and stop 
the alleged wrongdoing. Where that is the circumstance, particularly 
where sexual misconduct is alleged, the core mission and aspirational 
ethos of the institution can be damaged. Whether the #MeToo 
movement will alter the problem of institutional love of secrecy is not 
yet known.273 There is the concern that secrecy merely takes a new 
form of star chamber proceedings cloaked in administrative control 
and, once more, antithetical to the project of nourishing an institutional 
self-knowledge from the whole body. Institutional embrace of secrecy 
and management of internal voice die hard.  
The focus of the no confidence vote on leaders is not a cure for 
systemic problems in universities or other nonprofit enterprises. They 
occur against strong opposition from institutions, with efforts to 
portray them as forms of “mob rule” and forces for instability and 
reputational harm without benefit. Yet they will always be a potential 
factor in any setting that has not crushed a democratic ethos that leaves 
room for improvised group demand for a leader’s dismissal. The 
strange juxtaposition of Larry Summers, a respected American 
economist only thought by many colleagues to be unsuited as a leader 
of Harvard University, and Benito Mussolini, a fascist, dangerous 
leader to his nation and to world peace, demonstrates the function and 
staying power of the vote of no confidence. It occurs across 
dimensions of time and context and works against a misconceiving of 
hierarchy as undiluted command rather than coordination within a 
framework of consent and institutional citizenship. Despite the 
relative absence of documentation in institutional history and public 
records, the practice of no confidence votes signals an unspoken crisis 
in the culture of American nonprofit institutions. The atmospherics 
and performances of institutional command logic place our common 
citizenship and republican values in peril. 
Yet there is the capacity of a group to form outside the grip of a 
hierarchy set against open discourse. There is the oral tradition that 
persists without the need for permission. It cannot be talked into 
bureaucratic oblivion or “drowned by drops” in Dickens’s Court of 
Chancery.274 The vote of no confidence will not disappear. With roots 
 
 273. For an optimistic treatment of the overall social benefits of the 
movement, see Anna North, 7 Positive Changes That Have Come From the #MeToo 
Movement, VOX (Oct. 4, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/10 
/4/20852639/me-too-movement-sexual-harassment-law-2019 [https://perma.cc/ 
F5UL-KKGD] (noting that, among other positive changes, there is currently a trend 
by states to ban nondisclosure agreements about sexual harassment settlements). 
274.  See DICKENS, supra note 152, at 63. 
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in an improvisation in Great Britain’s Parliament, the idea of “no 
confidence” has a sturdy claim on mission-bonded groups that 
encounter corrupt or incompetent leaders. Despite the failures of 
groups to act altruistically to aid isolated victims of sexual 
misconduct, the moral core of the vote is nonetheless uniquely about 
institutional integrity. Where leaders and groups fail, other methods of 
redress yield some success, and, like the no confidence vote, provide 
glimpses of a crisis without providing the communal knowledge that 
is the epistemic ideal for a well-functioning organization. Only the 
vote achieves a small success in the quest for an enriched communal 
knowledge, as individuals “change [their] own willingness to speak 
up” and find themselves “meeting people they didn’t know before.”275 
 
 
 275.  See Statement of Anonymous, supra note 265. 
